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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on markets with imperfect compe-
tition, with implications for international economics.
The first essay presents an analytic solution framework applicable to a wide va-
riety of general equilibrium international trade models, including those of Krugman
(1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Melitz
(2003), in multi-location cases. For asymptotically power-law trade costs and in the
large-space limit, it is shown that there are parameter thresholds where the quali-
tative behavior of the model economy changes. In the case of the Krugman (1980)
model, the relevant parameter is closely related to the elasticity of substitution be-
tween different varieties of goods. The geographic reach of economic shocks changes
fundamentally when the elasticity crosses a critical threshold: below this point shocks
are felt even at long distances, while above it they remain local. The value of the
threshold depends on the approximate dimensionality of the spatial configuration.
This work bridges the gap between empirical work on international and intranational
trade, which frequently uses data sets involving large numbers of locations, and the
theoretical literature, which has analytically examined solutions to the relevant mod-
els with realistic trade costs only for the case of very few locations.
The second essay, coauthored with Glen Weyl, extends the incidence-based frame-
iii
work for the analysis of perfectly competitive markets to imperfect competition. We
show how, just as under perfect competition, a wide range of comparative statics
and policy analyses turn on simple properties of incidence, particularly the rate at
which unit taxes are passed through to consumer prices. We derive local and global
incidence properties, the division of surplus among deadweight loss, consumer sur-
plus and profits and show how these are linked to one another under a range of
imperfectly competitive environments. We then show how incidence functions as
a simplifying analytic and pedagogic device, an empirical sufficient statistic and a
key structural parameter in both classic and recently popular topics in industrial
economics including platforms, concession auctions, mergers, entry, price discrimi-
nation, product design, supply chains and advertising.
The third essay, coauthored with Gita Gopinath and Oleg Itskhoki, studies pric-
ing of durable goods by producers with market power. The durable nature of these
products makes their pricing differ from that of nondurables, since consumer de-
mand depends not only on prices today but also on their expectation of future prices.
When firms cannot commit to future prices, pass-through of cost shocks into prices
is incomplete and the adjustment is gradual. This is the case even when prices are
fully flexible and in environments where non-durable pricing would generate com-
plete pass-through. Prices are also sensitive to demand shocks and mark-ups are
pro-cyclical, in contrast to the case of cost shocks when mark-ups are countercyclical.
We present these results for the case of a monopolist, for oligopolistic competition
and for monopolistic competition.
iv
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INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I bring together three essays on markets with imperfect com-
petition, with implications for international economics. The first essay describes novel
solutions to most widely used models of international trade and highlights the impor-
tance of geography for transmission of economic shocks. The second essay provides
a new perspective on imperfectly competitive markets, with the pass-through rate
playing a central role. This approach streamlines welfare analysis in a wide variety of
economic models and makes it easier to asses robustness of the models’ predictions.
The third essay studies pricing of durable goods by producers with market power
who are unable to commit to high prices in the future. The essay analyzes the impli-
cations for business-cycle fluctuations and for cost pass-through (e.g., exchange rate
pass-through).
Chapter 1 presents an analytic solution framework applicable to a wide variety of
general equilibrium international trade models, including those of Krugman (1980),
Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Melitz (2003), in
multi-location cases. For asymptotically power-law trade costs and in the large-space
limit, it is shown that there are parameter thresholds where the qualitative behavior
of the model economy changes. In the case of the Krugman (1980) model, the relevant
parameter is closely related to the elasticity of substitution between different varieties
of goods. The geographic reach of economic shocks changes fundamentally when
the elasticity crosses a critical threshold: below this point shocks are felt even at long
1
distances, while above it they remain local. The value of the threshold depends on the
approximate dimensionality of the spatial configuration. This work bridges the gap
between empirical work on international and intranational trade, which frequently
uses data sets involving large numbers of locations, and the theoretical literature,
which has analytically examined solutions to the relevant models with realistic trade
costs only for the case of very few locations.
Chapter 2, coauthored with Glen Weyl, extends the incidence-based framework
for the analysis of perfectly competitive markets to imperfect competition. We show
how, just as under perfect competition, a wide range of comparative statics and policy
analyses turn on simple properties of incidence, particularly the rate at which unit
taxes are passed through to consumer prices. We derive local and global incidence
properties, the division of surplus among deadweight loss, consumer surplus and
profits and show how these are linked to one another under a range of imperfectly
competitive environments. We then show how incidence functions as a simplifying
analytic and pedagogic device, an empirical sufficient statistic and a key structural pa-
rameter in both classic and recently popular topics in industrial economics including
platforms, concession auctions, mergers, entry, price discrimination, product design,
supply chains and advertising.
Chapter 3, coauthored with Gita Gopinath and Oleg Itskhoki, studies pricing of
durable goods by producers with market power. Durable goods, of course, are known
to represent a large fraction of international trade flows. The durable nature of these
products makes their pricing differ from that of nondurables, since consumer de-
mand depends not only on prices today but also on their expectation of future prices.
When firms cannot commit to future prices, pass-through of cost shocks into prices is
incomplete and the adjustment is gradual. This is the case even when prices are fully
2
flexible and in environments where non-durable pricing would generate complete
pass-through. Prices are also sensitive to demand shocks and mark-ups are procycli-
cal, in contrast to the case of cost shocks when mark-ups are countercyclical. We
present these results for the case of a monopolist, for oligopolistic competition, and
for monopolistic competition. In the case of monopolistic competition studied here,
price dynamics is governed both by the dynamics of the stock of individual varieties
relative to the industry average and by the movements in the industry average, with
more weight placed on the latter.
3
1. TRADE AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN A SPATIALLY COMPLEX
WORLD
1.1 Introduction
Suppose that the cost of moving goods across the border between two large coun-
tries changes. How far from the border is the economic impact going to be felt? Do
such changes mostly affect regions close to the border, or do they significantly affect
even very distant locations? What if productivity increases or decreases in one of
these countries, due to an economic boom or due to a crisis? How is the productivity
change going to influence the level of welfare at various places in the other country?
To address these questions, it is natural to employ standard models of interna-
tional trade, such as Krugman (1980). The solutions to these models have been the-
oretically analyzed for some cases. If there are just two or three locations where
economic activity takes place, the analysis is very straightforward.1 To gain insight
into situations with many locations, the theoretical literature has used certain analyt-
ically convenient specifications of trade costs. Apart from zero trade costs, the most
popular assumption corresponds to ‘symmetric trade costs’, in which case the cost of
trade between any pair of distinct locations is the same.2 For example, the multilat-
1 Matsuyama (1999) solves interesting cases with as many as eight locations in the context of the
model introduced in Section 10.4 of Helpman and Krugman (1987), which adds a costlessly tradable
homogeneous good to Krugman (1980).
2 In the context of economic geography models (see Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999)), trade costs
4
eral trade policy analysis in Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud
(2005) builds on this assumption.
For the present purposes, however, it is necessary to work in a multi-location set-
ting with more realistic trade costs. Clearly, the transportation costs should grow
with distance. At the same time, they should reflect economies associated with ship-
ping goods over long distances: the per-unit-distance transportation cost should be a
decreasing function of distance.3
The empirical literature has been working with trade models at this level of real-
ism for a long time. In recent years, the multi-location aspect has become prominent
in empirical work. Due to falling costs of information technology, highly spatially
disaggregated data sets are becoming available for empirical analysis. For example,
Hillberry and Hummels (2008) study manufacturers’ shipments within the United
States with 5-digit zip code precision. Compared to previous studies this is a remark-
able improvement in spatial resolution.
The aim of the present work is to bridge the gap between the context in which
international trade models are used for empirical purposes and the context in which
they are studied theoretically. The article introduces a mathematical framework4 that
allows one to solve and analyze such trade models in basic cases involving many
locations. The model discussed extensively is that of Krugman (1980), but this choice
is made primarily for expositional purposes. The models of Anderson and van Win-
exponential in distance proved to be a convenient choice. In that specification, the per-unit-distance
trade cost is an increasing function of distance.
3 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and Hummels (2001) for empirical evidence on trade costs.
4 The framework makes extensive use of standard tools of functional analysis. In the concrete exam-
ples considered, these are Fourier series expansion and spherical harmonic expansion.
5
coop (2003)/Armington (1969)5 or Melitz (2003)6 have a very similar mathematical
structure,7 and only minor modifications are needed to write down their solutions
once the solutions to the Krugman model are known. The same is true8 for the Ricar-
dian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). This method may also be applied to many
other types of trade models, such as those in Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano,
and Robert-Nicoud (2005), where some factors of production are frequently assumed
to be mobile.
What are the practical lessons coming from the analysis? Take the Krugman
model as a representative example. Let the transportation costs be of the ‘iceberg’
type and asymptotically power-law9 in distance, as commonly assumed in the em-
pirical literature. Suppose also that the spatial geometry is very large and homo-
geneously populated. In this case, it turns out, the way general equilibrium effects
spread through the economy depends very strongly on the elasticity of substitution
between different varieties of goods. When the elasticity is above a certain thresh-
old, disturbances spread through the economy by short-distance interactions. With
the elasticity below the threshold, interactions between economic agents separated by
long distances play a crucial role. This fact has important consequences for various
quantities of interest.
Consider the case of two large neighboring countries mentioned earlier, and sup-
pose that the cost associated with moving goods across the border increases slightly.
5 The model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is an extension of Armington (1969) and Anderson
(1979).
6 For a derivation of the corresponding gravity equation, see Chaney (2008).
7 See Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodrı´guez-Clare (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of the similarities
between the models.
8 Also the portfolio choice model of Okawa and van Wincoop (2010) has the same property.
9 For a clarification of the term ‘asymptotically power-law,’ see Subsection 1.4.3.
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If the elasticity is above the threshold, only locations close to the border will be af-
fected. On the other side of the threshold, the change in the border cost significantly
affects all locations. In the case of a productivity change in one of the countries, the
situation is similar. With the elasticity above the threshold, the effects on the other
country will be restricted to a small region close to the border. For the elasticity below
the threshold, the consequences of the productivity change will be felt throughout the
other country.
At the empirical level, these observations imply that when fitting a similar trade
model to the data, the usual practice of assuming that all differentiated goods have
the same elasticity of substitution can lead to unexpectedly strong biases. The prop-
erties of the model are highly non-linear in the elasticity. Under such circumstances,
replacing heterogeneous goods with a single type of good having the average elas-
ticity is misleading. A related kind of bias arises when the elementary regions in
the data set do not have the same size. The range of goods contributing to the ob-
served trade flows strongly depends on the size of each elementary region, leading
to a spatial version of selection bias.
The existence of the threshold arises from the interplay between the economic
structure of the model and its spatial properties. It is not something that two-, three-,
or four-location cases would reveal. The value of the threshold is closely tied to the
dimensionality10 of the spatial configuration. If the spatial geometry is roughly one-
dimensional, meaning that economic agents are arranged along a line or a circle, the
threshold lies at one particular value for the elasticity of substitution. If economic
10 The value of the threshold is a linear function of the dimension of space. It is meaningful to consider
zero-dimensional cases as well. This corresponds to spatial configurations with just a few (point-like)
locations. Here the threshold condition translates into the requirement that the elasticity of substitution
be equal to 1. In this case the utility function becomes Cobb-Douglas, which is known to exhibit behavior
qualitatively different from the cases with elasticity of substitution greater than 1.
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agents are spread through a two-dimensional geometry, the value of the threshold is
significantly higher.
The solution method used here is easy to generalize to more complex situations.
For example, even though the focus of this work is on static models, dynamic models
can be solved in a similar fashion. Adding uncertainty does not represent an obstacle,
nor does the addition of differentiated goods with different elasticities of substitution.
The present work is related to two overlapping strands of economic11 research.
The first one is concerned with various aspects of empirical data on trade flows
(which are generally consistent with the ‘gravity model of trade’). The analysis here
is most closely connected to the four models of Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Melitz (2003), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)/Armington (1969), each
associated with empirical literature12 too rich to explicitly cite here.
The other strand of related research studies the influence of international borders
on trade flows (McCallum (1995), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Behrens, Er-
tur, and Koch (2007), Rossi-Hansberg (2005)) and on price fluctuations (Engel and
Rogers (1996), Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009), Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li
(forthcoming)).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section justifies the use of
functional analysis in later parts of the chapter by discussing various pitfalls associ-
ated with oversimplified approaches to multi-location economies. Section 1.3 reviews
the basics of the representative example of choice, namely the Krugman (1980) model.
11 There is also a close link to the physics literature; see Section 1.9 and Appendix A.11.
12 Recent examples include Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein
(2008). In the context of the present work, it is worth noting that Alvarez and Lucas (2007) establish
important properties of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model and provide a basis for solving the model
numerically. In addition, they solve the model analytically under the assumption of zero trade costs
and under the assumption of ‘symmetric trade costs’ mentioned earlier.
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It also introduces certain concepts needed to characterize the comparative statics of
the model. Section 1.4 provides a formal (first-order) solution to the model in the
form of an infinite series. Section 1.5 uses Fourier series expansion to derive an ex-
plicit general solution to the model in the case of a circular geometry. The resulting
formula is then used to analyze two special cases: the impact of changes in border
costs in Section 1.6, and changes in productivity in Section 1.7. Spherical geometry
is discussed in Section 1.8, with spherical harmonic expansion playing the role of the
Fourier series expansion. Section 1.9 considers the structure of higher-order terms.
1.2 Challenges of multi-location models
Differentiated goods models, as well as a certain type of Ricardian models, typi-
cally lead to large non-linear systems of equations.13 The number of equations as well
as the number of unknowns is proportional to the number of locations considered. It
is clearly desirable to be able to theoretically analyze the solutions to these models
even when there is a large number of locations. However, with realistic14 trade costs
this represents a technical challenge. Even after (log)-linearization the behavior of
the system is far from obvious. The equations become linear,15 which certainly is a
simplification, but the number of equations and unknowns is not reduced. To solve
13 An example may be found in Section 1.3, eq. (1.3), where each equation links the GDP at a particular
location to the GDP elsewhere in the economy. This particular case corresponds to Krugman (1980), but
analogous equations for other models have a very similar structure.
14 The term ‘realistic trade costs’ here refers to trade costs that increase with distance, but not as fast
as to make the per-unit-distance cost also increasing in distance, as discussed in the introduction.
15 For trade models where already the exact equations are linear, see Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ot-
taviano, and Robert-Nicoud (2005). An example is the ‘footloose capital’ model of Martin and Rogers
(1995).
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the system, one needs to invert a large matrix, which is an obstacle16 for the analytic
approach.
The present work uses methods of functional analysis to overcome this difficulty.
The reader may ask whether it is really necessary to go through all the calculations
in order to get a correct picture of the economic phenomena. Could it be that certain
shortcuts lead to qualitatively correct results? The rest of the section is devoted to two
such possibilities: working with a few locations only (Subsection 1.2.1) and neglecting
indirect general equilibrium interdependencies (Subsection 1.2.2).
1.2.1 Working with only a few locations
Let us look at a very simple situation in which economic activity takes place at
many different locations. In this example, the physical space is a continuous circle
parameterized by the angle q 2 ( p,p]. At every point, there are profit-maximizing
firms, each producing a different variety of differentiated goods. Only local inputs are
used in production. Consumer preferences for the varieties correspond to a constant
elasticity of substitution s 2 (1,•). Apart from the monopoly power of the firms,
all markets are competitive (and free of any distortions). Both the setup of the model
and the equilibrium involve a complete symmetry between different locations on the
circle. To have a concrete model in mind, one can consider, for example, the model of
Krugman (1980) or Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) /Armington (1969).
Trade costs are of the ‘iceberg’ type and are characterized by the function17 t (d) =
(1+ ad)r. When any good is transported over a distance d, a fraction (t (d)  1) /t (d)
16 Cramer’s rule, which expresses the solution to a linear system of equations in terms of a ratio of
determinants, is of little help here. The determinants are so complicated that they provide little insight
into the nature of the solution.
17 The qualitative conclusions of this subsection apply to any trade cost function t (d) that is ‘asymp-
totically power-law,’ in the sense of Subsection 1.4.3.
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Figure 1.1: (a) The continuous spatial configuration and (b) its discrete approximation.
will be lost. Distance is measured along the circle, and is proportional to the angle
between the two locations. The parameters a and r are positive exogenously-given
constants.
These assumptions are enough to determine the share of expenditures a consumer
at location q spends on products from any given region. For concreteness, consider
the consumer located in the middle of the lower shaded angle in Fig. 1.1a and calcu-
late the share s of expenditures on goods from the upper shaded angle in the figure.
A short calculation reveals that
s =
paR  1
1+ paR  (1+ paR)r(s 1)
0@1  7
8
 
1+ paR
1+ 78paR
!r(s 1)1A ,
where R is the radius of the circle. In the large-radius limit, the expression for s
simplifies.
11
lim
R!• s =
8><>: 1 
  7
8
 1 r(s 1) for r (s  1) < 1,
0 for r (s  1) > 1.
(1.1)
Now suppose that we approximate the circle with a small and fixed number of
locations, say eight, as in Fig. 1.1b. If the radius of the circle is very large, consumers
at x1 find varieties produced at other locations very expensive relative to those from
x1. They will spend almost all of their income on local products. As a result, the
counterpart18 of s approaches zero as R! • even when r (s  1) < 1.
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to qualitatively
reproduce the correct result (1.1) with a finite and fixed number of locations.19 It
is worth emphasizing that the word ‘fixed’ is important in the last sentence. The
behavior of the continuous model may be reproduced with a discrete one. To do that,
one has to increase the number of locations properly with the radius of the circle
when taking the large-space limit. In other words, there is nothing special about
working with a continuum of locations from the beginning. What is responsible for
the failure of the few-location model is not the discreteness of space, but the fact that
additional locations are not added when the radius of the circle is increased.
18 In the discrete approximation, there is just one location, namely x5, at the position of the upper
shaded angle of the continuous case. For this reason, the discrete counterpart of s is the share of
expenditures of consumers at x1 on products from x5.
19 The reader may ask whether it is possible to make the few-location model correctly reproduce the
qualitative behavior of the continuous model by a simple modification of its assumptions. What if we
assume that even goods produced and consumed at the same location have to travel a certain distance,
say one-half of the spacing between neighboring locations? It turns out that such assumption does not
lead to the desired outcome. It is true that for r (s  1) < 1 the counterpart of s will be non-zero in the
large-space limit. However, under the same assumption the limit of the counterpart of s remains large
even in the case r (s  1) > 1. Moreover, the magnitude of the deviation from (1.1) depends strongly
on the arbitrary choice of the number of locations in the discrete model. The departure from the correct
value is attenuated only if the number of locations is chosen to be large, contradicting the purpose of
the approximation.
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1.2.2 Neglecting changes in general equilibrium effects
We have seen that one simple way of avoiding algebraic complications, namely
working with only a few locations, leads to an impasse. Another way to circum-
vent the difficulty is to neglect general equilibrium feedback effects when performing
comparative statics exercises. In principle, such approach could yield qualitatively
correct results. It turns out, however, that even the signs of the resulting quantities
may be incorrect, as discussed in Appendix A.1.
To answer the questions raised in the introduction, it is necessary to work with a
model involving many locations and to incorporate all general equilibrium effects.
1.3 The Krugman model
1.3.1 Production and transportation
Consider the static model20 of trade described in Krugman (1980). The spatial
geometry consists of N locations xi with i = 1, 2, ..,N. There is a single factor of pro-
duction, referred to as labor. Labor markets are competitive, and labor is inelastically
supplied. Its endowment at location xi will be denoted L(xi). There is a continuum
of varieties of goods, each produced by a different monopolistically competitive firm
at a single location. Individual varieties are labeled by w 2 W, where W is the vari-
ety space. To produce an amount q of all varieties between w and w + dw, for some
infinitesimal measure dw of varieties, the firms need F dw units of labor to cover
their fixed overhead costs, and additional q dw units of labor to cover their variable
costs. Note that this choice corresponds to a particular normalization of the measure
of quantity of the goods.
20 The introductory exposition closely follows that of Eaton and Kortum (in progress). The reader may
consult this reference for more detail on the derivation of the main equations of the model.
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The model uses the ‘iceberg’ specification of trade costs. The goods can be trans-
ported from any location xi to any location xj, but a fraction
⇣
t(xi ,xj)   1
⌘
/t(xi ,xj)
will be lost on the way, making the total marginal cost t(xi ,xj) times higher than the
manufacturing marginal cost. For obvious reasons, t(xi ,xj)   1.
Entry into the industry is free. Consequently, the firms earn zero profits. Given
this assumption, the reader can easily verify that if the elasticity of substitution be-
tween any two varieties is s, the firm will find it optimal to spend s  1 times more on
variable costs than on fixed costs. As a result, the total measure of varieties produced
at xi is H(xi) =
1
sF L(xi) in this case.
1.3.2 Consumption
The per-capita consumer utility at a particular location is given by
u =
✓Z
q
s 1
s (w) dw
◆ s
s 1
,
where q (w) represents the per capita consumption of variety w, s > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution, and the integral is over all varieties available. The per capita spending
p (w) q (w) on variety w is given by
p (w) q (w) =
✓
p (w)
P
◆1 s
c.
Here p (w) denotes the price of variety w, the per capita consumption expenditure is
c =
R
p (w) q (w) dw, and the local price index P is defined as
P =
✓Z
p1 s (w) dw
◆ 1
1 s
.
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To avoid terminological complications, each person is endowed with one unit of labor,
and per capita and per unit labor quantities coincide. GDP per capita will be denoted
y, to be consistent with the notation for consumption per capita.
1.3.3 Closing the model
The GDP21 y(xi)L(xi) at location xi is equal to the revenue its firms collect from the
measure 1sF L(xi) of varieties they produce,
y(xi) =
1
sF
N
Â
j=1
 p(xi ,xj)
P(xj)
!1 s
c(xj)L(xj).
Here p(xi ,xj) is the price firms from xi charge at xj. Setting the markup over total
marginal cost p(xi ,xj)/
⇣
t(xi ,xj)y(xi)
⌘
to its optimal value of s/ (s  1) and imposing
budget constraints y(xj) = c(xj), the equation becomes
y(xi) =
1
sF
✓
s
s  1
◆1 s N
Â
j=1
 y(xi)t(xi ,xj)
P(xj)
!1 s
y(xj)L(xj),
with the price index given as
P(xj) =
s
s  1
 
1
sFÂk
t1 s
(xk ,xj)
y1 s(xk) L(xk)
! 1
1 s
. (1.2)
Combining the last two equations yields
ys(xi) =
N
Â
j=1
t1 s
(xi ,xj)
y(xj)L(xj)
ÂNk=1 t
1 s
(xk ,xj)
y1 s(xk) L(xk)
. (1.3)
21 Note that local wages are equal to the local GDP per capita, because labor is the only factor of
production and firms earn zero profits.
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This is a set of N equations that must hold in equilibrium, and together they
determine the economic outcome. The choice of units in which y is measured is
arbitrary.22 We are free to pick a nume´raire good and normalize its price to 1. (In the
subsequent discussion, a different, more abstract condition will be imposed, in order
to keep the calculations simple.)
1.3.4 Comparative statics - part 1
The rest of the section discusses the comparative statics of the Krugman model,
motivates the definition of the GDP propagator, and establishes its basic properties.
Readers interested primarily in the concrete results, not in their detailed derivation,
may proceed to Section 1.4.
Consider a small change in trade costs,23 with the goal of evaluating the induced
change in GDP at different places. For ease of notation, denote T(xi ,xj) ⌘ t1 s(xi ,xj). This
quantity is sometimes referred to as freeness of trade. The GDP equations are
y(xi) =
0@ NÂ
j=1
T(xi ,xj)y(xj)L(xj)
ÂNk=1 T(xk ,xj)y
1 s
(xk)
L(xk)
1A 1s . (1.4)
Suppose we know y corresponding to some particular T. We are interested in the
change y ! y + dy caused by a change T ! T + dT. Here y ⌘
⇣
y(x1), ..., y(xN)
⌘0
and T is a collection of T(xi ,xj). The standard prescription for deriving first-order
comparative statics is to differentiate both sides of the equation, leading to
22 The set of equations (1.3) is homogeneous in y.
23 The general method employed in this work is elucidated using simple examples in Appendix A.2.
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dy(xi) =
N
Â
i=1
G(xi ,xj)L(xj)dy(xj) +
N
Â
i=1
N
Â
j=1
N
Â
k=1
H(xi ,xj,xk)dT(xj,xk). (1.5)
Here L(xj)G(xi ,xj) is the derivative of the right-hand side of the ith equation (1.4)
with respect to y(xj), and H(xi ,xj,xk) is its derivative with respect to T(xj,xk). In matrix
notation, the set of equations above becomes
(1  GLN) dy =
N
Â
j=1
N
Â
k=1
H(xj,xk)dT(xj,xk), (1.6)
with the N ⇥ N matrix G containing elements G(xi ,xj), and with the N-dimensional
vectors H(xj,xk) ⌘
⇣
H(x1,xj,xk), ...,H(xN ,xj,xk)
⌘0
. The diagonal N ⇥ N matrix LN ⌘
diag
⇣
L(x1), ..., L(xN)
⌘
contains the labor endowments of individual locations on the
diagonal. The elements of all of these objects can be computed explicitly if y is
known.
The next standard step is to use these equations to express dy in terms of dT(xj,xk).
To achieve that, one may be tempted to multiply both sides of (1.6) by (1  GLN) 1 ,
but the situation requires more caution because such matrix is not well-defined. The
homogeneity of eq. (1.3) implies24 that GLN has one eigenvalue equal to 1, associated
with the eigenvector y: GLNy = y. Consequently, 1 GLN has a vanishing eigenvalue
and cannot be inverted. For this reason, let us pause here to discuss other properties
of the matrix G, which will enable us to complete the calculation.
24 If eq. (1.4) is satisfied for some vector y, it must also be satisfied for gy, where g is a positive
number. Replacing y by gy in (1.4), differentiating with respect to g, and setting g = 1 leads to the
conclusion that GLNy = y.
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1.3.5 The GDP propagator
Performing the differentiation of the right-hand side of (1.4), G(xi ,xj) can be written
as a sum of two parts,
G(xi ,xj) = Gc,(xi ,xj) + Gp,(xi ,xj), (1.7)
with
Gc,(xi ,xj) ⌘
1
s
y1 s(xi)
T(xi ,xj)
ÂNk=1 T(xk ,xj)y
1 s
(xk)
L(xk)
,
Gp,(xi ,xj) ⌘
s  1
s
y1 s(xi) y
 s
(xj)
N
Â
l=1
T(xi ,xl)y(xl)T(xj,xl)L(xl)⇣
ÂNk=1 T(xk ,xl)y
1 s
(xk)
L(xk)
⌘2
= s (s  1) 1
y(xj)
N
Â
l=1
Gc,(xi ,xl)Gc,(xj,xl)y(xl)L(xl).
The matrix G will be referred to as the GDP propagator,25 and Gc and Gp are its
‘consumption part’ and ‘production part’, respectively. These objects capture the
strength of GDP spillovers from one location to another.
The intuition behind these expressions is simple. The GDP at location xj will
affect the GDP at xi through two different channels. The first channel relates to the
consumption at xj, and corresponds to Gc,(xi ,xj). Location xi is influenced by the
consumption at xj since firms from xi have customers there. If GDP increases at xj,
the firms will receive more revenue. This is the reason why Gc,(xi ,xj) is positive. The
second channel is more closely related to the production at xj, and is captured by
Gp,(xi ,xj). Firms from xi compete with firms from xj for customers elsewhere. Higher
y(xj) means more expensive products from xj, raising the revenue that firms from
25 The algebraic framework used in this chapter is an adaptation of the technique of Feynman dia-
grams, which has become ubiquitous in physics. The term ‘propagator’ is borrowed from that literature.
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xi receive at xl . This is again a positive effect, translating into a positive Gp,(xi ,xj).
The first effect is direct, so Gc,(xi ,xj) contains T(xi ,xj). The second effect is indirect,
mediated through a third location xl . For this reason Gp,(xi ,xj) contains T(xi ,xl)T(xj,xl)
with l being summed over. The presence of the Ts in the denominators is related
to the ‘multilateral resistance’ terms in the corresponding ‘gravity equation’, whose
importance has been emphasized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Notice that if trade costs are not symmetric (in the sense that T(xi ,xj) 6= T(xj,xi)),
then the matrix G(xi ,xj) will not in general be symmetric. (Even if y(xi) is the same ev-
erywhere and Gp,(xi ,xj) is symmetric as a consequence, the consumption part Gc,(xj,xi)
of the propagator can still be asymmetric.)
The N-dimensional vector space to which y belongs can be thought of as a one-
dimensional space spanned by y times an (N   1)-dimensional vector space YˆN 1
whose elements yˆ satisfy yTLNyˆ = 0. We already know that the action of GLN pre-
serves the one dimensional space: GLNy = y. But it is also true26 that the (N   1)-
dimensional space YˆN 1 is preserved by the action of this matrix. (In other words, if
yTLNyˆ = 0, then also yTLN (GLNyˆ) = 0.)
Because both the space YˆN 1 and the space spanned by the vector y are preserved
by the action of GLN , the matrix GLN may be written as
GLN = Pspan{y}GLNPspan{y} + PYˆN 1GLNPYˆN 1 = Pspan{y} + PYˆN 1GLNPYˆN 1 , (1.8)
where Pspan{y} is the projector onto the one-dimensional space generated by the vector
y, and PYˆN 1 is the projector onto YˆN 1.
26 To verify this property, it is sufficient to show that GTLNy = ay for some constant a. Direct evalu-
ation using the expressions for Gc,(xi ,xj) and Gp,(xi ,xj) above confirms that this is indeed the case with
a = 1, i.e. that GTLNy = y.
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1.3.6 Comparative statics - part 2
Now let us go back to the discussion of (1.6). We have not imposed any normal-
ization condition on y+ dy yet. The international trade literature typically chooses a
definite good to serve as nume´raire, and normalizes its price to 1. Such choice would
be inconvenient in the present context. To take advantage of the decomposition (1.8),
we need to impose the more abstract27 condition yTLNdy = 0, i.e. dy 2 YˆN 1. It fol-
lows that GLNdy 2 YˆN 1, and as a result of (1.6), also that ÂNj=1ÂNk=1 H(xj,xk)dT(xj,xk) 2
YˆN 1. Thanks to these properties, the equation (1.6) can be written as
PYˆN 1 (1  GLN) PYˆN 1dy =
N
Â
j=1
N
Â
k=1
H(xj,xk)dT(xj,xk).
Since dy and the right-hand side of this equation belong to YˆN 1, and since the prod-
uct PYˆN 1 (1  GLN) PYˆN 1 is an operator on YˆN 1, we can restrict attention to that
space and conclude that28
dy =
⇣
PYˆN 1 (1  GLN) PYˆN 1
⌘ 1 N
Â
j=1
N
Â
k=1
H(xj,xk)dT(xj,xk). (1.9)
Here, of course, the inversion is performed in YˆN 1, not in the full N-dimensional
space. As discussed in Subsection 1.3.4, GLN has one eigenvalue equal to 1 and
associated with the eigenvector y. Stability of the system implies that all other eigen-
values are smaller than 1 in absolute value. For this reason PYˆN 1 (1  GLN) PYˆN 1 is
invertible in YˆN 1, and the final expression for dy is well-defined.
27 If all elements of the vector y have the same magnitude, this condition translates into the require-
ment that the total (nominal) GDP remain fixed as the trade costs change. More generally, the quantity
kept fixed is a weighted average of the GDP at individual locations. The same condition may be inter-
preted in terms of wages, since these are identically equal to the GDP per capita in this model.
28 The continuous-space analog of this equation is the relation (1.21) in Section 1.4.
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1.4 The Krugman model in continuous space
While introductory exposition is simpler with a finite number of locations, the ex-
amples discussed below will involve continuous space. Retaining a fine discrete grid
in the model would not lead to any additional economic insights, and the continuous-
space examples provide greater algebraic convenience. The equations of the model
may easily be translated into continuum notation.
Let the spatial geometry be a continuous space with points parameterized by a
vector of coordinates x. In general, the space can be curved. The coordinates are
chosen arbitrarily. Denote the labor element29 at location x by dL (x) . The equation
(1.3) for GDP becomes
ys (x) =
Z T (x, x0) y (x0)R
T (x00, x0) y1 s (x00) dL (x00)
dL
 
x0
 
, (1.10)
where T (x, x0) ⌘ t1 s (x, x0) . The degree of interdependence between different loca-
tions is captured by the GDP propagator30 defined31 as
G
 
x, x0
 
= Gc
 
x, x0
 
+ Gp
 
x, x0
 
, (1.11)
29 To follow the discussion, the reader does not have to be familiar with various concepts of differential
geometry. Nevertheless, they are useful for expressing dL (x) in more explicit terms. The distances in
the physical space are captured by a definite metric tensor whose values depend on x. Denoting its
determinant g (x) , the endowment of labor dL (x) in a particular coordinate element dx equals
p
g (x)dx
times the labor density.
30 As mentioned in Subsection 1.3.5, the term ‘propagator’ comes from related physics literature.
31 For the discrete analog of this definition, see eq. (1.7).
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with the ‘consumption part’
Gc
 
x, x0
 
=
1
s
y1 s (x) T (x, x0)R
y1 s (x00) T (x00, x0) dL (x00)
, (1.12)
and the ‘production part’
Gp
 
x, x0
 
= s (s  1) 1
y (x0)
Z
Gc
 
x, x00
 
Gc
 
x0, x00
 
y
 
x00
 
dL
 
x00
 
. (1.13)
Intuitively, the GDP propagator G (x, x0) measures how strongly an infinitesimal
change in GDP at x0 influences the GDP at x. The consumption part reflects the fact
that if consumption at x0 increases, this will directly increase the sales of firms from
x. The production part arises from the fact that increased GDP (wages) at x0 make it
easier for firms from x to compete in other markets.32
The GDP propagator satisfies the conditions33
y (x) =
Z
G
 
x, x0
 
y
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
, y (x) =
Z
G
 
x0, x
 
y
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
. (1.14)
The expression for the price index analogous to (1.2) is now
P (x) =
s  1
s
✓
1
sF
Z
T
 
x0, x
 
y1 s
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 ◆ 11 s
. (1.15)
32 This intuition is discussed in more detail in Subsection 1.3.5.
33 These are analogous to the conditions y = GLNy and y = GTLNy of Subsection 1.3.5.
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1.4.1 Change in the solution in response to a small change in trade costs
Now suppose that the trade costs change34 so that
T
 
x, x0
 !  1  kb  x, x0   T  x, x0  . (1.16)
The small but finite parameter k sets the size of the change, while b (x, x0) captures the
geometric aspects of the change. For example, if the change under consideration was
the introduction of a (proportional) cost of crossing a border, then b (x, x0) could be
set to one whenever x and x0 were separated by the border, and set to zero otherwise.
The GDP equation (1.10) will now take the form
ys (x) =
Z
(1  kb (x, x0)) T (x, x0) y (x0)R
(1  kb (x00, x0)) T (x00, x0) y1 s (x00) dL (x00)dL
 
x0
 
. (1.17)
Let us expand the new GDP values in a Taylor series
y (x) = y0 (x) + ky1 (x) + k2y2 (x) + ...
Here y0 (x) represents the GDP before the change. The functions y1, y2, y3, ... are
required to be orthogonal35 to y0, in the sense that
R
yn (x) y0 (x) dL (x) = 0 for n > 0.
These conditions are imposed (instead of fixing the price of a nume´raire good) in
order to keep the calculations simple. The rationale behind this choice is explained
34 The change in trade costs corresponding to (1.16) is analogous to the change T ! T+ dT considered
in the discrete-space case of Subsection 1.3.4. Besides working in continuous space, the difference here
is that the change does not have to be infinitesimal.
35 The discrete-space analog of these conditions would be yT0 LNyn = 0 for n > 0. The space of functions
considered here is the space of real square-integrable functions with measure dL (x) , i.e. the space of
functions f for which
R
f 2 (x) dL (x) is finite. This space is usually denoted L2; see, for example, Section
15.1 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) for its formal definition. The inner product of functions f and
g is defined as
R
f (x) g (x) dL (x) .
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in Subsection 1.3.6.
The main focus of this work is on the first-order change y1 (x) . The higher-order
terms yn, n   2, may be computed in an analogous way. They are the subject of
Section 1.9. An equation for the first-order term y1 (x) can be obtained by plugging
the Taylor expansion into the GDP equation and comparing terms of the first-order
in k. The details of the calculation can be found in Appendix A.3. The result is
y1 (x) =
Z
G
 
x, x0
 
y1
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
+
Z
B
 
x, x0
 
y0
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
, (1.18)
with the ‘primary impact function’ B (x, x0) defined as
B
 
x, x0
 
=  b  x, x0 Gc  x, x0 + sGc  x, x0  Z b  x00, x0 Gc  x00, x0  dL  x00  . (1.19)
Alternatively, using an operator notation, this is
y1 (x) = (Gy1) (x) + (By0) (x) .
In general, for a given function F (x, x0) the action of the corresponding operator F on
a function f will be defined36 as
(F f ) (x) =
Z
F
 
x, x0
 
f
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
. (1.20)
Since y1 is orthogonal to y0, and, due to (1.14), so is Gy1, it must be that By0 is
36 Note that the measure dL (x0) used here corresponds to the labor endowment. The discrete-space
analog would be multiplication by the matrix FLN .
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orthogonal to y0 as well. The equation for y1 (x) can be iterated indefinitely, giving37
y1 (x) =
•
Â
n=0
(GnBy0) (x) . (1.21)
Here we used the identity38 limn!• Gny1 = 0. For later convenience, let us define
also the ‘general equilibrium GDP propagator’39 Gg (x, x0) as the integral kernel of
the operator
Gg =  
•
Â
n=0
Gn+1. (1.22)
In terms of Gg, the result (1.21) becomes
y1 (x) =
  
1+ Gg
 
By0
 
(x) .
Another useful expression for y1 may obtained using the identity B =   (1  sGc) G˜c,
which follows from the definition (1.19) of B. Here G˜c is the integral operator corre-
sponding to
G˜c
 
x, x0
  ⌘ Gc  x, x0  b  x, x0  . (1.23)
37 The discrete-space counterpart of this equation is the relation (1.9). When interpreting the result
(1.21) for y1, it is useful to compare it to the expression (A.3) in Appendix A.2, which applies to the case
of two endogenous variables. Obviously, the function By0 plays the role of the vector v. It is an initial
effect of the change in k. Just like in (A.3), this effect has an infinite number of echoes, described by the
terms GnBy0 with positive n.
38 This follows from the fact that any Gny1 is orthogonal to y0, thanks to (1.14), and from the fact
that all eigenvalues of G are smaller than 1 in absolute value, except for the one corresponding to the
eigenfunction y0.
39 This object captures not only the direct interdependencies, but also all the general equilibrium
feedback effects.
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Denoting also
g˜c (x) ⌘
Z
G˜c
 
x, x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
, (1.24)
we have
y1
y0
=    1+ Gg  (1  sGc) g˜c. (1.25)
For future convenience, let us also introduce the notation
gˆc (x) ⌘
Z
G˜c
 
x0, x
 
dL
 
x0
 
. (1.26)
Of course, if Gc (x, x0) b (x, x0) = Gc (x0, x) b (x0, x) in general, then gˆc (x) = g˜c (x) .
The intuition behind the expression (1.19) for the primary impact function B (x, x0)
is as follows. If a new trade barrier, say a border, is introduced between x and x0,
such change is captured by positive b (x, x0) . There will be two immediate effects on
x. First, with the new barrier, firms from x will lose some part of their revenues from
x0. This lowers y (x) and is consistent with the first term in (1.19) being negative.
Second, it will be easier for these firms to compete with firms from x00 in the market
at x0, as long as b (x00, x0) is also positive. This effect increases y (x). For this reason,
the second term in (1.19) is positive.
1.4.2 Welfare
The welfare of individual agents is characterized by the local GDP per capita
adjusted for the local price index, y(P) (x) ⌘ y (x) /P (x), where the price index
P (x) is given by (1.15) with the replacement T (x0, x) ! (1  kb (x0, x)) T (x0, x) . Ap-
pendix A.4 shows that the price-index-adjusted analog of y1 (x) , namely y
(P)
1 (x) ⌘
limk!0
⇣
y(P) (x)  y(P)0 (x)
⌘
/k, is given by
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y(P)1 (x)
y(P)0 (x)
=
y1 (x)
y0 (x)
  s
Z
Gc
 
x0, x
  y1 (x0)
y0 (x0)
dL
 
x0
   s
s  1 gˆc (x) , (1.27)
or, in operator notation,
y(P)1
y(P)0
= (1  sGc) y1y0  
s
s  1 gˆc. (1.28)
Here gˆc is the function defined in (1.26).
1.4.3 Asymptotically power-law transportation costs
Before specializing to concrete economic situations, let us pause here to clarify the
choice of trade cost functions that will be used in the rest of the chapter. The Krugman
model uses the ‘iceberg’ form of trade costs, characterized by the quantity t (x, x0) .
In principle, the trade costs can depend on many characteristics of location pairs.
For example, they are likely to be lower when the two locations share a common
language. The present work will abstract from many such possibilities. Instead, the
trade costs will take the simple form
t
 
x, x0
 
= t˜ (d) b˜
 
x, x0
 
.
The first factor t˜ (d) corresponds to transportation costs, and depends only on the
distance d between x and x0. The second factor b˜ (x, x0) represents additional costs,
such as the cost of crossing international borders. In baseline cases without any
additional trade costs, b˜ (x, x0) will be set to 1.
It is common in the empirical literature40 to assume that for large d, t˜ (d) is well
40 See, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Note also that the model of Chaney (2011a)
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approximated by a power law:
t˜ (d) ⇡ (ad)r ,
with r > 0 and a > 0. Of course, t˜ (d) cannot be exactly equal to (ad)r at short
distances. Otherwise the obvious restriction t (d)   1 would be violated41 for small
enough d. There are several convenient functional forms that ensure the t   1 re-
striction is satisfied while preserving the power-law behavior at long distances, for
example
 
1+ a2d2
  r
2 , (1+ ad)r , or 1+ (ad)r . The present article works with finite
geometries, such as a circle or a sphere of radius R. In these cases, closely related
functional forms
⇣
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 d2R
⌘ r
2 ,
⇣
1+ 2aR sin d2R
⌘r
, and 1+
⇣
aR sin dR
⌘r
pro-
vide a greater algebraic convenience. At short distances, these coincide with the
previous three, while at long distances they still have the same order of magnitude.
For future purposes, let us mention one important property of the six functional
forms above. Define the function tˆ (d) as
tˆ (d) ⌘
8><>: 1 for d 
1
a ,
(ad)r for d   1a .
It is true that for each of the six functional forms t˜ (d) considered above, there exist42
(with matching frictions similar to the Chaney (2011b) model of trade networks) provides a theoreti-
cal justification for the empirical values of the power-law exponent in the international trade gravity
equation.
41 Unless b˜ (x, x0) is chosen to precisely compensate for the small magnitude of t˜ (d) whenever x and
x0 are close to each other.
42 Concrete values of these coefficients {al , ah} that can be used for the functional forms 
1+ a2d2
  r
2 , (1+ ad)r , 1+ (ad)r ,
⇣
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 d2R
⌘ r
2 ,
⇣
1+ 2aR sin d2R
⌘r
, and 1+
⇣
aR sin dR
⌘r
aren
1, 2r/2
o
, {1, 2r} , {1, 2} ,
n
(2/p)r , 2r/2
o
,
 
(2/p)r , 2r
 
, and
 
(2/p)r , 2
 
, respectively.
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positive constants al and ah independent of R such that
al tˆ (d)  t˜ (d)  ahtˆ (d) (1.29)
for all d 2 [0,pR]. Loosely speaking, this means that these t˜ (d) are similar to the
simple function tˆ (d) . In general, monotonic functions satisfying this condition will
be referred to as ‘asymptotically power-law’, despite the fact that the geometries un-
der consideration have finite R. In the large R limit, the term ‘asymptotically’ regains
its conventional meaning.
To simplify notation in the rest of the chapter, the following combination of r and
s will be denoted d:
d ⌘ 1
2
r (s  1) .
1.5 The Krugman model on the circle
1.5.1 Basic setup
Consider the case where the spatial geometry is a circle43 of radius R with points
parameterized by q 2 ( p,p], and where the labor density is constant. Identify the
coordinate x with q. The labor element is now dL (q) = rLdq with rL = L/ (2p) . The
endowment of labor per unit of physical length is rL/R. A baseline solution to the
Krugman model corresponding to t (q, q0) = t˜ (d) is easy to obtain. Due to rotational
symmetry, the GDP equation is solved by setting the GDP density to a constant,
y0 (q) = y0. The GDP propagator G (q, q0) associated with this solution depends only
on the distance d (q, q0) between its arguments, defined as the smaller of |q   q0| and
43 The case of a finite number of locations symmetrically arranged on a circle can be solved in a similar
fashion, employing discrete Fourier transform instead of Fourier series expansion.
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2p   |q   q0| . For this reason, all the information in G (q, q0) can be captured by a
function G with only one argument defined by G (d (q, q0)) = G (q, q0) . This specifies
the single-argument G (q) only for q 2 [0,p] . For notational convenience, extend it
symmetrically to negative arguments, G ( q) = G (q), and then periodically over the
entire real line, G (q + 2pn) = G (q) , n 2 Z. The action (1.20) of the operator G on
any (periodically extended) function f (q) on the circle can be written as
(G f ) (q) = rL (G ⇤ f ) (q) = rL
Z p
 p
G
 
q   q0  f  q0  dq0. (1.30)
Define also the single argument functions Gc (q), Gp (q), and Gg (q) in a similar way.
The symbol ⇤ here stands for a 2p-periodic convolution. For any two 2p-periodic
functions f and g their 2p-periodic convolution is defined as
( f ⇤ g) (q) =
Z p
 p
f
 
q   q0  g  q0  dq0.
In the context of the circular geometry, the term ‘convolution’ will always refer to the
2p-periodic convolution.
1.5.2 Expansion in terms of convolution powers of Gc (q)
We will see that the numerical values of the solutions y1 can have very different
orders of magnitude depending on the values of the parameters of the model, such
as r or s. It is desirable to have an intuitive way of finding the correct order of
magnitude without performing explicit calculations. For this purpose, let us take
a closer look at the mathematical objects the solution contains. Readers interested
primarily in the final results for y1, not in the properties of individual contributions
to it, may proceed to the next subsection.
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The formal solution (1.21) can be written as
y1 =
•
Â
n=0
rnLG
⇤n ⇤ (By0) , (1.31)
where the nth convolution power G⇤n (q) of G (q) is the n-fold (2p-periodic) convo-
lution of the function G (q) with itself. Because equations (1.11) and (1.13) imply
G (q) = Gc (q) + s (s  1) rLG⇤2c (q) , the expression for y1 can be written as
y1 =
•
Â
n=0
rnL
 
Gc + s (s  1) rLG⇤2c
 ⇤n ⇤ (By0) . (1.32)
We see that the right-hand side is a linear combination of various convolution
powers G⇤mc of the function Gc, convoluted with the function By0. In order to gain
some intuition about the behavior of y1 for large R, it is necessary understand what
the functions G⇤mc look like in that case.
The large R limit of G⇤2c (q) and G⇤mc (q) with m   3
Suppose that R is very large, much larger than 1/a. The assumption of asymptot-
ically power-law trade costs (1.29) has implications for the behavior of the function
G⇤2c (q) ⌘
R p
 p Gc (q
0)Gc (q   q0) dq0. A few of its properties are immediately clear. We
know that Gc (q) is a positive decreasing function of |q| 2 [0,p] . As a consequence,
the same must be true for G⇤2c (q) . Also, decreasing d ⌘ r (s  1) /2 increases the im-
portance of the tails of the function Gc (q), and makes it more spread out. This means
that relative to Gc (q), any features of the function G⇤2c (q)will be even more smoothed
out. (Note that these observations, as well as those that follow, are consistent with
the plots in Fig. 1.2.)
In order to gain a more detailed intuitive understanding of the properties of
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Figure 1.2: Plots of Gc(q) (highest peak), G⇤2c (q), and G⇤3c (q) (lowest peak) for different values
of d. Trade costs are (1 + 4a2R2 sin2(q/2))r/2 with aR = 20. These functions
characterize individual contributions to the spreading of economic shocks.
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G⇤2c (q), it is important to know which regions of the integration domain dominate
the integral. This issue is technical, and for this reason the derivations are left for
Appendix A.5, but the results follow. For d 2  0, 14  , the main contribution to the
integral comes from |q0| and |q   q0| being both of order one. For d 2   14 , 12  it comes
from |q0| of order |q| . When d 2   12 ,•  , the integral is dominated by the region where
|q0| is of order 1/ (aR) and the region where |q0   q| is of order 1/ (aR) .
With this knowledge one can make an informed guess about the shape of G⇤2c (q) .
With d 2  0, 14  , the integral is insensitive to what happens at short distances of order
1/ (aR) . For this reason, even though Gc (q) has a relatively sharp peak, this feature
will be smoothed out in the case of G⇤2c (q) . One can expect the maximum G⇤2c (0)
to be of the same order of magnitude as the minimum G⇤2c (p) . Moreover, G⇤2c (p)
should have a finite positive limit as R! •.
For d 2   14 , 12  , the situation is a little more subtle. For |q| of order one, the
integral is still dominated by long distances, i.e. by |q0| and |q   q0| of order one. One
would therefore expect the minimum G⇤2c (p) to take similar values as in the previous
case. It should stay finite and positive as R ! •. By contrast, for small |q|, say of
order 1/ (aR), the integral is dominated by short distances, i.e. by |q0| and |q   q0|
of order 1/ (aR) . This contribution is larger than the contribution of long distances,
and as a consequence there should be a substantial peak at q = 0. In other words,
G⇤2c (0)  G⇤2c (p) .
When d 2   12 ,•  , the story is again relatively simple. Irrespective of the value of
q, the dominant contribution to the integral comes from the short-distance regions,
where either |q0| or |q0   q| is of order 1/ (aR) . This means that the shape of the
function G⇤2c (q) should be quite similar to the shape of Gc (q) , with a large peak
and quickly decreasing tails. As R ! •, the minimum G⇤2c (p) should approach
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zero. Given the normalization of Gc (q) , the maximum G⇤2c (0) should be of order
Gc (0) /rL.
Appendix A.5 also contains the derivation of various bounds on the values of
G⇤2c (q). These bounds provide a clearer quantitative picture of the behavior of G⇤2c (q) .
As the reader can verify, they are consistent with the intuition just discussed. For the
maximum of G⇤2c (q) , which is attained at q = 0, we have the following bounds
1
2ps2
(1 2d)2
1 4d a˜
2
l . r2LG⇤2c (0) . 12ps2
(1 2d)2
1 4d a˜
2
h for d 2
 
0, 14
 
,
(1 2d)2
2ps2 (paR)
4d 1 a˜2l . r2LG⇤2c (0) .
(1 2d)2
2ps2 (paR)
4d 1 a˜2h for d 2
  1
4 ,
1
2
 
,
1
2s2
(2d 1)2
d(4d 1)aRa˜
2
l . r2LG⇤2c (0) . 12s2
(2d 1)2
d(4d 1)aRa˜
2
h for d 2
  1
2 ,•
 
.
(1.33)
They are written in terms of the quantity r2LG
⇤2
c (0), which does not depend on the
choice of units in which labor is measured. The constants a˜l ⌘ as 1l /as 1h and a˜h ⌘
as 1h /a
s 1
l are defined in terms of the constants appearing in (1.29). The important
message these bounds convey is the dependence of G⇤2c (0) on the radius R. If d 2 
0, 14
 
, the peak of G⇤2c (0) is relatively small and independent of R. When d 2
  1
4 ,
1
2
 
,
the maximum increases as R4d 1. For d 2   12 ,•  , it increases is even faster; it is
linearly proportional to R itself.
Now let us look at G⇤2c (0) relative to Gc (0) .
1
s
1 2d
1 4d
1
(paR)2d
a˜2l .
rLG⇤2c (0)
Gc(0)
. 1s 1 2d1 4d 1(paR)2d a˜
2
h for d 2
 
0, 14
 
,
1
s
1 2d
(paR)1 2d
a˜2l .
rLG⇤2c (0)
Gc(0)
. 1s 1 2d(paR)1 2d a˜
2
h for d 2
  1
4 ,
1
2
 
,
1
s
4d 2
4d 1 a˜
2
l .
rLG⇤2c (0)
Gc(0)
. 1s 4d 24d 1 a˜2h for d 2
  1
2 ,•
 
.
(1.34)
When d 2  0, 12  , the ratio G⇤2c (0)/Gc (0) decreases with R. This means that G⇤2c (0)
is quite small relative to Gc (0) , which is consistent with significant smoothing out. If
d 2   12 ,•  , the ratio is independent of R. The peak of Gc (0) is preserved to a large
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extent by the convolution.
For the minimum of G⇤2c (q) at q = p, we have
p4d 2
4s2 (1  2d)2 I (p) a˜2l . r2LG⇤2c (p) . p
4d 2
4s2 (1  2d)2 I (p) a˜2h for d 2
 
0, 12
 
,
1
2ps2
2d 1
2d
1
(paR)2d 1
a˜2l . r2LG⇤2c (p) . 12ps2 2d 12d 1(paR)2d 1 a˜
2
h for d 2
  1
2 ,•
 
.
(1.35)
The function I is defined in (A.9). Its value I (p) is independent of R and is roughly
of order one when other parameters do not take extreme values. We see that the
minimum is independent of R when d 2  0, 12  , and decreases with R when d 2  1
2 ,•
 
.
The last set of inequalities presented here is
p4d 2
4s2 (1  2d)2 I (q) a˜2l . r2LG⇤2c (q) . p
4d 2
4s2 (1  2d)2 I (q) a˜2h for d 2
 
0, 12
 
,
1
srLGc (q) a˜l . r2LG⇤2c (q) . 1srLGc (q) a˜h for d 2
  1
2 ,•
 
.
(1.36)
These hold for |q| much greater than 1/ (aR) . When d 2  0, 14  , the function I (q) is
roughly of order one for any q. For d 2   14 , 12  , it is roughly of order one when |q|
is of order one. As |q| decreases, the function increases indefinitely. But remember
that the bound itself is valid only if |q|   1/ (aR) . (A more careful analysis reveals
that in this case the peak of G⇤2c (q) is not very important, it does not contribute much
when G⇤2c (q) is integrated over q.) When d 2
  1
2 ,•
 
, the bound implies that G⇤2c (q)
has tails that look similar to those of Gc (q) .
Here we discussed only G⇤2c (q) , but G⇤mc (q) with a low m > 2 behave in a similar
fashion, as the reader can confirm by the same methods. The only qualitative differ-
ence is that for d 2   14 , 12  and a high enough m, it ceases to be true that G⇤mc (0)! •
as R! •.
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1.5.3 General solution for y1 and y
(P)
1
The evaluation of y1 (q) and y
(P)
1 (q) can be performed using Fourier series. A
square integrable function f (q) on the circle may be decomposed as
f (q) =
•
Â
n= •
fneinq , (1.37)
where i =
p 1 is the imaginary unit and the Fourier coefficients fn are given by
fn =
1
2p
Z p
 p
f (q) e inqdq. (1.38)
In general, the notation used here for the nth Fourier coefficients will be to add
subscript n to the symbol of the corresponding function. The convolution theorem
for Fourier series states that for two functions f and g the Fourier coefficients ( f ⇤ g)n
of their (2p-periodic) convolution f ⇤ g may be computed by multiplying the Fourier
coefficients of the individual functions,
( f ⇤ g)n = 2p fngn.
The operator G acts according to (1.30) as a convolution with rLG (q), so
(G f )n = LGn fn.
Identical relations hold also for Gc,Gp, and Gg. In the last case, one should remember
that Gg is only well defined when acting on functions orthogonal to the constant
function y0, i.e. on functions f whose zeroth Fourier coefficient f0 vanishes.
We can now find an expression for the Fourier coefficients y1,n of the function
36
y1 (q) . The zeroth coefficient y1,0 vanishes since y1 is chosen to be orthogonal to the
constant function y0. For nonzero n, applying the convolution theorem to the general
expression (1.25) gives
y1,n
y0
=    1+ LGg,n  (1  sLGc,n) g˜c,n.
This can be further simplified by two identities. The first identity, LGg,n = 1/ (1  LGn) 
1, comes from the definition (1.22), and the standard formula for the sum of a ge-
ometric series. The second identity, LGn = (1+ s (s  1) LGc,n) LGc,n, is a conse-
quence of (1.11) and (1.13). Together they imply that    1+ LGg,n  (1  sLGc,n) g˜c,n =
  g˜c,n1+(s 1)LGc,n . The conclusion is that
y1,n
y0
=
8><>: 0 for n = 0,  g˜c,n1+(s 1)LGc,n for n 6= 0. (1.39)
For the local-price-index-adjusted GDP y(P)1 (1.28) leads to
y(P)1,n
y(P)0
=
8><>:  
s
s 1 gˆc,0 for n = 0,
  1 sLGc,n1+(s 1)LGc,n g˜c,n   ss 1 gˆc,n for n 6= 0.
(1.40)
If b (q, q0) = b (q0, q) , the Fourier coefficients are real and g˜c,n = gˆc,n. In that case (1.40)
simplifies to
y(P)1,n
y(P)0
=
8><>:  
s
s 1 g˜c,0 for n = 0,
  2s 1s 1 g˜c,n1+(s 1)LGc,n for n 6= 0.
(1.41)
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1.5.4 Fourier coefficients of Gc (q) for specific functional forms of trade costs
The general formula (1.12) for Gc (x, x0) reduces in the case under consideration
to
Gc
 
q, q0
 
= Gc
 
q   q0  = 1
srL
T (q   q0)R p
 p T (q00   q0) dq00
=
1
srL
T (q   q0)R p
 p T (q00) dq00
. (1.42)
Here, of course, the T (q   q0) corresponds to the trade costs before the introduction
of border costs, T (q   q0) = t˜1 s (q   q0) . The Fourier coefficients of Gc (q) are
Gc,n =
1
sLT0
Tn.
Note that this implies that Gc,0 = 1/ (sL) , and via (1.11) and (1.13) also that Gc,0 =
1/L, as expected from (1.14).
Subsection (1.4.3) mentioned several convenient functional forms for transporta-
tion costs. They all have similar properties. For the purpose of finding analytic
solutions to the Krugman model, we will focus mostly on one of them, namely
t˜ (d) =
⇣
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 d2R
⌘ r
2 , but the other ones can be treated similarly. For the
functional form of choice, T (q) can be written as
T (q) =
 
1
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 q2
!d
,
where the important parameter d is defined as
d ⌘ 1
2
r (s  1) .
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An alternative expression for T (q) is
T (q) = Z2d
 
1
Z2 cos2 q2 + sin
2 q
2
!d
(1.43)
with
Z2 ⌘ 1
1+ 4a2R2
As shown in Appendix A.8, the Fourier coefficients of T (q) are
Tn =
Zd ( 1)n
(1  d)n
Pnd 1
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
.
Pba (z) is the associated Legendre function.44 The Pochhammer symbol (a)n is defined
in terms of the gamma function as G (a+ n) /G (a), and should not be confused with
the notation for Fourier coefficients. For positive integer n, this definition reduces to
the nth order polynomial (a)n = a (a+ 1) (a+ 2) ... (a+ n  1) . The resulting expres-
sion for Gc,n is
Gc,n =
1
sL
( 1)n
(1  d)n
Pnd 1
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘
Pd 1
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘ . (1.44)
1.6 The impact of border costs
1.6.1 General solution for GDP in the presence of border costs
Now consider the introduction of a small border cost. Let us split the circle
into two ‘countries’, country A characterized by q 2   p2 , p2   and country B by
q 2   p, p2   [ (p2 ,p], separated by a border consisting of two points,  p2 and p2 .
44 Mathematica introduces three distinct definitions of associated Legendre functions. The function
used here corresponds to the third definition, i.e. to LegendreP[n,µ,3,z]. See Appendix A.13 for a list of
special functions and other mathematical notation.
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This assumption is made for simplicity, and generalization to different situations is
straightforward. The trade costs are now t (q, q0) = t˜ (d) b˜ (q, q0), with
b˜
 
q, q0
  ⌘ 1+ k˜1CA (q) 1CB  q0 + k˜1CB (q) 1CA  q0  ,
where 1CA and 1CB are the country indicator functions. The small positive parame-
ter k˜ is related to the parameter k considered in the general discussion by k ⌘ 1 
(1+ k˜)1 s. For small k˜, this is roughly k ⇡ (s  1) k˜. In terms of T (q, q0) the change
associated with the introduction of the border cost is T (q, q0)! (1  kb (q, q0)) T (q, q0)
with
b
 
q, q0
  ⌘ 1CA (q) 1CB  q0 + 1CB (q) 1CA  q0  .
The Fourier coefficients g˜c,n of the function g˜c (q) are given in Appendix A.7,
g˜c,n =
8><>: 0 for n odd,1
2s d0n   4( 1)
n
2
p2 Â
•
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+1)2 n2 for n even.
(1.45)
The result (1.39) then becomes
y1,n
y0
=
8><>: 0 for n odd or zero,4( 1) n2
p2
1
1+(s 1)LGc,n Â
•
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+1)2 n2 for n even and nonzero,
while (1.41) gives
y(P)1,n
y0
=
8>>>><>>>>:
  12 1s 1 + 4p2 ss 1 Â•m=0 LGc,2m+1(2m+1)2 for n zero,
4( 1) n2
p2
2s 1
s 1
1
1+(s 1)LGc,n Â
•
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+1)2 n2 for n even nonzero,
0 for n odd.
(1.46)
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Figure 1.3: Plots of a measure of welfare changes, (s  1)y(P)1 (q)/y(P)0 , induced by an increase
in the border costs between two semi-circular countries. Only half of each country
is shown. Locations on the circle are parameterized by q 2 ( p,p]. The border is
located at q = ±p/2, and q = 0 and q = p correspond to the midpoints of the two
countries. In part (a) d is above the threshold of 1/2 while in part (b) it is below
the threshold. Trade costs are (1+ 4a2R2 sin2(q/2))r/2 with r = 0.5 and aR = 20.
In part (a) s = 6, and in part (b) s = 2.
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The resulting function y(P)1 (q) is plotted in Fig. 1.3 for different values of the param-
eter d.
1.6.2 Bounds on y(P)1 (0) /y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
Using the explicit solution (1.45) for functional forms of the trade costs discussed
in Subsection 1.4.3, one can derive simple bounds on the values of y1. In particular,
(1.44) can be used to show that for d < 1/2,
lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)1
 
p
2
    s  12s  1 (1  2d) , (1.47)
while for d > 1/2,
lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)1
 
p
2
  = 0. (1.48)
In other words, there is a sharp change of behavior at d = 1/2 in the large-space
limit. Above 1/2, locations in the middle of the country will not be impacted by the
presence of the border at all. Below 1/2, the impact on the middle of the country will
be comparable to that on the border region.
1.7 The impact of changes in productivity
Suppose that the productivity in a particular country changes. How are individual
locations inside and outside of this country going to be affected? This question can
be answered in a way very similar to the case of the border cost. If the country in
question is large, one can consider the same spatial setup as for the border cost. There
are two countries, A and B. Suppose that country B, represented by the ‘southern’
semicircle experiences a productivity increase. If productivity in B increases by a
factor of 1 + k˜, then this is equivalent to decreasing t (x, x0) from any location x
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in country B by the same factor. In terms of the function T, this corresponds to
the change T (x, x0) ! (1  kb (x, x0)) T (x, x0) with b (x, x0) =  1CB (x) and k =
1   (1+ k˜)1 s. Again, for small k˜, k ⇡ (s  1) k˜. Now we can express the main
quantities of interest in terms of Gc,n.
Evaluation of the Fourier coefficients of g˜c (q) is simple. Since
 g˜c (q) = rL1CB (q)
Z p
 p
Gc
 
q   q0  dq0 = 1
s
1CB (q) ,
they are proportional to the Fourier coefficients (A.14) of the indicator function of
country B:
g˜c,n =   1s1CB,n =
8>>>><>>>>:
  12s for n = 0,
0 for n even and nonzero,
  ( 1)
n+1
2
psn for n odd.
Substituting these expressions into (1.39) gives
y1,n
y0
=
8><>: 0 for n even ,( 1) n+12
pn
1
1+(s 1)LGc,n for n odd.
For the local-price-index-adjusted GDP, we should use the general formula (1.40)
instead of (1.41), since b (q, q0) is not identically equal to b (q0, q). Remembering that
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Figure 1.4: This is a productivity change counterpart of Fig. 1.3. It shows a measure of welfare
changes, (s  1)y(P)1 (q)/y(P)0 , induced by an increase of productivity in country B.
Only half of each country is shown. The border is located at q = ±p/2. As in
Fig. 1.3, in part (a) d is above the threshold of 1/2 while in part (b) it is below the
threshold. Trade costs are (1+ 4a2R2 sin2(q/2))r/2 with r = 0.5 and aR = 20. In
part (a) s = 6, and in part (b) s = 2.
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Gc,0 = 1/ (sL) ,
 gˆc (q) = rL
Z   p2
 p
Gc
 
q   q0  dq0 + rL Z p
p
2
Gc
 
q   q0  dq0
= rL
•
Â
n= •
Gc,neinq
✓Z   p2
 p
e inq0dq0 +
Z p
p
2
e inq0dq0
◆
=
1
2s
+
1
p
•
Â
n= •, n odd
( 1) n+12
n
LGc,neinq .
For the individual Fourier coefficients gˆc,n this implies
gˆc,n =
8>>>><>>>>:
  12s for n = 0,
0 for n even nonzero,
  ( 1)
n+1
2
pn LGc,n for n odd.
The formula (1.40) then yields
y(P)1,n
y(P)0
=
8><>:  
s
s 1 gˆc,0 for n = 0,
  1 sLGc,n1+(s 1)LGc,n g˜c,n   ss 1 gˆc,n for n 6= 0.
y(P)1,n
y(P)0
=
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2
1
s 1 for n = 0,
0 for n even nonzero,
( 1) n+12
psn
⇣
1 sLGc,n
1+(s 1)LGc,n +
s2
s 1LGc,n
⌘
for n odd.
See Fig. 1.4 for plots of y(P)1 for different values of the parameter d. Again, there is a
threshold behavior at d = 1/2.
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1.8 The Krugman model on the sphere
1.8.1 The role of dimensionality
The previous section established that in the large-space limit, the qualitative prop-
erties of the Krugman model on the circle with asymptotically power-law trade costs
change as d ⌘ r (s  1) /2 crosses the threshold of 1/2. This value is not universal,
however. For spaces of different dimensionality, the value of the threshold is different.
In general, for a ds-dimensional space, the threshold condition is45
d =
ds
2
.
Clearly, it is of little economic interest to study cases with ds   3. The choice ds = 2,
however, is more appropriate for real-world economies than ds = 1.
For this reason, the present section is devoted to the Krugman model on a two-
dimensional spatial geometry, the sphere. It turns out that its properties closely
resemble the case of the circle, apart form the fact that the role of d is now played by
d/2.
1.8.2 Basic setup
Let the spatial geometry be a sphere S of radius R parameterized by colatitude
q 2 [0,p] and longitude j 2 [0, 2p). Identify these coordinates with x introduced
previously, x = (q, j) . As in the case of the circle, labor density is chosen to be
constant. The labor element is dL (q, j) = rL sin qdqdj with rL = L/ (4p). The
endowment of labor per unit physical area equals rLR2. Again, the baseline solution
45 A hint that this may be the case comes from repeating the calculations that led to eq. (1.1). A careful
analysis of geometries of arbitrary dimension provides a confirmation.
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corresponds to constant GDP density: y0 (q, j) = y0. The GDP propagator G (x, x0)
depends only on the (rescaled) distance d˜ (x, x0) between x and x0 given by
cos d˜
 
x, x0
 
= sin q sin q0 + cos q cos q0 sin
 
j  j0  .
The information contained in G (x, x0) can be captured by a single-argument function
G, defined by the relation G
 
d˜ (x, x0)
 
= G (x, x0). The action (1.30) of the operator G
can be thought of as a spherical convolution with rLG
 
d˜ (x, x0)
 
,
(G f ) (x) = rL (G ⇤ f ) (x) = rL
Z
S
G
 
d˜
 
x, x0
  
f
 
x0
 
dA
 
x0
 
.
Here dA (x0) is the (rescaled) area element at point x0 = (q0, j0) and may be written as
dA (x0) = sin q0dq0dj0. A similar statement holds for Gc,Gp, and Gg and analogously
defined functions Gc(d˜), Gp(d˜), and Gg(d˜). Again, it is worth remembering that the
action of Gg is defined only on functions orthogonal to the constant function y0.
Convolutions on the sphere are a little more subtle than convolutions on the cir-
cle. In the case of the circle there is a natural definition of convolution for arbitrary
functions as long as the corresponding integral is convergent. On the sphere a nat-
ural definition of convolution exists only if at least one of the convolution factors is
required to be rotationally symmetric, in the sense that it depends only on q but not
on j. The functions G(d˜),Gc(d˜),Gp(d˜) and Gg(d˜) all satisfy this requirement, so this
is not a source of any difficulty here. The general definition of spherical convolution
is
(F ⇤ f ) (x) =
Z
S
F
 
d˜
 
x, x0
  
f
 
x0
 
dA
 
x0
 
. (1.49)
Here F is the function that only depends on q, identified with d˜, and f may depend
on both spherical coordinates of the point x0.
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The spherical analogs of (1.31) and (1.32) take the same form,
y1 =
•
Â
n=0
rnLG
⇤n ⇤ (By0) =
•
Â
n=0
rnL
 
Gc + s (s  1) rLG⇤2c
 ⇤n ⇤ (By0) .
The large R results for G⇤2c (q) (and higher G⇤mc (q)) for the case of the circle have a
direct analog here. To avoid repetition, detailed discussion is left for Appendix A.6.
As mentioned earlier, the main lesson is that the role of d (defined as r (s  1) /2)
in the case of the circle is now played by d/2. Otherwise the qualitative behavior
remains the same.
1.8.3 General solution for y1 and y
(P)
1
A square integrable function f (q, j) on the sphere can be written as
f (q, j) =
•
Â
l=0
l
Â
m= l
f ml Y
m
l (q, j) , (1.50)
for some coefficients f ml . These coefficients may be computed as
f ml =
Z
S
f (q, j)Ym⇤l (q, j)
q
g (x)dx =
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
f (q, j)Ym⇤l (q, j) dj sin qdq, (1.51)
where the star denotes complex conjugation. The spherical harmonic function Yml (q, j)
of degree l and order m is defined as
Yml (q, j) = N
|m|
l P
|m|
l (cos q) e
imj.
P|m|l is the associated Legendre polynomial of degree l and order |m|, i =
p 1 is
the imaginary unit, and N|m|l is a positive normalization factor needed to make the
system orthonormal (without the Condon-Shortley phase). The general convention
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for spherical harmonic coefficients of a function on the sphere is to add the indices l
and m to the corresponding symbol of the function. When the index m is zero, it may
be omitted. In other words, fl ⌘ f 0l . All spherical harmonics needed here will be of
order zero.46 They are given more explicitly as
Y0l (q, j) ⌘
p
2l + 1p
4p
Pl (cos q) , (1.52)
where Pl is the Legendre polynomial of degree l. According to the convolution theo-
rem on the sphere, spherical harmonic coefficients of the convolution (1.49) are equal
to properly normalized products of the spherical harmonic coefficients of the indi-
vidual convolution factors:
(F ⇤ f )ml =
p
4pp
2l + 1
Fl f ml , (1.53)
with Fl ⌘ F0l . For the GDP propagator G this implies
(G f )ml =
1p
4p
1p
2l + 1
LG0l f
m
l ,
and similarly for Gc,Gp and Gg. Following the same steps as in the case of the circle,
we obtain
(y1)
m
l
y0
=
8><>:
0 for l = 0 or m 6= 0,
  g˜c,l
1+(s 1) 1p
4p
1p
2l+1
LGc,l
for l > 0 and m = 0,
(1.54)
46 In other applications of the same framework, working with spherical harmonics of nonzero order
may be necessary.
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⇣
y(P)1
⌘m
l
y(P)0
=
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for m 6= 0,
  ss 1 gˆc,0 for l = 0 and m = 0,
 
p
4p
p
2l+1 sLGc,lp
4p
p
2l+1+(s 1)LGc,l g˜c,l  
s
s 1 gˆc,l for l > 0 and m = 0.
(1.55)
1.8.4 Solutions for specific functional forms of trade costs
Proceeding in analogy with the case of the circle,
Gc
 
q, j, q0, j0
 
= Gc
 
d˜
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
=
1
srL
T
 
d˜ (q, j, q0, j0)
 R p
0
R 2p
0 T
 
d˜ (q00, j00, q0, j0)
 
sin q00dj00dq00
,
Gc (q) =
p
4p
sLT00
T (q) .
The spherical harmonic coefficients of Gc (q) are
(Gc)ml =
p
4p
sLT00
Tml .
Note that G00 =
p
4p/L, which is consistent with (1.14). For transportation costs of
the form t˜ (d) =
⇣
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 d2R
⌘ r
2 ,
T (q) = Z2d
 
1
Z2 cos2 q2 + sin
2 q
2
!d
,
with d ⌘ r (s  1) /21 and Z2 ⌘  1+ 4a2R2  1 . Because of rotational symmetry
Tml = 0 and (Gc)
m
l = 0 for m 6= 0. As shown in Appendix A.10, the remaining
coefficients are
Tl = 2p
p
2l + 1 (d)l
Z 12+dp
1  Z2 P
 l  12
d  32
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
,
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Gc,l =
p
4p (d)l
sL
P l 
1
2
d  32
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘
P 
1
2
d  32
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘ .
1.8.5 The impact of changes in border costs
The spherical counterpart of the two semicircular ‘countries’ are the northern and
the southern hemisphere, CA = {(q, j) |q 2 [0, p2 )}, and CB = {(q, j) |q 2 (p2 ,p]}.
The corresponding spherical harmonic coefficients of g˜c (and gˆc) are given by equation
(A.19) in Appendix A.9. The values of the coefficients can be used in the expressions
(1.54) and (A.19) for the change in GDP. The resulting solutions exhibit the threshold
behavior at d = 1.
1.8.6 The impact of changes in productivity
Similarly to the case of the circle, g˜c (q, j) equals  1CB (q, j) /s. As a result, its
spherical harmonic coefficients with non-zero m vanish and the others are propor-
tional to (A.18):
g˜c,l =
8>>>><>>>>:
  1s
p
p for l = 0,
0 for l even and nonzero,
  1s
p
p
p
2l + 1 ( 1)
 l 1
2
2l
(l 1)!
l 1
2 !
l+1
2 !
for l odd.
The formula (1.54) then gives
(y1)
m
l
y0
=
8><>:
0 for l even or m 6= 0,
1
s
( 1) l 12
2l
(l 1)!
l 1
2 !
l+1
2 !
2p(2l+1)p
4p
p
2l+1+(s 1)LGc,l for l odd and m = 0.
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Recognizing that gˆc (q) =  rL (Gc ⇤ 1CB) (q) and applying the spherical convolution
theorem (1.53) leads to
gˆc,l =
8>>>><>>>>:
  12s for l = 0,
0 for l even and nonzero,
  ( 1)
 l 1
2
2l+1
(l 1)!
l 1
2 !
l+1
2 !
LGc,l for l odd.
Of course, (gˆc)ml with nonzero m vanish. The price-index-adjusted change in GDP
(1.55) becomes
⇣
y(P)1
⌘m
l
y(P)0
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1
2
1
s 1 for l = 0 and m = 0,
0 for l even nonzero or m 6= 0,
1
s
( 1) l 12
2l
(l 1)!
l 1
2 !
l+1
2 !
⇣p
p
p
2l + 1
p
4p
p
2l+1 sLGc,lp
4p
p
2l+1+(s 1)LGc,l +
1
2
s2
s 1LGc,l
⌘
for l odd and m = 0.
As in the case of border cost, the qualitative behavior changes at d = 1.
1.9 Higher-order terms
The first-order changes in GDP y1 (x) capture the full impact of changes in trade
costs when k is very small. There is an analytic way to evaluate this impact even
for larger k. The goal of this section is to provide basic insight into how this can be
achieved.
As in Section 1.4, suppose that there is an initial equilibrium with GDP equal to
y0 (x), and consider a change in trade costs. If the trade costs were characterized
initially by T (x, x0) and after the change by (1  kb (x, x0)) T (x, x0), the new GDP
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equation reads
ys (x) =
Z
(1  kb (x, x0)) T (x, x0) y (x0)R
(1  kb (x00, x0)) T (x00, x0) y1 s (x00) dL (x00)dL
 
x0
 
. (1.56)
The Taylor series of the new solution y (x) is
y (x) = y0 (x) + ky1 (x) + k2y2 (x) + ...
The functions yn (x) are required to satisfy
R
yn (x) y0 (x) dL (x) = 0, n > 0. In Section
1.4 we saw that inserting the Taylor expansion into (1.56) and comparing terms linear
in k provides an equation that determines y1 in terms of y0. An analogous statement
can be made for the higher-order terms as well. Denote
Dy (x) ⌘ y (x)  y0 (x) = ky1 (x) + k2y2 (x) + ...
The GDP equation (1.56) can be expanded as47
Dy (x)  (GDy) (x)
=   (GDy) (x) + y0 (x)Â•m=1 1m!
  1
s
 
m y
 ms
0 (x)
{ R T (x, x0) y0 (x0)Â•k=1 ( 1)k(N(x0))k+1 dL (x0)⇥
(
R
(1  kb (x00, x0)) T (x00, x0) y1 s0 (x00)Â•j=0
(1 s)j
j! y
 j
0 (x
00) (Dy (x00))j dL (x00)
 N (x0))k
+
R
T (x, x0) (Dy (x0)  kb (x, x0) y0 (x0)  kb (x, x0)Dy (x0))Â•k=0 ( 1)
k
(N(x0))k+1
dL (x0)⇥
(
R
(1  kb (x00, x0)) T (x00, x0) y1 s0 (x00)Â•j=0
(1 s)j
j! y
 j
0 (x
00) (Dy (x00))j dL (x00)
 N (x0))k }m ,
(1.57)
47 Note that the two different summations over k have different starting points.
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where N (x) ⌘ R y1 s0 (x0) T (x0, x) dL (x0) and (a)n is the Pochhammer symbol. The
terms   (GDy) (x) which are present on both sides would cancel, of course. However,
when the equation is written in this way, it has an important property. On the left-
hand side the term proportional to kn, n > 0 is simply knyn (x)   kn (Gyn) (x) . On
the right-hand side, the term proportional to kn contains functions y0, y1, ..., yn 1 , but
does not contain yn, yn+1, yn+2, ... This makes the equation useful: one can first solve
for y1 (as in the previous sections), then for y2, y3, etc. To be more precise, at each step
the equation allows one to compute only the function yn   Gyn directly. To recover
yn itself, one can use the identity
yn (x) =
  
1+ Gg
 
(yn   Gyn)
 
(x) .
The method48 just described provides a way to express any yn in terms of y0, T,
and b. The resulting expressions may seem very complicated, but they are not. The
value of yn can be written an a sum of a finite number of expressions. These can
be evaluated explicitly by the same techniques that were used to compute the first-
order terms. Derivation of individual equations from (1.57), as well as the process of
solving them, is greatly simplified by a diagrammatic technique49 analogous to the
48 The mathematical insights underlying the calculation framework introduced here are most closely
associated with Richard Feynman. He observed in 1940s – just like Ernst Stu¨ckelberg years earlier – that
solutions to certain complicated physics problems can be obtained by evaluating series of terms, and
that each one of these terms may be represented by a simple cartoon. These “Feynman diagrams” play
two different roles. They ensure that one does not get lost in the algebra, and they provide an intuitive
way of thinking about the mechanism the model in question represents.
Interestingly, another line of Feynman’s thinking has already influenced other parts of economics;
the Feynman-Kac formula is often used in financial economics and related fields. Although this is a
mathematically related topic, the typical series of Feynman diagrams with multivalent vertices are not
present there. This ultimately follows from the fact that the variables representing physical space here
represent state space in the financial application of the Feynman-Kac formula.
49 There are two versions of the diagrammatic technique. The first one has important consequences
primarily for yn with n > 1. The second one is slightly more complicated, but provides insight into the
structure of y1.
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method of Feynman diagrams in physics.
1.10 Conclusion
Traditional models of international and intranational trade, as well as models
introduced in the last decade, have some unexpected spatial properties. As we have
seen, under standard assumptions used in the empirical literature, their behavior
is highly sensitive to the precise values of their parameters. Naturally, such high
sensitivity can lead to strong biases in various estimation procedures. This raises the
question: to what extent are existing empirical results affected by such biases?
To address this issue, future empirical work can employ trade models based on
familiar principles, but rich enough to include economic sectors with heterogeneous
characteristics. The present work provides a convenient way to study the properties
of these models analytically, without having to rely on individual numerical solu-
tions, each generated for a single point in a large parameter space. The results of
such analytic inquiry will lead to more appropriate model selection for empirical
estimation.
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2. PASS-THROUGH AS AN ECONOMIC TOOL
(W)e may prepare the way for using, as we go, illustrations drawn from
the incidence of taxation to throw side-lights on the problem of value.
For indeed a great part of economic science is occupied with the diffu-
sion throughout the community of economic changes which primarily af-
fect some particular branch of production or consumption; and there is
scarcely any economic principle which cannot be aptly illustrated by a
discussion of the shifting of the effects of some tax...
–Alfred Marshall, “Principles of Economics”, Book V, Chapter IX
2.1 Introduction
Following Marshall (1890), standard treatments of a range of topics in perfectly
competitive markets are typically taught and analyzed in relationship to tax inci-
dence. For example, Chetty (2009) surveys recent work in public finance that builds
on the fact that incidence is often a “sufficient statistic” for various welfare analysis
to reduce the number of structural assumptions needed to reach welfare conclusions.
Virtually all of this work, however, assumes perfect competition, while much of con-
temporary economic analysis assumes firms have market power. In this paper we
show how the principle of using incidence as an analytic tool, sufficient statistic and
key economic parameter extends to imperfectly competitive models, unifying a num-
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ber of previous disparate literatures. We survey existing and establish new results
relating local and global incidence of various sorts to one another and to properties
of the demand and cost system. We then apply these to the analysis of a range of
economic applications ranging from platform markets to merger analysis.
We consider a very general model of symmetric imperfect competition, nesting
Cournot, differentiated Bertrand, monopolistic competition, conjectural variations
and other models. Imperfect competition alters the logic of incidence in two key
ways. First, as we discuss in Section 2.2 and has been understood at least since the
work of Cournot (1838), the rate r ⌘ dpdt at which a tax on a firm is passed-through
to consumer prices depends on the curvature of consumer demand as well as on the
elasticities of supply and demand that determine it in a perfectly competitive market.
Second, as less widely discussed in the literature1 and considered in Section 2.3, tax
burden is not simply “split” between the two sides because market power induces a
pre-existing distortion. Thus the total magnitude of incidence, and not just its split,
is determined by the pass-through rate and the degree of competitiveness.
As a result, pass-through determines the incidence of shocks among consumer
surplus, producer and excess burden. Subsection 2.3.1 argues, sufficient taxes elim-
inate the market, and therefore both consumer surplus and profits, entirely so inte-
grating up pass-through we show that the global division of surplus is given by a
simple, level-of-competition-contingent transformation of the average pass-through.
We then show that, when there are constant returns to scale, the effect of an exoge-
nous increase in supply on quantity supplied to the market in equilibrium is a simple
transformation of the pass-through rate. The incidence of such exogenous supply
1 For example, while Turner (2012) explicitly uses the pass-through formula for monopoly and cites
an earlier version of this paper, she assumes the tax burden is simply split according to the pass-through
rate.
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shifts is also determined by a simple pass-through-based formula. Because sufficient
exogenous increases in supply eliminate deadweight loss and monopoly profits, the
global deadweight loss to profit ratio is also determined by simple transformations
of average pass-through. In the case of monopoly, both the consumer surplus-to-
profit and deadweight loss-to-profit ratios are exactly averages of the pass-through
rate itself with no transformation. Section 2.4 provides a graphical illustration of this
particularly sharp result for the case of monopoly or a cartel.
The second half of the paper shows how these incidence principles offer an elegant
frame for analyzing a range of classical and more recent models and policy questions
related to imperfect competition. While we discuss some well-known existing results
that may be re-interpreted in light of the incidence logic, our primary focus is on
deriving novel results using these ideas and extending existing results to broader
settings. We begin with two, more detailed application in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 and
then turn to a variety of other applications that we treat more superficially in Section
2.7.
Section 2.5 considers platform industries, where consumers’ utility from partici-
pation depends on how many other consumers participate. Optimal policy in such
markets typically involves trade-offs between utility gained by consumers from lower
prices and that lost by a decline in externalities accruing to inframarginal consumers.
Both depend crucially on incidence under many natural parameterizations of prefer-
ences and thus simple properties of incidence answer a range of normative questions
in two canonical models: the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model of two-sided markets
and a natural parameterization of the Becker (1991) model with unidimensional diner
heterogeneity.
Section 2.6 considers a range of settings in which a planner must procure the cre-
58
ation of a new market that will be imperfectly competitive ex-post. Examples include
auctions for monopolistic concessions, intellectual property incentives for innovation
as considered by Weyl and Tirole (2012) and settings where firms may select among
proposals for market structures to propose to a planner as in Armstrong and Vickers
(2010) and Nocke and Whinston (2011). Mechanism design in all of these settings has
to strike a balance between incorporating the private information of firms and the
fact that private profits do not coincide with social welfare. Incidence and its hetero-
geneity (or manipulability) quantify the degree of this conflict and thus are crucial
determinants of optimal design.
Subsection 2.7.1 uses incidence to show that when pass-through is constant, there
are constant returns to scale and a merger is small, the “diversion ratio” typically
used in policy to evaluate the impact of a merger in a differentiated products indus-
try quantifies the fraction of consumer surplus destroyed by the merger. Pass-through
plays a broader role in the analysis of mergers and entry, as we illustrate in Subsec-
tion 2.7.2 by making more precise the analysis of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) of
entry into homogeneous goods industries. In Subsection 2.7.3, summarize and ex-
tend to imperfect competition the work of Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) and
Cowan (2010) who show that simple incidence properties determine the impacts of
third-degree price on output, consumer surplus and social welfare. In Subsection
2.7.4, we show how incidence allows an elegant analysis of nonparametric versions of
the question of Spence (1975) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) about how firms should
design their products to extract maximal value. In Subsection 2.7.5, we show how
pass-through determines the equilibrium prices of various levels of imperfectly com-
petitive supply chains and thus the comparison between profits at various levels. In
Subsection 2.7.6, we show how incidence provides a unified framework for analyz-
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ing (prominent special cases of) the Farrell (2008) model of welfare in aftermarkets
and the contrasting Dixit and Norman (1978) and Becker and Murphy (1993) mod-
els of the welfare effects of advertising, while extending the results of all of these.
Subsection 2.7.7 shows how incidence illuminates the similarities and differences be-
tween terms-of-trade-based models of international trade policy with (Brander and
Spencer, 1981; Ossa, 2011) and without (Johnson, 1953–1954) market power. In Sub-
section 2.7.8, we discuss our past and future work showing that incidence properties
are restricted in important ways by many common demand forms and proposing
tractable demand forms that avoid these restrictions. Finally, in Subsection 2.7.9, we
discuss an empirical application of our framework by Atkin and Donaldson (2012) to
the competition and the division of surplus in geographically disparate markets in
the developing work.
We conclude in Section 2.8 by discussing some directions future research on re-
lated to incidence under imperfect competition might take. Extensions of our results
on supply shocks and deadweight loss being the constant-returns-to-scale setting ap-
pear in an appendix that follows the main text of the paper.
2.2 Pass-through
To simplify the analysis, we focus on symmetric industries. However, we allow
for (symmetric) product differentiation and arbitrary conduct.2 There are n firms and
a representative firm i sells quantity qi at price pi and has cost function C(qi) with
associated marginal cost MC(qi) = C0(qi). We assume there are no fixed costs and
2 We neglect the possibility that goods are complements, rather than substitutes, here. However,
a symmetric treatment of the case of perfect or imperfect complements is possible and available on
request, exploiting the Sonnenschein (1968) duality between competition and complements.
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thus C(0) = 0.3 We also assume all functions are twice continuously differentiable.
Because we consider only symmetric equilibria, we drop the index i when denoting
equilibrium quantities. We denote total demand in the market at symmetric prices as
Q (p) and inverse demand when aggregate (symmetric) quantity is Q as p (Q). More
generally, we use lower case q to denote individual firm level variables and upper
case for industry aggregates; by symmetry in equilibrium, q = Qn .
If firms act as price takers they set p MC = 0 while if they collude, or if n = 1
and the firm is a profit-maximizing monopolist, they set p MC =   QQ0 ⌘ µ, which
we refer to as the aggregate market power. We therefore use an index l ⌘ p MCµ to
denote the competitiveness of the market conduct ranging from 0 for perfect compe-
tition to 1 for perfect collusion. It is useful to consider how two canonical models of
imperfect competition fit into this frame, both nesting monopoly/collusion as special
cases.
2.2.1 Examples: Cournot and differentiated Bertrand competition
In the Cournot model products are homogeneous and firms choose qi, taking as
given all other firms’ quantities. Then they maximize p
⇣
qi +Âj 6=i qj
⌘
qi   C  qi  and
thus their first-order condition is p+ p0qi  MC = 0 or, when q is symmetric across
firms at a symmetric equilibrium,
p MC =   Q
nQ0
=
µ
n
3 We do this for two reasons. First, the existence of fixed costs would change the interpretation of
our results on global incidence without changing their substance and the interpretation possible in their
absence is simpler to explain. Second, they are ruled out by our global concavity assumption discussed
in Subsection 2.2.2 discussed below, which is not necessary for our analysis as we showed in previous
drafts of this paper, but which is convenient to avoid unnecessary technicalities.
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and thus l = 1n . As usual, perfect competition corresponds to n! •, while monopoly
corresponds to n = 1.
On the other hand, suppose that firms produce symmetrically differentiated prod-
ucts and compete Bertrand (Nash-in-prices). Let qi denote the output of firm i and
p i denote the (symmetric) price of all other firms. If all other firms’ prices are sym-
metric, firm i maximizes piqi
 
pi, p i
  C  qi  pi, p i  . This implies firms’ first-order
conditions are
qi + qi1p
i  MC
⇣
qi
⌘
qi1 () pi  MC =  
qi
qi1
=
 
1+
(n  1)qi2
qi1
!
µ.
By Slutsky symmetry ∂q
i
∂p i =
∂q i
∂pi so that q
i
2 =
∂qj
∂pi . Thus D ⌘  
(n 1)qi2
qi1
is the fraction
of the sales that firm i losses as a result of an increase in price that are recaptured
by firm  i. We refer to this as the aggregate diversion ratio to other firms. Thus at a
symmetric equilibrium we have
p MC = (1  D)µ
and thus l = 1 D. D = 1 corresponds to perfect competition because it implies that,
if there is any elasticity to the market as a whole, the elasticity of individual firm
demands are infinitely more elastic as the market-exiting elasticity is a fraction 0 of
the total elasticity. If D = 0 then the industry acts just as if it were cartelized because
the products have independent demand (are not substitutable).
2.2.2 Pass-through formula
Thus our formulation captures a wide range of natural models of imperfect com-
petition that are typically considered distinct. It also allows for a wide range of
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others, including conjectural variations (Bowley, 1924), supply function equilibrium
(Klemperer and Meyer, 1989), differentiated products Cournot competition and mo-
nopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1931). As we will see, many of the details of
the models giving rise to aggregate behavior are less important than the equilibrium
pass-through and incidence behavior they induce.
We now use this broad formulation of competition to derive a basic comparative
static: the rate r at which a specific (per-unit) tax imposed uniformly on all producers
is passed through to consumers. Note that because the physical incidence of a tax
is, as usual, irrelevant to its economic incidence, a subsidy to (or parallel shift in the
demand of) consumers will lead to a rise in the pre-subsidy price of 1  r, a fact we
will occasionally invoke below.4
Now suppose that a specific tax of size t is imposed and that l may be a function
of t and p. We assume through out that globally 1  MC0Q0n   lµ0   l2µ > 0 to ensure
global “concavity”/stability of the unique symmetric equilibrium. The marginal costs
of the product increase by t and thus equilibrium conditions are
p MC  t = l(t, p)µ(p).
Implicitly differentiating with respect to t and letting r ⌘ dpdt ,
r MC0Q
0
n
r  1 = l1µ+ l2µr+ lµ0r =) r = 1+ l1µ
1  MC0Q0n   lµ0   l2µ
. (2.1)
4 Jeremy Bulow and we, several years back, independently arrived at versions of this observation, but
the elegant and parsimonious argument for it given here is Jeremy’s. Note that this implies a subsidy
may lead to an optimal reduction in price when r > 1, only possible in an imperfectly competitive
market. The result generalizes those of Baldenius and Reichelstein (2000) who consider only constant
returns to scale, monopoly and a few thresholds for r that correspond to common notions of (log-
)concavity of demand.
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Note that this formula generalizes both the classical results on incidence in Cournot
competition (Cournot, 1838) and the recent results of Anderson, de Palma, and Keider
(2001) on differentiated products competition, showing why both yield such similar
results, as well as the symmetric case of Reny, Wilkie, and Williams (2011)’s analysis
of pass-through with conjectural variations. For the most part we do not discuss the
subscripted l terms’ effects on pass-through. However, it is worth noting that if taxes
directly (l1 > 0) or indirectly (l2 > 0) make conduct less competitive then clearly
pass-through will rise. However under Cournot competition l1 = l2 = 0 and under
differentiated Bertrand l1 = 0 always and l2 = 0 if the diversion ratio is constant in
the price.
2.2.3 Discussion
The other two factors determining pass-through are the perfectly competitive term
MC0Q0
n and the term arising from imperfect competition lµ
0. To interpret the first term,
note that in a competitive market, the horizontally summed marginal cost curves of
the firms represent the supply curve. In this context, these horizontally summed
curves are (the inverse of) MC
⇣
Q
n
⌘
. Thus, assuming it is monotone, we can write
the perfectly competitive supply function S(p) = nMC 1(p). While this is not the
true supply function in the imperfectly competitive markets we consider, it is useful
to consider it to facilitate comparability with the behavior of perfectly competitive
markets. The elasticity of this function is eS ⌘ npQMC0 . On the other hand the demand
function is Q and has elasticity  Q0pQ . Thus
MC0Q0
n
=   
Q0p
Q
np
QMC0
=  eD
eS
.
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Thus when there are decreasing returns-to-scale, the more elastic is demand and the
less elastic supply, the lower pass-through is. When there are increasing returns, the
more elastic demand is and the more rapidly economies of scale set in, the higher
pass-through is. If an industry has highly elastic demand and has capacity con-
straints, we should expect a small pass-through, but if capacity constraints are not
too strict and demand is relatively inelastic, pass-through will not be too depressed.
If an industry has strong economies of scale and demand is highly elastic at the indus-
try level then it will have very high pass-through, etc. Most economists are familiar
with both empirically measuring and calibrating such elasticities.
However, in addition to these competitive forces, economists beginning with
Cournot (1838) have recognized that the (log-)curvature of demand, represented by
µ0, matters when and to the extent that competition is imperfect. As we discuss
more extensively with examples in work in progress (Fabinger and Weyl, 2012), µ0
measures the curvature of the logarithm of demand because log(Q)0 = Q
0
Q =   1µ
so log(Q)00 = µ
0
µ2
. Therefore log-concave demand always has µ0 < 0 and log-convex
µ0 > 0; if demand is concave then µ0 <  1 while if it is convex µ0 >  1. Another
way of viewing µ0, proposed by Gabaix, Laibson, Li, Li, Resnick, and de Vries (2010),
is to notice that if a is the standard tail index for the demand, viewed as a probability
distribution of consumer values, then µ0 = 1a . For the generalized Pareto/constant
pass-through class of demand functions proposed by Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983),
which include linear, exponential and constant elasticity as special cases, µ0 =  1 for
linear, µ0 = 0 for exponential and µ0 = 1e for constant elasticity. A final way to think
of µ0 is in relationship to risk-aversion:  Q0(1+ µ0) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk-aversion of the demand function Q if this function were to be viewed as
a utility function.
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Economists have typically viewed µ0, compared to eD and eS, as variously diffi-
cult to estimate empirically and form intuitions about; see, for example, Farrell and
Shapiro (2010). This attitude strikes us as overly pessimistic. Suppose, for example,
that consumer willingness to pay was proportional to income. Then µ0 corresponds
to the well-known curvature properties of income distributions in the segment of the
population representing the marginal consumer of the product. Such properties were
used by Saez (2001) to calibrate models of optimal income taxation. In particular,
a 2 [1.5, 3] =) µ0 2 ⇥ 13 , 23⇤ appears to fit well in the upper tail for most countries
and a much less convex distribution (log-normal) appears to fit lower and middle-
range incomes. Superior goods will stretch the distribution of willingness to pay
and thus have a higher µ0 than this income calculation suggests; inferior goods will
compress it and lead to a more concave distribution.
Of course this income example is very specific, though commonly used: con-
sumers’ willingness-to-pay for most products are not simply proportional to income.
However, identifying other specific sources of heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay
may help with calibration. In general, idiosyncratic, niche products with highly dis-
persed values to different populations will have high µ0 while utilitarian products
that save a constant amount of money to all will have compressed value distributions
and thus low and likely negative µ0.
The relative importance of the competitive factors and of demand curvature is
determined by l, the conduct parameter. In a highly competitive market (l close to 0),
curvature will not play an important role in determining r. In a very uncompetitive
market, it may well play a dominant role, especially when the elasticity of supply is
high relative to the elasticity of demand so that the competitive factors are not impor-
tant. Note that in a competitive market MC0   0, as otherwise one firm would grow
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until the market were no longer competitive. Thus pass-through may not be greater
than 1 in a competitive market, whereas it may be greater than 1 when competition
is imperfect, though it may also be below 1. Empirical work on pass-through, which
we survey in Weyl and Fabinger (2009) and Fabinger and Weyl (2012), indicates that
it may take on a range of values including both of these. However, it has not focused
thus far on confirming or refuting patterns inspired by theory for its value in different
settings.
2.3 Local and global incidence
From here on, we assume away income effects. Thus both consumers and firms
have quasi-linear utility and surplus may be computed in a` la Marshall. In a compet-
itive market, both consumers and firms act as price takers and thus, by Hotelling’s
Lemma given quasi-linearity, consumers lose for each infinitesimal unit that the
tax increases dpdt Q = rQ and producer’s lose (1   r)Q. Thus letting CS repre-
sent consumer surplus and PS producer surplus we have that the incidence of a tax
I =
dCS
dt
dPS
dt
= r1 r . In this case r =
1
1+ eDeS
and thus we obtain the classic formula
I =
1
1+ eDeS
1  1
1+ eDeS
=
eS
eD
.
The tax is always born completely by either consumers or the firms and the split is
determined by the ratio of elasticities. While Hotelling’s Lemma continues to hold
for consumers when firms are imperfectly competitive, and thus consumers still lose
 rQ, it does not hold for firms as firms no longer take price as given. Aggregate firm
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profits are
p(t)Q (p(t))  tQ (p(t))  nC
✓
Q (p(t))
n
◆
and thus the change in profits from an increase in the tax is
rQ+Q0pr Q  tQ0r MCQ0r = Q

r
✓
1  p MC  t
µ
◆
  1
 
=  Q [1  (1  l)r] ,
where l is defined, analogously to before, as p MC tµ . In the extreme case of monopoly
this becomes  Q: the monopolist, who optimizes the price, by the envelope theorem
only experiences the direct loss from the tax, Q. Thus with imperfect competition
incidence is
I =
r
1  (1  l)r . (2.2)
The numerator and denominator of incidence here sum to more than 1: r+ 1  (1 
l)r = 1+ lr.5 Thus, for every unit of additional tax imposed, Qlr is excess burden.
2.3.1 Global incidence
These local incidence calculations can naturally be translated into global calcula-
tions of the division of surplus. Increasing a tax sufficiently high, potentially towards
infinity, eventually eliminates all gains from trade. We can thus see the gains from
trade currently in a market as the result of lowering a tax from this point towards 0.
Formally let
t ⌘
8><>: • Q(p) > 0 8pinfQ(p)=0 p 9p : Q(p) = 0
5 The first extension we are aware of the incidence formula to imperfect competition was arrived at
simultaneously by us and Atkin and Donaldson (2012), building off conversations based on an earlier
version of this paper. Their formulation is slightly less general than ours as it assumes homogeneous
products.
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Let p(t) be the equilibrium price when the tax is t, CS(t) ⌘ R •p(t) Q(x)dx, PS(t) ⌘
p(t)Q (p(t))   nC
⇣
Q(p(t))
n
⌘
  tQ (p(t)). We know that p(t)   t, as otherwise firms
make negative profits, so assuming no fixed costs CS
 
t
 
= PS
 
t
 
= 0. Thus
CS(0) =   R t0 CS0(t)dt and PS(0) =   R t0 PS0(t)dt by the fundamental theorem of
calculus. But from our logic above, CS0(t) =  Q (p(t)) r (p(t), t) while PS0(t) =
 Q (p (t)) (1  [1  l (p(t), t)] r (p (t) , t)). Let x ⌘
R •
t=0 x(t)Q(p(t))dtR •
t=0 Q(p(t))dt
. Then, compressing
all functions to depend directly only on t and dropping the evaluation at 0, we obtain:
CS
PS
=
r
1  r+ lr (2.3)
If l is constant as a function of p and t this simplifies to
CS
PS
=
r
1  (1  l)r . (2.4)
This generalizes the bounds on consumer surplus obtained by Anderson and Renault
(2003) in three ways. First, it replaces bounds based on global inequalities on µ0
with precise average expressions that imply these bounds. Second, it provides much
richer results when costs are not constant. Third and most importantly, it applies
well beyond Cournot competition, on which those authors focused.6 In the case
of perfect competition this also provides a global expression for the consumer to
producer surplus ratio, based on average elasticities, which we have not been able to
find in the literature.
6 Our proof is also substantially simpler.
69
2.3.2 Excess burden
The same approach may be used to provide a global expression for deadweight
loss, using the logic discussed above that a tax generates an excess burden of Qlr. It
is thus intuitive that the larger pass-through is the larger is deadweight loss created
by the implicit tax of monopoly. To formalize this argument, we focus on the case
of constant marginal cost of c; our appendix extends our results allow more general
variable costs.
Consider an industry facing, in addition to a potential tax, exogenous competition
in an amount Q˜; i.e. rather than demand in the industry being Q(p) it is Q(p)  Q˜. It
can be shown, by the same arguments above, that under Cournot and differentiated
Bertrand competition the degree of competition is unaffected by the introduction of
the exogenous quantity. We omit this derivation for brevity and instead proceed
based of a definition of l, valid in these cases, which is analogous to that above:
l =   (p  c  t)Q
0
Q  Q˜ ,
as µ is now effectively  Q Q˜Q0 rather than   QQ0 . To compare the comparative static
effect of t and Q˜, we take the partial derivative of the right hand side with respect
to t and Q˜ respectively, ignoring any implicit effects through changes in p. The first,
analogously to before, yields Q
0
Q Q˜ and
 Q
0(p  c  t) 
Q  Q˜ 2 = 1Q0 l Q
0
Q  Q˜ .
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Thus dpdQ˜ =
1
Q0 lr or the quantity pass-through
rq ⌘ dQdQ˜ = lr. (2.5)
That is, an increase in exogenous (quantity) competition raises the equilibrium quan-
tity produced by the industry by lr.
Thus, again together with the degree of competition, pass-through is equivalent
to the “strategic” effect of increased quantity when there are constant returns to scale:
if total quantity expands by lr then the quantity of the industry (not including the
exogenous quantity) increases by lr  1 and thus there are “strategic substitutes” if
lr < 1 and “strategic complements” if lr > 1.
Now consider the incidence of this exogenous competition, assuming the exoge-
nous quantity is produced at the same, constant marginal cost that the rest of the
industry faces. Industry profits are [P (Q)  c]  Q  Q˜ . Taking the derivative with
respect to Q˜ yields
P0lr
 
Q  Q˜ +(lr  1) (P  c) = M lr  1     Q  Q˜  P0
P  c lr
!
=  M [1+ (1  l) r] ,
where M ⌘ P  c. Note that, now that there is an “external” producer of the good
exogenously supplying Q˜ at constant marginal cost c, we must consider the impact on
her welfare as well. We add this to consumer welfare and calculate that the impact on
consumer-and-external-producer welfare, is  P0(Q  Q˜)lr+ M = M(r+ 1). Thus,
summing the two terms together, we see that social surplus rises (deadweight loss
falls) by Mlr when Q˜ increases. Thus the ratio of gained efficiency to lost firm profits
is
lr
1+ (1  l) r .
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Let Q?? be the efficient quantity where P (Q??) = c and Q? be the equilibrium quan-
tity when Q˜ = 0. Then note that if Q˜ = Q?? both profits and deadweight loss are 0
as the efficient quantity is supplied and firms have no mark-up and therefore (given
constant returns) makes zero profits. Therefore we can apply the same argument that
we used to link local and global incidence. In particular letting ex ⌘ R Q??eq=0 x(Q˜)M(Q(Q˜))deqR Q??eq=0 M(Q(Q˜))deq
and the deadweight loss be defined as DWL ⌘ R Q??Q? M(Q)dQ we have that,
DWL
PS
=
elr
1+ er  elr ,
or, if l is independent of eq and Q,
DWL
PS
=
ler
1+ (1  l) er .
This formalizes the intuitive idea that when pass-through is high, excess burden is
large relative to profits because consumers bear an important part of the implicit tax
created by imperfect competition. It also formalizes the “folk theorem” (Harberger,
1954; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990) that when competition is closer to perfect, dead-
weight loss relative to profits is small as a small l makes both the numerator small
and the denominator large.
2.4 Graphical illustration
This section provides a simple graphical illustration of our results, focusing on the
monopoly case. To facilitate comparison, the mark-up over marginal cost and quan-
tity at the optimum are held constant across all panels in Figure 2.1. In the first row,
firms have constant returns technology; we compare two different demand curves
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Figure 2.1: Pass-through and the division of surplus for various demand-cost combinations.
Top has c = 1; left: P(q) = 5  q23 ; right: P(q) = .221  1
Q
1
2
. Bottom has P(q) =
19
3   43q; left: MC(q) = Q
2
4 ; right: MC(q) =
5
2q+1 .
with different pass-through rates, given constant returns, drawn from the Bulow and
Pfleiderer (1983) constant (linear cost) pass-through demand class. On the left, the
concave demand curve has a small pass-through as indicated by the small increase
in price induced by increasing the cost and thus moving along the marginal revenue
curve and up to the demand curve to the new price. On the right, the convex demand
curve has a high pass-through rate. Note that, consistent with our incidence results,
consumer surplus and deadweight loss are much larger relative to (the same) profits
on the right than on the left.
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The second row illustrates a cost-side transformation. Both the left and right
panels have the same linear demand and marginal cost at the optimum, but the left
panel has an increasing and the right panel a declining marginal cost curve. Pass-
through is thus smaller on the left than on the right. While both have the same
consumer surplus, monopoly profit is larger than with linear cost on the left, and
smaller on the right (in fact, the area above price and below marginal cost on the
right should be subtracted from the already-small profits). Thus, again, the ratio of
consumer surplus and deadweight loss to profits tracks pass-through.
2.5 Platforms
Many, and increasingly many, products (such as credit cards, social networks and
operating systems) operated by firms with market power exhibit consumption exter-
nalities between users. This has generated a growing literature, surveyed by Rysman
(2009), on such platform industries. An influential parameterization of such models,
proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2003) (RT2003), is for individual to gain a utility from
participating proportional to the aggregate number of individuals participating on
the platform, but for this constant of proportionality to differ across individuals. Be-
cause this model creates trade-offs between the surplus of infra-marginal consumers
and prices, incidence plays an important role in its analysis. We therefore consider
platforms as our first and most detailed application.
2.5.1 The Rochet and Tirole (2003) model
Consider, in particular, the original RT2003 model: a monopoly platform must
attract two distinct groups of users, such as holders and accepters of a credit card or
gamers and developers for a video game system. Value is generated by the interac-
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tion of these two groups, who are either completely or randomly matched, with the
number of users on each of the sides, denote B and S, depending on the per-interaction
prices pB and pS respectively charged. The fractions of users participating at these
prices are denoted by QB
 
pB
 
and QS
 
pS
 
respectively and the total number of inter-
actions is (proportional to) QB
 
pB
 
QS
 
pS
 
. Each QI function is a standard demand
function: smooth, strictly declining and exhibiting declining marginal revenue. The
platform faces a cost c per interaction of providing the service and thus earns profits
p
⇣
pB, pS
⌘
=
⇣
pB + pS   c
⌘
QB
⇣
pB
⌘
QS
⇣
pS
⌘
.
User surplus on each side, per-interaction, is given by the integral of demand VI
 
pI
 
=R •
pI Q
I (x) dx while average surplus is VI
 
pI
 
=
VI(pI)
QI(pI) . RT2003, and especially Ro-
chet and Tirole (2006), emphasize the distinction between the price level p ⌘ pB + pS
and the price balance, the division among the two prices, holding fixed the price level.
An elegant feature of the RT2003 model is that the quantity on each side of the
market simply multiplies the quantity on the other side, so that given linear per-
interaction costs it does not affect optimal pricing. Furthermore the (per-interaction)
price on each side of the market enters the optimization on the other side exactly
as a subsidy would: the effective marginal cost on side I is c  p I . This simplifies
analysis of monopoly pricing: on each side I the monopoly pricing rule is followed
taking c  p I as cost so
pI  
⇣
c  p I
⌘
= µI
⇣
pI
⌘
,
where µI ⌘   QI
(QI)0 is the market power term. Noting that p
I    c  p I  = p  c we
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obtain a summary of the first-order conditions as
p  c = µB
⇣
pB
⌘
= µS
⇣
pS
⌘
. (2.6)
Socially optimal pricing, on the other hand, follows Pigou’s rule (Weyl, 2009) that
price equals marginal cost less positive externalities. Here, the per-interaction ex-
ternality is the gross willingness of users on the other side to pay for an additional
interaction, the sum of their per-interaction price and average surplus. Thus socially
optimal pricing requires pI = c  p I  V I  p I  or
c  p = VB
⇣
pB
⌘
= VS
⇣
pS
⌘
. (2.7)
It can be shown (Weyl, 2009) that at any price level, not merely the optimal ones,
the profit-maximizing and consumer surplus optimal balance of prices is determined
by the second equation in (2.6) and (2.7) respectively. A profit maximizer seeks to
maximize volumes, equating the inverse hazard rates, while a planner maximizes
external benefits by equating average surplus.
Let us consider three policy-oriented questions in this context:
1. How do the socially and privately optimal balance of prices compare? Holding
fixed the price level, would moving the balance in one direction or the other
increase total user welfare?
Consumer surplus-optimal (CSO) balance requires that VB = VS or, equiva-
lently and using r analogously to Subsection 2.3.1, that rBµB = rSµS while
profit-maximizing balance requires µB = µS. Thus the divergence between the
two conditions is the factor of r: if rB > rS the CSO balance calls for lower
prices to side S than does the profit-maximizing balance as side B gains more
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infra-marginal surplus from the externalities delivered by side S than vice versa.
Thus the comparison of average pass-through on the two sides determines how
the balance should be adjusted from its private settings to maximize consumer
welfare. RT2003 assume linear demand, which has constant pass-through of 12 ,
on both sides of the market and thus obtain a coincidence between socially and
privately optimal price balance.
2. What is the incidence of a tax on interactions (an increase in c)? Is it positive on
both sides?
A rise in the price on side  I is equivalent to a cost subsidy on side I; these are
passed through at the pass-through rate to price. Thus
dpI
dc
= rI
✓
1  dp
 I
dc
◆
,
allowing us to solve out, invoking a symmetric argument, for
dpI
dc
= rI
1  r I
1  rBrS .
The second-order conditions for a monopoly optimum require rBrS < 1.7 As
a result, we note that the incidence of side I may be either positive or nega-
tive depending on how r I compares to unity; it is possible that it is above
unity without violating the second-order condition.8 RT2003 thus obtain equal
incidence of 13 for each of the firm and consumers on the two sides.
7 A small increase in prices on side B in amount e is passed through as a decrease in amount rSe on
side S and this, in turn, would be passed through as an increase of rBrSe on side B. If this second-round
effect is greater, the process is unstable, violating the standard second-order condition.
8 Note that observing a shock to cost’s effect on the two prices identifies the two pass-through rates.
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3. How does an infinitesimally small price control of size d on one side of the
market impact surplus on the other side? In particular, what is the impact of a
small price control starting from the monopolist’s optimum?
Let us decompose the effect. Total consumer surplus on side I is VIQBQS =
rIµIQBQS. The price control on side  I has two effects: it increases the exter-
nalities accruing to  I by  drIµIQI  Q I 0. On the other hand it leads to an
increase in prices on side I in an amount rI which, by the envelope theorem,
costs consumers on side I drIQBQS. The net effect of this is
 d
✓
rIµIQI
⇣
Q I
⌘0
+ rIQBQS
◆
= dQBQS
0@rI µI
  Q I
(Q I)0
  rI
1A
= dQBQS
✓
rI
µI
µ I
  rI
◆
,
where the first equation follows just by rearrangement, while the second follows
by the definition of µ I . Note that at the monopoly’s pre-control optimum,
µI = µ I and thus the expression is proportional to rI   rI . Intuitively, the
relative size of the externality compared to pass-through effects should be de-
termined by the divergence between the degree of infra-marginal surplus and
the pass-through of the tax arising from the reduction in prices on the other
side. Thus whether the other side benefits from or is harmed by a small price
control is determined by how average pass-through at prices above the equilib-
rium compares to its marginal value. This, in turn, is determined by whether
pass-through is (on average) increasing, in which case the other side benefits
from the control, decreasing, in which case it is harmed, or constant, in which
case the two effects are a wash. RT2003 thus obtain that consumers on each side
are indifferent to a small decrease in prices on the other side as linear demand
78
has constant pass-through.
While the RT2003 is obviously very special, it is useful to note that the key special
feature that makes incidence so important is not the random matching assumption
or two-sidedness but rather the uni-dimensionality of types that creates a simple and
known relationship between marginal and infra-marginal consumers’ preferences.
This feature is shared with the overwhelming majority all platform models we are
aware of.9
2.5.2 The Becker (1991) model
To illustrate this, rather than considering each of these models separately, we
instead consider another platform model that differs along as many dimensions as
possible, other than the uni-dimensionality of heterogeneity, from the RT2003 model
and show how the welfare analysis turns on similar features. Becker (1991) proposes a
platform model of restaurant pricing. While is model is much broader, let us consider
a natural version of his model with one-dimensional heterogeneity, though of a sort
opposite to that in RT2003 and much closer to the other canonical model of two-sided
markets by Armstrong (2006). Because of social influences, diners receive a smooth
utility of u(N) for visiting the restaurant if a fraction of the population N also wants
to go to the restaurant, in addition to an inherent utility from eating there of q   P
where P is the restaurant’s price. Becker assumes that, for exogenous reasons of
capacity constraints, the restaurant cannot accommodate more than K individuals
and thus earns profits Pmin{N,K}  C (min{N,K}). Nonetheless the firm may find
it optimal to set prices low enough to attract N > K diners because raising the price
may cause a discontinuous collapse in demand to below K even if q is drawn from a
9 See Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Weyl (2010) for notable exceptions.
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continuous distribution as the reduction in demand can cause a downward spiral of
diners’ social utility falling because other diners defect. In this case we may suppose
that K customers of the N interested in a spot are randomly selected.
A natural question is whether a profit-maximizing monopolist will restrict N be-
low what is optimal, as in a standard market. This is not obvious as increasing N
increases the amount of rationing, an additional effect not internalized by the firm.
A useful way to consider this problem is to imagine the firm can directly control N;
see Weyl (2010) for a justification of how the firm may be able to do this through
dynamic pricing. We let P(N) be the prevailing price at which N customers want
to go to the restaurant given that N want to go and let f be the continuous distri-
bution function of q. P(N) is the unique solution for P to N =
R •
P u(N) f (q)dq. Let
M(N) ⌘ f (P(N)  u(N)) be the density of marginal diners. By the implicit function
theorem 1 =  (P0   u0)M so P0 = u0   1M .
Assuming N > K, the interesting case, diner surplus is
K
"R •
q=P(N) u(N) q f (q)dq
N
+ u(N)  P(N)
#
.
The sign of the monopoly distortion is simply the derivative of this with respect to
N as the monopoly does not internalize the diners’ surplus while the planner does.
Taking this derivative, dividing by the constant K and dropping arguments yields
  (P0   u0)MN(P  u)  R •q=P u q f (q)dq
N2
+u0   P0 = P  u 
R •
q=P(N) u(N) q f (q)dq
N
N
+
1
M
=
P  u  q
N
+
1
M
,
where q ⌘
R •
P u(N) q f (q)dq
N which has the same sign as
N
M   CSK = µ  CSK . By the same
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reasoning as above, this is positive if r < 1 and negative if r > 1. Thus if r < 1
there is still a monopoly distortion but if r > 1 a profit-maximizing monopolist
would actually attract too many diners to the restaurant to wait in line as she fails to
internalize the disutility of rationing.10 Thus we see that incidence plays central role
in a range of platform models with unidimensional user heterogeneity with different
dimensions of heterogeneity, utility functions, rationing rules, etc.
2.6 Procuring new markets
2.6.1 Concession auctions
A public authority seeks to select the provider of a monopolistic concession to
maximize the social surplus this creates. Suppose that each concession operator will
charge a uniform price if she wins the concession, has a single feasible proposal and
has private information on both the consumer surplus CS and profits p this proposal
will generate. The authority cannot or is unwilling to monitor prices ex-post to avoid
monopoly distortions and thus must simply choose the operator generating most
surplus.
In addition to purely public settings, similar trade-offs arise when platforms, such
as supermarkets (Armstrong and Zhou, 2011) or websites (Edelman, Ostrovsky, and
Schwarz, 2007), allow product sellers to display their wares or advertisements for
these prominently in exchange for payment, because, as Gomes (2011) argues, the
platform has an incentive to internalize the consumer surplus generated by these
products in order to profit from consumers on other offerings such as fixed fees for
10 This logic, and the result it generates, are essentially identical to the analysis of the welfare ef-
fects of price controls in competitive markets with perfectly inelastic supply in Bulow and Klemperer
(Forthcoming).
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using the platform. In these literatures our assumptions of no discrimination, ex-
post monitoring or project selection are maintained. In the following two subsections
we show how the same principles of incidence will be relevant if these restrictive
assumptions are relaxed.
Solving for the optimal mechanism in this multidimensional context is beyond
the scope of our analysis here, but some interesting results can derived directly from
the logic of incidence.11 To begin, note that social surplus at the monopoly’s optimal
price is the sum of consumer surplus and monopoly profits or (1+ r)p. Because
only p affects the incentives of the various potential operators to seek the concession,
the logic of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) suggests that it will typically be impossible
to use a mechanism to screen for anything other than p. If the planner views r as
symmetrically distributed across firms (conditional on p), then she wishes to select
the firm with highest p if and only if E [ (1+ r)p|p] is ranked in the same way p
is. A grossly sufficient condition for this is that r is distributed independently of p.
Clearly if r is constant across all competitors, this is satisfied, implying Armstrong,
Vickers, and Zhou (2009)’s result that if all firms have linear demand and constant
returns (which yields constant pass-through of 12 ) then the ranking of profits and
social surplus are identical and a simple auction is optimal.
More generally, an auction should perform reasonably well so long as there is
not too strong a negative correlation between r and p. If such a correlation were
too strong, the planner might want to be unresponsive to p because of the implied
adverse selection, randomizing among symmetric proposals. Especially in such cases,
the authority would seek information that would allow it to handicap the auction
11 For more on two distinctive approaches multidimensional mechanism, see Rochet and Stole (2003)
and Veiga and Weyl (2012). The logic of the results given here is closely related to that of the latter
paper for obvious reasons.
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to favor operators with high expected r. Firms with proposals that would involve
strict capacity constraints, for example, should be disfavored as this implies rapidly
declining returns and thus low pass-through. Firms with proposals that bring valued
by an enthusiastic niche of consumers or offer products with high income elasticities
should be favored as such products are likely to have highly convex demands and
thus a high r.12 We suspect that principles of incidence would also play an important
role in the design of the optimal mechanism.
In the above we have focus on the case of ex-post monopoly as this is one of
the more common cases for concession auctions. However, if multiple, but a small
number of, operators is being selected to supply symmetrically differentiated services
and the profits of each industry configuration is observable or can be screened, the
same logic as that can be applied, replacing the monopoly incidence expression r
with the imperfectly competitive incidence r1 (1 l)r . Now the competitiveness of dif-
ferent arrangements, if this may vary, will also be a desirable screening variable. In
the following two sections we focus again on the ex-post monopoly case, with the
understanding maintained that the results are extensible to the analogous imperfect
competition settings.
2.6.2 Innovation incentives
One restriction in the previous subsection was that the authority could not mon-
itor prices ex-post. In a setting without competition (procuring a single innovation),
Weyl and Tirole (2012) consider mechanisms to simultaneously screen for the best
project while holding down prices ex-post. Assuming no marginal costs of produc-
12 We have assumed uniform pricing, but if some firms were able to discriminate more effectively
than others, discriminatory firms should be penalized (relative to their willingness to pay) as they will
appropriate more consumer surplus.
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ing the product ex-post, they consider providing innovators with rewards of the form
T
 
paq1 a
 
. Higher values of a lead to higher prices, but also raise rewards on a
given isoreward curve to innovations with high values of x ⌘ pq . In particular, taking
a derivative of the rewards
T0 · [log(p)  log(q)] paq1 a
shows that the marginal reward from raising a for a given innovation is proportional
to log(x) while the social value of an innovation is proportional (on a given isoreward
curve) to (1+ r)x1 2a. To eliminate the dependence on r, Weyl and Tirole assume
innovations are drawn according to a parameterization of demand that ensures r is
constant across all innovations. However, more generally, they show that the value
of raising a and thus distortion price ex-post in order to screen more effectively is
proportional to the average over all values of k of
Cov
h
log(x), (1+ r)x1 2a
    paq1 a = ki .
Thus a natural way to enrich their analysis would be to determine, empirically or the-
oretically, the correlation between r and various increasing functions of x. If small-
market, high-priced goods have more convex demand, as seems plausible, market
power will be more attractive than the Weyl and Tirole analysis implies as the above
covariance will be greater. If large-market, low-priced goods have more convex de-
mand, on the other hand, market power may be much less useful as a screening
device. This could be extended to allow variable costs of producing the innovative
product and broader rewards schemes by using properties of incidence more broadly
in combination with the more general version of the above covariance formula de-
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rived by Veiga and Weyl (2012). Combining this model with ex-ante competition for
the right to enter would transform this into a model of ex-post price monitoring in
the concession auction model; given the important role of incidence in screening in
both models we suspect they would combine in a natural way.
2.6.3 Project choice/design
Another restriction we imposed in Subsection 2.6.1 was that each concession op-
erator had a single, exogenous proposal. If, instead, operators can take (potentially
costly) actions to affect the characteristics of their proposals or can choose among
many potential proposals, moral hazard enters the problem. We consider each of
these formulations in turn as they correspond to different strands in the contract
theory literature. Again, we assume away competition.
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) consider a model where only one dimension of
a multidimensional set of choices by an agent may be observed. In the setting dis-
cussed above, p is the natural observable dimension and r the natural unobservable
dimension. Even if not directly observable, profits can be screened by conditioning
the probability of granting the agent operation of the concession on payments made,
while as discussed above r is unlikely to be directly screenable. By the logic of Holm-
stro¨m and Milgrom, the more difficult it is to observe r and the more responsive
r is to effort by the agent, the less incentives should respond to p (the less of the
profits generated by effort the agent should be allowed to keep). Designing an opti-
mal mechanism to implement this screening in the absence of ex-post monitoring of
profits is beyond our scope here, but the principle is clear.
An alternative formulation, proposed by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) is that
the agent may choose one of a finite set of concession projects to propose. The set
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available to the agent is unknown to the principal. The principal observes the payoff
to herself of a proposal and the payoff to the agent and thus may prohibit certain
combinations from being created, but has no access to transfers. They show that the
principal should prohibit combinations with high agent payoffs and low principal
payoffs, even if these benefit both the principal and agent compared to the status
quo, to encourage the agent to choose more socially advantageous proposals, even
though this means committing to implementing. They show that this effect grows
with the number of proposals are likely to be available and falls with the correlation
between the dimensions and with weight is placed on the agent’s payoff. In the
concession context, the agent payoff is p and the principal’s (1 + r)p. As above,
therefore, properties of r and its correlation with p determine optimal policies.
One particular implication of this style of logic is explored by Nocke and Whin-
ston (2011) who consider proposals to be mergers, many of which could be proposed.
They argue that the threshold in terms of consumer welfare gains for a merger to be
approved should be higher for mergers between larger firms in a Cournot industry
because a greater fraction of the gains from such mergers accrue to the merging part-
ners. That is, the incidence of the efficiency gains from the merger is tilted towards
the merger partners. Any other factor that would lead the incidence to be inclined
in this direction, such as greater capacity constraints among the firms, more con-
cave joint demand, etc. would lead to an analogous result by the logic of Armstrong
and Vickers. Thus a class of principles for merger policy can be derived from inci-
dence logic. In the following section we analyze more closely the connection between
industry-wide incidence and the incidence of mergers.
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2.7 Other Applications
2.7.1 Mergers
A long line of work (Werden, 1996; Shapiro, 1996; Farrell and Shapiro, 2010) has es-
tablished a close connection between the impact of mergers in differentiated products
industries and the effects of changes in cost. These ideas have been incorporated into
policy through the new United States and United Kingdom horizontal merger guide-
lines. They suggest that agency investigators consider the equivalent of a merger
in marginal cost changes to determine its competitive effects. Jaffe and Weyl (2012)
show that a (matrix) product of pass-through rates and these equivalent cost changes
are a first-order approximation to the effect of a merger on prices, where the approx-
imation’s error is proportional to the curvature of the demand system and the square
of the size of the equivalent cost changes. Rather than discuss these existing results,
in this section we consider the simpler, symmetric, merger-to-monopoly case with
constant returns to scale and use the incidence analysis from above to establish more
detailed connections between incidence and the effects of mergers. We focus on the
case of mergers between the producers of differentiated products and return to the
analysis of homogeneous goods in the next subsection on entry.
There are two firms producing symmetrically differentiated products and com-
peting Bertrand. As derived in Subsection 2.2.1, the pre-merger first-order condition
for a symmetric equilibrium at common price p is
f (p) ⌘ p  c  (1  D(p)) µ(p) = 0.
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The post-merger first-order condition is
h(p) ⌘ p  c  µ(p) = 0.
Following the logic of Jaffe and Weyl, let pM and p0 represent the assumed-unique
post- and pre-merger prices. Then, assuming h and f are locally invertible,
pM   p0 = h 1(0)  h 1 (h(p0)) ⇡ r (p0)D (p0) µ (p0) +O
⇣
D (p0)2 µ (p0)2
⌘
,
where r is the post-merger pass-through 11 µ0 . Note that because the merger is small
(rDµ|p0 is small because D is small) then µ (p0) ⇡ µ (pM) , r (p0) ⇡ r (pM) and
Q (p0) ⇡ Q (pM) then the price increase is approximately r(pM)µ(pM)D(p0) and the
fall in consumer surplus Q (pM) r(pM)µ(pM)D(p0).
Note that µ = p  c post-merger so post-merger PS = µ (pM)Q (pM). Thus, by
our results of Subsection 2.3.1 consumer surplus post-merger is r (pM)Q (pM) µ (pM).
Thus if r (pM) is close to r (pM), as would be precisely the case if pass-through is
constant, we may interpret D (p0) as approximately the ratio of the consumer surplus
destroyed by the merger to the total post-merger consumer surplus or D(p0)1+D(p0) as the fraction
of pre-merger consumer surplus destroyed by the merger. This makes the diversion
ratio a particularly natural gauge of merger impacts.
Similar approximations may be used to derive the effect of mergers on profits
(r2D2µ) as in Baker and Bresnahan (1985) or the deadweight loss created by it (for
a small merger to monopoly this is the same as the change in consumer surplus as
the change in profits is second order by this approximation) using the principle of
incidence. We suspect that in the richer, multi-product firm, merger-to-imperfect-
competition with nonlinear costs, as analyzed in Jaffe and Weyl (2012), analogous
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results may be obtained using the multi-dimensional analogs of the imperfectly com-
petitive incidence formulas from Section 2.3 and bounds based on cost non-linearities
as in our appendix.
2.7.2 Entry
Now we consider the effects of entry into an initially n-firm symmetric, Cournot
industry with common constant returns production technology. Let qn+1 be the equi-
librium post-entry, per-firm quantity and qn be the same before the merger. Entry
is equivalent to the creation of an exogenous quantity of qn+1. Let rˆn+1n be the aver-
age pass-through taken with respect to changes in the exogenous quantity and not
weighted by the mark-up. Then the entry increases industry quantity by rˆ
n+1
n
n qn+1 and
thus
rˆn+1n
n
qn+1 + nqn = (n+ 1)qn+1 =) qn+1 = n
n+ 1  rˆn+1nn
qn.
Thus output per-firm expand (contracts) if and only if n < (>)rˆn+1n . Mankiw and
Whinston (1986), ignoring the discreteness of entry, show that entry generates net
positive (negative) externalities if other firms’ output expands (contracts).13 We can
make these results more precise using incidence analysis.
First we use the formula for the impact of exogenous quantity on profits from
Subsection 2.3.2. Let ern+1n by the mark-up weighted version of rˆn+1n . Then the impact
of entry on profits of existing firms is bounded between the (inter-equilibria average
of) the pre-entry profit incidence
 
1+ n 1n r
 
(P   c)qn+1 and the post-merger inci-
dence
 
1+ nn+1r
 
(P   c)qn+1. The reduction in deadweight loss is bounded above
by the pre-entry incidence formula, the average of rn (P  c)qn+1 and rn+1 (P  c)qn+1.
13 They also establish weaker results when the integer constraints are included, but our results here
are more precise than these.
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The profit gained by entering is (P  c)qn+1 evaluated at the post-merger equilibrium.
Note that as we allow n to change continuously we recover the Mankiw and Whin-
ston results as r, P and n are constant so the comparison of deadweight loss reduction
to profit gain is just rn to 1. Discreteness makes entry more attractive to the extent
that average mark-ups on the entry path are significantly above post-entry mark-ups,
n+1
n is significantly different from 1 and pass-through increases as prices fall (making
its mark-up weighted average less than its straight weighted-average).
Thus incidence is a useful summary of the impact of entry on profits, quantities
and social welfare. Because mergers in symmetric, constant returns Cournot indus-
tries are equivalent to exit, these could be analyzed in the same manner and combined
naturally with marginal cost efficiencies, given that the impact of these will again be
determined by incidence.
2.7.3 Price discrimination
A recent literature has revisited classical questions in the theory of monopoly price
discrimination using an approach closely related to that employed here. Aguirre,
Cowan, and Vickers (2010) (ACV) return to one of the oldest questions in industrial
organization, posed by Pigou (1920): when does explicit third-degree price discrimi-
nation by a monopolist raise output and/or welfare?
Consider two markets, high (H) and low (L). Absent discrimination, prices are
constrained to be identical. With discrimination, prices in H exceed those in L by D.
ACV propose a natural continuous path from no discrimination to discrimination: we
require that pH < pL + d. Assume profits in each market pH and pL are concave in
price. Then for any d 2 [0,D], the monopolist will choose pH = pL + d. Her first-order
condition is thus
 
pH
 0
(pL + d) +
 
pL
 0
(pL) = 0. For d < D,
 
pL
 0
< 0 <
 
pH
 0, but
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these both converge to 0 as d goes to D.
A firm facing exogenous quantity Q˜ earns profits
⇥
Q(p)  Q˜⇤ (p  c). Her first-
order condition is thus Q0(p)(p   c) + Q(p)   Q˜, while the first-order condition in
the high market in the price discrimination problem is
 
QH
 0
(p)(p  c) + QH(p) + 
pL
 0
(p  d). In effect, the downward pressure on prices from the constraint against
discrimination in the low market enters in the same way as exogenous quantity. Mov-
ing towards discrimination is therefore equivalent to moving exogenous quantity
from the high market to the low market.
Thus ACV show that discrimination leads to higher output if an average of (quan-
tity) pass-through in the low market exceeds that in the high market. Similarly the
change in social welfare in each market from the change in quantity is
R
Mdq so
a comparison of an average of the mark-up times the pass-through over the relevant
range in the two markets determines the welfare effect of discrimination. The connec-
tions of pass-through to demand curvature make it clear how this result immediately
implies the famous prior results of Pigou (1920), Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981)
and Varian (1985) on the connections between demand curvature and the effects of
discrimination.
Cowan (2010) analyzes the consumer surplus effects of discrimination by formu-
lating the change from non-discrimination to discrimination instead in terms of a
change in costs. Prior to discrimination, effectively costs in the low (high) market are
elevated (depressed) by
   MRL(H)n   c    where MRL(H)n represents the marginal revenue
in the low (high) market at non-discriminatory prices. Introducing discrimination
eliminates this cost shift and thus causes surplus in the low market to rise by rqLndDt
and in the high market to fall by rqHndDt, where this represents the average over the
range between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory prices and Dt represents
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the equivalent change in cost. Cowan argues that rq is likely an increasing function
of q (decreasing in p) so rqLnd > r
L
nqLn , while rqHnd < r
H
n qHn .
On the other hand at the non-discriminatory optimum, the marginal costs (excess
of MC over MR in the high market) and benefits (excess of MR over MC in the low
market) of lowering prices by an infinitesimal number of log points are equal and
thus
eLnq
L
n
⇣
MRLn   c
⌘
= eHn q
H
n
⇣
c MRHn
⌘
,
where e is the elasticity of demand. Thus, assuming Cowan’s relations from the
previous paragraph, a sufficient condition for discrimination to increase consumer
welfare is that
rLn
rHn
>
eLn
eHn
.
Cowan also derives necessary conditions using a similar approach.
The logic of incidence can be used to extend both of these results to the wide range
of imperfectly competitive models we analyzed above. Consider the ACV result.
Suppose that, with or without discrimination, each market is governed by the same
conduct l = p cµ where µ is either independent or pooled depending on whether
discrimination is allowed or not. Absent discrimination
µ =   Q
H +QL
(QH)0 + (QL)0
=  
QL   QH(QL)
0 QL(QH)0
(QH)0+(QL)0
(QL)0
=  
QH + Q
H(QL)
0 QL(QH)0
(QH)0+(QL)0
(QH)0
.
Thus the argument that the prohibition on discrimination acts as equal-and-offsetting
exogenous quantity competition in the two markets in an amount
QH(QL)
0 QL(QH)0
(QH)0+(QL)0
holds generally. Because quantity pass-through in the two markets is lr, if l is con-
stant in p, precisely the same results, interpreted in terms of averages of pass-through
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or of demand curvature (as this is a simple transformation of pass-through), hold un-
der imperfect competition. An analogous argument applies for Cowan’s results.
Finally, Myatt and Rasmusen (2011) argue that the more infra-marginal surplus
and deadweight loss there are, the more incentive a monopolist will have to per-
fectly price discriminate. To formalize this they assume that under third-degree price
discrimination the monopolist must bilaterally Nash (1950) bargain with each buyer.
Thus, if bargaining weights are equal, this is attractive if and only if the sum of con-
sumer surplus and deadweight loss is greater than profits. As they observe, with
constant returns, a sufficient condition is that demand be convex and a sufficient con-
dition to avoid this is demand be concave, as these imply respectively pass-through
globally above and below 12 . A generalization is that discrimination is desirable if
r+ r˜+ 1 > 1l , where l is the monopolist’s bargaining weight.
14
2.7.4 Product design
Spence (1975) considers a firm’s optimal choice of a one-dimensional quality pa-
rameter, arguing that firms will move quality in a direction that redistributes from
infra-marginal to marginal consumers. Johnson and Myatt (2006) study a special case
of the Spence model where the quality parameter induces a rotation of the demand
curve about a point and, under some restrictions of this parameterization, obtain
sharper results. While illuminating, these exercises are all highly parametric in char-
acter. Here we show how the logic of incidence allows analysis of non-parametric
formulations of these types of problems.
Suppose a monopolist must charge a uniform price and has normalized-to-zero
14 This generalization may or may not extend to case of general costs, depending on the interpretation
one takes of bargaining with non-constant cost. It does not extend under the interpretation adopted by
Myatt and Rasmusen.
93
variable cost of producing a good. She may face any demand such that potential gains
from trade are constant, say at 1. What demand curves are most and least attractive
to her?
Given that total potential gains from trade divide into consumer surplus, dead-
weight loss and profits, the best curves will be those which minimize the ratio of
the second two to the first and the worst those that maximize it. Thus her optimal
demand curve has a pass-through rate everywhere as close to 0 as possible. This
is achieved by the maximally concave demand curve, one which kinks from flat to
vertical, namely there is a mass 1 of consumers each of whom value the good at 1. In
this case the monopolist captures all surplus.
Her pessimal demand curve has pass-through rate every whereas large as possi-
ble. For any fixed demand curve the monopolist can always make some profits by
charging, say, the mean willingness to pay which is strictly positive and we can always
construct another demand with higher pass-through than this one which will reduce
her profits further. Thus there is no single pessimal demand curve. However, we can
use Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983)’s class of constant pass-through demand curves to
construct an increasing sequence that conveys the idea.
If demand is given by their form, Q(p) = s
⇣
1+ r 1r
p
m
⌘ r
1 r then pass-through
is constant at r and integration yields that consumer surplus is rsm
⇣
1+ r 1r
p
m
⌘ 1
1 r .
Thus when the price is efficient at 0 surplus is rsm. Let m be constant at 1 and
s = 1r for r > 0. We then obtain a parameterized class
⇣
1+ r 1r p
⌘ r
1 r
r . As r ! •
we have at each point a well-defined demand curve with total gains from trade of 1.
However the monopolist’s optimal price is 1 at every point and Q(1) ! 0. Thus her
profits approach 0. Thus the sequence of arbitrarily bad demand curves approaches
a constant elasticity demand curve, shifted vertically down one unit and scaled down
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as the elasticity approaches 1 to preserve constant potential gains from trade. This is
the maximally convex demand curve maintaining finite surplus and asymptotically
denies all profit to the monopolist. Note that the particular sequence of demands
we have chosen has also asymptotically 0 deadweight loss as the quantity below the
monopoly price tends to 0.
While it would be excessive to here consider other problems of this sort in detail,
we briefly mention two other possibilities and sketch their solution, highlighting the
role of incidence:
1. What demand curve generates most waste? We want a curve that has low
pass-through above the monopoly optimum but a high pass-through below. We
could achieve this by mixing the two solutions above, having demand kink to
being flat above the price of 1 but approach the shifted constant elasticity form
at prices below 1.
2. What if the monopolist is taxed by a government (or supplied by an upstream
firm) that seeks to maximize some combination of consumer surplus and the
revenue it earns with no weight on the monopolist’s profits? Now the monopo-
list’s best demand curve from above is as bad as his worst as the authority can
tax away all her profits. To see this, note that the government or upstream form
may charge the monopoly price to the monopoly without inducing it to raise
price, thereby extracting all of its surplus. However, as we discuss further in
the next subsection, high pass-through acts as a deterrent to taxation as it forces
consumers to bear the burden of taxes, reducing tax revenue and increasing
consumer surplus lost by taxation. Therefore the monopolist will want a high
pass-through locally, but a low pass-through at higher prices (to avoid leaving
too much surplus to consumers) and lower prices (to avoid too much dead-
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weight loss), while still satisfying the second-order conditions of the upstream
firm or authority.
The intuitions emerging from this analysis are in many ways similar to those of
Spence and Johnson and Myatt and parametric versions of the variations on those
problems. However, they show how incidence can provide a complementary non-
parametric analysis of the incentives in product design that may be useful in settings
where no particular parameterization is naturally compelling. Clearly, these exercises
can be easily extended to imperfect competition.
2.7.5 Supply chains
A canonical model of supply chains proposed by Spengler (1950) has a “up-
stream” firm choosing its price, which is then taken by a downstream firm that
charges prices to consumers. Natural extensions considered by many authors allow
for multiple stages in the supply chain and imperfect competition at each stage.
First consider a supply chain consisting of several layers of imperfectly compet-
itive firms supplying a necessary input to a downstream sector, which may then
supply end-consumers or another downstream sector. There is a final demand func-
tion Q (p0) for the product. This, combined with a supply side structure, determines
an equilibrium pass-through rate r0 of the retailers as a function of the per-unit cost
p1 they are charged by the upstream firms. The upstream firms thus face effective
demand Q (p0 (p1)) with market power
µ
r0
, where µ ⌘   QQ0 as before. Thus, letting l1
be the competitiveness of the level 1 sector, equilibrium in an a symmetric upstream
market is given by
p1  MC = µl1r0 .
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Thus the comparison of mark-ups between the upstream and downstream firms
is given by the comparison of l1r to l0 where l0 is the competitiveness parameter
downstream. This reasoning continues up the supply chain, with the aggregate pass-
through of all levels beneath determining the incentives faced at each level. This im-
plies that the pass-through from the nth to the (n  1)th level will depend on deriva-
tive of the pass-through from the (n  1)th to the nth level and thus on the (2+ n)th
derivative of demand, in principle allowing the identification from mark-up data of
very high-order properties of demand, extending the logic of Villas-Boas and Heller-
stein (2006). Conversely if constant pass-through is assumed many of these effects
disappear, strong predictions are implied and the model is highly over-identified.
Analogous settings arise when firms sequentially choose how much of a homo-
geneous good to produce, as in the classic von Stackelberg (1934) model, extended
by Anderson and Engers (1992) to the case when this occurs in many stages. The
pass-through of quantities at each stage to the final market plays an analogous role
to cost pass-through along a supply chain. Details are available on request.
2.7.6 Aftermarkets and advertising
Farrell (2008) considers a simple model of “aftermarkets” where a firm sells an
add-on to a base product. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and others have argued that
often consumers fail to anticipate the expense of these add-ons. Farrell asks whether
and by how much such failure harms consumers. This is very similar to the analysis
of Dixit and Norman (1978) who study firms who, through advertising, can persuade
consumers their product is worth more than it really is. However, Farrell is more
concerned with whether a small amount of abusive after-product activity is harm-
ful, while Dixit and Norman focus on whether at equilibrium too much or too little
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advertising is supplied.
A small abusive after-market profit raises the effective profit of selling the initial
good and thus acts as a uniform (if all consumers are homogeneous) subsidy on the
product. Thus, to the first-order, the net effect of imposing a small such after-market
“tax” on consumers that effectively subsidizes the initial good is  Q (1  r). Thus, as
Farrell shows, such a subsidy may, paradoxically, actually increase consumer surplus
if r > 1. The same holds for (a small bit of costless) advertising, except that the
subsidy is given, effectively, to the consumers and thus the nominal price will rise by
one unit more than in the Farrell case (though possibly still fall). Note, too, that social
welfare clearly rises as long as l > 0 as total incidence is Qlr.
Now we consider the privately optimal level, in the spirit of Dixit and Norman.15
Suppose an industry association (or a monopolist) must choose a level of advertis-
ing a which uniformly increases willingness-to-pay for the product. Consumers lose
Q (1  r) directly but also lose indirectly by purchasing a good they value less than
they pay for it. This indirect loss is given, on the margin, by the Harberger triangle
 aQ0r. Thus total consumer loss is Q
h
1  r
⇣
1  aµ
⌘i
. Thus, if firms in the industry
perfectly collude on advertising levels, advertising is excessive (insufficient) if
1 > (<)r
✓
1  a
µ
◆
.
Explicit assumptions about cost of advertising can tie down a further using the gains
that firms make from advertising (from their incidence formula), but rather than con-
tinue on this analysis, we turn to an alternative perspective on advertising, that of
Becker and Murphy (1993). In this case consumers gain the full benefit from the ad-
15 Our analysis differs from theirs, however, by allowing demand to be more general but advertising
to enter demand in a more restricted way and using pre-advertising preferences to evaluate welfare.
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vertisement and thus view advertisements as equivalent to quality improvements in
the good or subsidies. Again sticking to the uniform benefit formulation, consumers
gain Qr from advertising, which is not internalized by the firm, and thus advertising
is undersupplied at a rate proportional to r.
Of course, the uniform value increment assumption is a simplistic way to model
the benefits from advertising. The distribution of marginal value increases from ad-
vertising could be modeled in many other ways, but incidence calculations for both
the original demand and the marginal change from advertising would likely be cru-
cial for the welfare properties in these cases as well.
2.7.7 Taxing foreign trade
Brander and Spencer (1981) ask when a government that does not care about the
welfare of an imperfectly competitive sector will find it attractive to tax that sector
to extract its rents.16 While Brander and Spencer motivate the problem with a focus
on foreign trade, the same principles would apply to the regulation of a domestic
firm if the planner does not value firm profits equally with consumer surplus and
government revenues as in Laffont and Tirole (1993).
The government charges a specific tax t. If Q is the equilibrium demand of con-
sumers, the marginal loss to consumers of the product is rQ and to the government
on infra-marginal tax is trQ0, while the marginal revenue gain to the state is Q. Thus
the optimum requires
1 = r
✓
1+
t
µ
◆
=) t? = µ1  r
r
.
16 They only consider a monopoly model, while we consider general imperfect competition.
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Note that this formula in no way depends on the existence of imperfect competition;
it applies equally well to the setting where the foreign firms are perfectly competitive.
It thus unifies the analysis of Brander and Spencer with the classic analysis of terms-
of-trade reasons for taxing imports as in Johnson (1953–1954). The only difference
is that with an imperfectly competitive foreign sector, it is possible that r > 1 and
thus a negative tax (subsidy) on imports may, in principle, be optimal. Thus the two
theories are one, at least this far.
However, the externality of a tax on the foreign sellers is strictly greater with
market power than in its absence: rather than Q (1  r), incidence on the foreign
industry is Q [1  (1  l)r]. Thus there will be a stronger incentives for international
trade agreements to limit such taxes between countries where firms have greater
market power and in models where firms exercise this power, as in Ossa (2011).
2.7.8 Demand forms
As we hope has become clear from the examples above, incidence plays an impor-
tant role in a range of problems in industrial economics. Parametric restrictions on
it are thus powerful. The commonly-used linear, constant elasticity and exponential
demand forms each imply constant pass-through of respectively 12 ,
e
e 1 and 1. In pre-
vious work (Weyl and Fabinger, 2009), we showed that most standard demand forms,
even when flexible along many dimensions imply equally strong restrictions on pass-
through and thus may not be flexible in the most relevant dimensions for many eco-
nomic problems. We proposed a new Adjustable pass-through (Apt) demand function
that allowed for flexibility on the level, elasticity, pass-through and slope of pass-
through while maintaining most of the tractability of simpler demand forms in the
Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) constant pass-through class. In on-going work (Fabinger
100
and Weyl, 2012), we are using this form to obtain closed-form solutions canonical
models, such as monopolistically competitive international trade models, and high-
light the ways results obtained under particular incidence assumptions (arising from
linear and/or constant elasticity demand models) depend on or are invariant to pass-
through. We are also working on parameterized transformations of non-parametric
demand functions that preserve, as with the stretch parameterization of Weyl and
Tirole (2012), or transform the pass-through properties of an arbitrary demand func-
tion.
2.7.9 An empirical example
Atkin and Donaldson (2012) explicitly use the role of pass-through as a sufficient
statistic and the structure of our results above to analyze the degree of competition
in markets and the division of surplus from globalization. They consider markets for
various internationally-traded commodities in different locations within developing
countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. They impose three key assumptions:
that demand curvature is constant (demand is in the Bulow and Pfleiderer class) and
the same across markets for a given product, returns are constant to scale and conduct
is invariant to prices (l is constant). They then use the variation in empirical pass-
through in the face of global price shocks across geographic locations for a given
product to back out l, the degree of competition. Integrating and using the fact the
under their assumptions local and global incidence are identical, they determine the
division of surplus arising from the market existing between the intermediaries and
consumers. This illustrates how relatively transparent restrictions on the behavior of
pass-through can be used for empirical identification of questions of long-standing
economic interest.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper argues that, just as in perfectly competitive models, incidence offers
a powerful framework for organizing the analysis of comparative statics and welfare
under imperfect competition. We have argued that, to paraphrase the conclusion of
Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), the crucial question for welfare in im-
perfectly competitive markets is typically not “Do these markets exhibit price compe-
tition or quantity competition or competition using some other strategic variable?”,
“Are products differentiated, how many firms are there, do firms act strategically or
are they monopolistic competitors?” or even Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer’s
“Do competitors think of the products as strategic substitutes or as strategic comple-
ments?” but rather, “What is the pass-through and incidence of a tax in this market?”
Unlike the first group of questions, including the Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klem-
perer formulation this last question is not “new” to oligopoly theory. Rather it is
what, at least since the time of Marshall, economists have been asking about compet-
itive markets to analyze a wide range of outcomes and policies. Thus the analysis
of “strategic” industries with market power may not be as distinct as it may at first
seem from the analysis of perfectly competitive markets.
While we offered a number of applications of incidence reasoning we neither
exhausted potential applications nor exhaustively treated those we considered. More
basic theoretical work remains to be done on incidence, particularly in imperfectly
competitive asymmetric differentiated products industries. We briefly discuss each of
these directions for future in this conclusion.
Extensions of many of the applications to related models could be fruitful, such
as:
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• Other models of platforms with unidimensional heterogeneity, such as those of
Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006), Goos, Cayseele, and Willekens
(2011) and Gomes and Pavan (2011).
• Enrichments of the procurement models of Section 2.6 to combine aspects of
competition, moral hazard, product selection and ex-post monitoring.
• Merger and entry analysis in non-symmetric, differentiated products industries
with more than two firms.
Other promising applications of incidence reasoning include:
• The design and analysis of auctions, some connections to which are drawn by
Mares and Swinkels (2011).
• Nonlinear pricing and optimal taxation, where curvature of distributions was
shown by Saez (2001) to play an important role.
• Almost all international trade models use explicit, often constant pass-through
demand forms to obtain results, which are known to vary based on, for exam-
ple, whether linear or constant elasticity demand are employed. It thus seems
likely that incidence plays an important role in the comparative statics of such
models.
Finally, there are some important areas for extending the basic logic of incidence.
Generalizations to multi-product firms and to relax the assumptions of concavity and
stability made here were included in previous versions of this paper and are available
on request. But the analysis of asymmetric, differentiated and imperfectly competing
firms, a workhorse of empirical industrial organization, remains under analyzed; see
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Gabaix, Laibson, Li, Li, Resnick, and de Vries (2010), Quint (2012), earlier versions of
this paper and Jaffe and Weyl (2012) for some suggestive but special results about the
role of incidence in these settings.
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3. PRICE DYNAMICS FOR DURABLE GOODS
3.1 Introduction
Expenditure on durable goods accounts for 60% of consumption expenditure and
all of investment expenditure. It is the most volatile component of GDP at business
cycle frequencies. A large fraction of international trade is in durable goods. As
is well known, the durable nature of the product makes the pricing of these goods
differ from that of nondurables, since consumers demand for durables today depends
not only on prices today but also on their expectation of future prices. In the vast
majority of macroeconomic models (both closed and open-economy) that study the
behavior of durables pricing of durables is treated similar to that of nondurables:
either perfect competition is assumed and firms are price takers or if the firm has
pricing power they are assumed to not internalize the effect of their price today on
future demand for their product, despite the durable nature of their product (Barsky,
House, and Kimball (2007)). In the open economy literature the impact of exchange
rate movements on prices is studied in environments where goods are assumed to be
nondurable, despite the preponderance of durable goods in trade.
On the other hand there is a large microeconomic literature that studies the spe-
cific problem of pricing of durable goods and its special features relative to non-
durable pricing. The forward looking nature of demand implies that the prices firms
set will depend on whether they can commit to future prices or cannot. In one of the
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earliest papers in the literature Coase (1972) conjectured that in the absence of com-
mitment a monopolistic firm producing durable goods will be bound to charge the
marginal cost due to perfect inter-temporal competition with itself. This conjecture
has been proven by Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson
(1986) in various setups, as discussed in the Supplementary Section 1.5 of Chapter 1
of Tirole (1988). This conjecture is a limiting result in an environment where prices
adjust at each instant (continuous time) or there is zero depreciation of the durable
good. A large literature has followed as surveyed in Waldman (2003). Much of this
analysis has focused on long-run pricing behavior with less emphasis on dynamics
and response to shocks. Also, the analysis is typically done for the case of a mo-
nopolist. As Waldman (2003) mentions in his conclusion (see p. 150) “most of the
literature assumes either monopoly or perfect competition, while clearly most real
world markets are either oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive”.
In this work we bring the insights in the microeconomic literature on durable
goods pricing into macroeconomic environments. Consistent with macroeconomic
treatment of durable goods we allow for positive depreciation rates and discrete time
periods between price setting and evaluate several pricing environments including
monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. We explore the cases of commit-
ment and discretion and evaluate the response to cost and demand shocks.
We consider a partial equilibrium environment and focus on firms price setting
given a consumer demand function that depends on its prices today and in the future.
In the case with commitment, prices are independent of the past levels of durable
goods consumption and of past prices. It depends on the current level of demand
and on current and future costs. If the elasticity of demand (with respect to the
“rental” price of the durable good) is constant then prices are a constant markup over
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marginal costs. There are no endogenous dynamics in prices. There is complete and
instantaneous pass-through of cost (exchange rate shocks) into prices and demand
shocks have no effect on prices. When firms have the ability to commit they are able
to commit not to compete with themselves and thus obtain monopoly rents.
As is well known the commitment solution is not dynamically consistent. The
demand for the durable good depends on its expected future price. In the current
period the monopolist would benefit if the consumers believed that the future prices
of the durable good would be high, but in the next period, the monopolist would like
to lower the price in order to increase sales. In the absence of the monopolist’s ability
to commit to high future prices, the consumers will base their current purchases on
their expectation of low future prices. This impedes the producer’s ability to capture
the full potential monopoly rent.
We evaluate the implications of the time consistent solution for the dynamics of
adjustment to cost and demand shocks and focus on Markov perfect equilibria. In this
environment prices depends on the endogenous state variable, the stock of durables.
Consequently prices adjust sluggishly to shocks even when the shock is a permanent
shock. Markups move endogenously over time. In response to a positive cost shock
(exchange rate shock) prices increase but by less than the percent increase in costs
and markups decline generating incomplete pass-through. When costs increase firms
mute the price response to prevent consumers from shifting demand to the future
when they cannot commit to keep prices high (relative to their marginal cost). De-
mand shocks also now impact pricing. Markups and prices increase in response to
positive demand shocks.
The fact that markups decrease in response to a positive cost shock has implica-
tions for the literature on incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Most traded goods
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are durable in nature. The fact that pass-through is incomplete in the long-run is fre-
quently attributed to strategic complementarities in pricing that prevents a firm from
raising its price in response to cost shocks as this causes the elasticity of demand it
faces to rise. Adding the assumption of frictions in price adjustment then generates
dynamics in pass-through.
Therefore, in the case of durable goods, with discretion in pricing one obtains
pass-through dynamics even in the flexible price case, and incomplete pass-through
even in the absence of standard strategic complementarities in pricing and constant
elasticity of demand. This contrasts with the literature on exchange rate pass-through
that treats all goods as nondurable and where endogenous dynamics in prices arise
because of infrequent price adjustments and pass-through is incomplete in the long-
run because of variable markups that arise from strategic complementarities in pric-
ing. The solution here also contrasts with the standard macroeconomic assumption
of marginal cost pricing of durable goods. The endogeneity of markups implies that,
in response to cost shocks, the volatility in prices and therefore quantity is lower than
the case of constant markup pricing.
In the case of oligopolistic competition where firms engage in Cournot competi-
tion in producing a homogenous good the pricing decision of each firm is influenced
by two different forces: competition with the other firms and inter-temporal compe-
tition with itself. We show here that the extent of dynamics in prices, in the time-
consistent solution, is a decreasing function of the number of firms. That is, with
a large number of competing firms, the across-firm competition dominates the inter-
temporal within firm competition of the firm. In the case of monopolistic competition
where each firm produces an individual variety and is assumed to be infinitesimally
small relative to the industry we show that the problem is similar that of a durable
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good monopolist subject to stochastic demand shocks. We also show that the price of
a particular variety (and the persistence in price dynamics) of durable good depends
more strongly on the deviation of the average stock of durables in the industry from
its steady state as compared to the deviations of the stock of its variety relative to the
industry average.
In future versions of this work we plan to nest the durable goods pricing problem
into a general equilibriummacroeconomic environment. A paper in the literature that
speaks to the dynamic response to demand shocks is Caplin and Leahy (2006). They
provide an (S, s) model of durable stock adjustment by heterogeneous consumers
with monopoly pricing by firms, also in a partial equilibrium environment. Our
approach to modeling demand is very different which allows us to address the cases
of oligopoly and monopolistic competition. Esteban and Shum (2007) study price
and quantity dynamics in an oligopolistic environment with secondary markets for
the case of automobiles. Their focus is on measuring the competitive importance of
the secondary market.
Section 3.2 describes the demand for durable goods. Section 3.3 derives results
for pricing and quantity dynamics for the case of a monopolist and Sections 3.4 and
3.5 analyze dynamics for the case of oligopoly and monopolistic competition.
3.2 Durable good demand
Consider an infinitesimal agent deriving instantaneous utility U(Ct,Dt; xt) from
consumption of durable good Dt and nondurable good Ct in period t. The parameter
xt represents a demand shock. The time is discrete and the one-period discount
factor is b. Period t purchases of the durable good are denoted by Xt and d is the
depreciation rate of the durable, so the dynamics of the stock of durable is described
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by
Dt = (1  d)Dt 1 + Xt. (3.1)
Denote by Pt the price of the durable good and by PCt the price of the nondurable
good, which is being consumed in positive quantities each period. The agent faces
one-period gross interest rate equal to 1/b. The agent maximizes
E0
•
Â
t=0
btU(Ct,Dt; xt)
subject to
•
Â
t=0
bt (PCtCt + Pt (Dt   (1  d)Dt 1))  NPV0
where NPV0 represents the discounted net present value of the agent’s resources1.
The first order conditions for the choice of Ct and Dt are
U1(Ct,Dt; xt) = ltPCt
and
U2(Ct,Dt; xt)  ltPt + b(1  d)Etlt+1Pt+1 = 0
where lt is the Lagrange multiplier on the period t budget constraint. In deriving
the first order condition we have implicitly assumed that there are no irreversibility
of purchases constraints. In other words, the consumer can always sell the remaining
stock of the durable good at the market price. Alternatively, we may assume that
shocks are small and prices are never so high that the irreversibility constraint Xt+1  
0 binds. That is, the representative consumer will want to purchase positive amounts
1 Generalization to stochastic consumer’s endowment is straightforward.
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of the durable good in every period. This will be the case, for example, if d is high
enough.
Let us now assume that the period utility function is quasi-linear, U(Ct,Dt; xt) ⌘
Ct + u(Dt; xt), and normalize PCt = 1. The first order conditions are then equivalent
to lt = 1, and2
u0(Dt; xt) = Pt   b(1  d)EtPt+1 (3.2)
The marginal utility from an additional unit of the durable good should equal the
price of the durable net of the expected future resale value of the undepreciated
durable goods stock. In the following sections we use this demand equation as a
starting point, specializing at times to linear or constant elasticity demand. Linear
demand corresponds to a quadratic utility function u. With a convenient choice of
the demand shock xt, the marginal utility may be written as
u0(Dt; xt) = a+ xt   bDt.
for some parameters a and b > 0. Constant elasticity demand3 corresponds to u being
a concave power function. The demand shock xt is chosen so that
u0(Dt; x) = xtD 1/st ,
where s is the demand elasticity in case of no durability, i.e., d = 1.
In the next section we introduce the firm that produces the durable good and its
2 In general, for functions of multiple variables, prime is used to denote the partial derivative with
respect to the first argument.
3 This choice of terminology requires caution. The demand function does not have constant elasticity
with respect to the price Pt, but with respect to the price at which the durable goods could be, in
principle, rented, namely Pt   b(1  d)EtPt+1.
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price setting decision. We assume that the firm’s production function is linear, with
constant marginal costs Wt that can vary over time.
3.3 Durable good monopoly
3.3.1 The commitment case as a benchmark
Consider a monopolistic firm producing durable goods at a marginal cost Wt in
period t, which can commit to a sequence of prices {Pt}•t=0 of its choice. The prices
may depend on the state of the world. The sequence of prices is chosen in period
t = 0 to maximize the discounted net present value of profits
E0
•
Â
t=0
bt(Pt  Wt)Xt,
where Xt satisfies (3.1) and Dt satisfies (3.2). For convenience, we denote by (1 
d)D 1 the stock of the durable good the consumers had at the beginning of period
t = 0 before making any purchases in that period. The following lemma characterizes
the optimal choice of prices by the monopolist.
Lemma 1 (Monopoly, pricing with commitment): Provided that the initial condition
is D 1 = 0, the durable good monopolist’s optimal pricing with commitment satisfies
Pt = Et
•
Â
j=0
bj(1  d)j st+j
st+j   1
 
Wt+j   b(1  d)Et+jWt+j+1
 
,
where
st ⌘ s(Dt; xt) =   u
0(Dt; xt)
u00(Dt; xt)Dt
,
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and the level of demand Dt is determined by
u0(Dt; xt) =
st
st   1 (Wt   b(1  d)EtWt+1)
Proof: The Lagrangian for the firm’s problem may be written as
L0 = E0
•
Â
t=0
bt
⇥
(Pt  Wt) (Dt   (1  d)Dt 1) + lt
 
u0(Dt; xt)  Pt + b(1  d)Pt+1
 ⇤
,
where lt is the Lagrange multiplier for the demand condition (3.2). The optimality
conditions are
(Dt   lt)  (1  d)Dt 1 = 0 for t = 0,
(Dt   lt)  (1  d) (Dt 1   lt 1) = 0 for t > 0,
(Pt  Wt)  b(1  d)Et (Pt+1  Wt+1) + ltu00(Dt) = 0 for all t.
When D 1 = 0, the optimal path of Dt is Dt = lt, and the optimal path of Pt satisfies
(Pt  Wt)  b(1  d)Et(Pt+1  Wt+1) =  Dtu00(Dt) (3.3)
Using the demand equation (3.2) and rearranging terms yields the demand con-
dition in the proposition:
u0(Dt; xt) =
st
st   1 (Wt   b(1  d)EtWt+1)
Recursively substituting for Pt+j in (3.2), letting Etbj(1   d)jPt+j ! 0 as j ! •,
and substituting for u0(Dt; xt) using the previous equation one arrives at the price
equation in the proposition. ⌅
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Note that in the case of competitive pricing, Pt = Wt, and Dt evolves according to
u0(Dt; xt) = Wt   b(1  d)EtWt+1, which differs from the monopoly pricing solution
by the factor st/ (st   1) .
In general, it follows from the proposition that there is no endogenous dynamics
in prices. Prices set at time t do not depend on lagged prices, only on current and
future costs. If the costs Wt follow an AR(1) process with mean W and persistence
fW , the price sequence satisfies
Pt = (1  b(1  d))
•
Â
j=0
bj(1  d)jEt
⇢
st+j
st+j   1

W + (Wt+j  W)1  b(1  d)fW1  b(1  d)
  
.
For constant elasticity demand, st ⌘ s, and arbitrary processes for cost and de-
mand shocks, the optimal pricing policy is the standard constant markup pricing:
Pt =
s
s  1Wt.
This pricing has the following properties: (a) complete instantaneous pass-through;
(b) independence from demand shocks; and (c) independence from the depreciation
rate d and length of time period (inversely related to b). It coincides with the opti-
mal nondurable pricing policy. This will be our benchmark for comparison in what
follows.
With linear demand u0(D; x) = a+ x   bD and AR(1) processes for demand and
cost shocks (with persistence parameters fx and fW), we have
a+ xt   2bdt = W + (Wt  W)[1  fWb(1  d)],
st =
a+xt
bDt   1,
Pt = 12
h
a
1 b(1 d) + (Wt  W) + xt1 fxb(1 d)
i
.
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Here the mean of xt is set to zero.
3.3.2 Discretionary pricing of durable goods
It is well known that the commitment solution for the monopolist is time inconsis-
tent. The demand for the durable good depends on its expected future price. In the
current period the monopolist would benefit if the consumers believed that the fu-
ture prices of the durable good would be high, but in the next period, the monopolist
would like to lower the price in order to increase sales. In the absence of the monop-
olist’s ability to commit to high future prices, the consumers will base their current
purchases on their expectation of low future prices. This impedes the producer’s
ability to capture the full potential monopoly rent.
In this subsection we evaluate the case of such discretionary pricing. In each pe-
riod the monopolist sets prices taking as given the residual demand for the good.
The monopolistic firm does not internalize the effect its expected pricing in the cur-
rent period had on demand in the previous period. We solve for Markov perfect
equilibria.
In the case under consideration, the demand for the product in each period is
still given by (3.2), where EtPt+1 are the expectations of consumers about the pricing
policy of the monopolist. There are two exogenous state variables Wt and xt, both
of which follow Markov processes. We restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria
where the only endogenous state variable is Dt 1. In other words, we assume that
only the current level of the ‘physical’ state variable matters for decisions economic
agents, not the full history leading to this level. A change in Dt affects the policy of
the firm in future periods and consumers take this into account when they demand
the durable good today.
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Formally, denote by V(Dt 1;Wt, xt) the value of the firm as a function of the
endogenous and exogenous state variables. The value satisfies the Bellman equation
V(Dt 1;Wt, xt) = max
Pt,Dt
{(Pt  Wt) (Dt   (1  d)Dt 1) + bEtV(Dt;Wt+1, xt+1)} (3.4)
subject to the demand condition
u0(Dt; xt) = Pt   b(1  d)EtPt+1, (3.5)
We represent the optimal behavior of the firm and the consumers using policy func-
tions d, p, and f as follows:
Pt = p(Dt 1;Wt, xt)
Dt = d(Pt;Wt, xt) = d(p(Dt 1;Wt, xt);Wt, xt) ⌘ f (Dt 1;Wt, xt)
The first order condition for the choice of P gives
Dt   (1  d)Dt 1 + (Pt  Wt) d0(Pt;Wt, xt)
+bd0(Pt;Wt, xt)EtV 0(d(Pt;Wt, xt);Wt+1, xt+1) = 0,
which combined with the envelope condition
V 0(Dt 1;Wt, xt) =  (1  d) (Pt  Wt)
yields
(Dt   (1  d)Dt 1) + [(Pt  Wt)  b(1  d)Et (Pt+1  Wt+1)] d0(Pt;Wt, xt) = 0. (3.6)
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Substituting d(Pt;Wt, xt) for Dt and p(d(Pt;Wt, xt);Wt+1, xt+1) for Pt+1 in (3.5)
and differentiating with respect to Pt leads to
d0(Pt; xt) =
1
u00(Dt; xt) + b(1  d)Et p0(Dt;Wt+1, xt+1) (3.7)
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium pricing policy without com-
mitment.
Lemma 2 (Monopoly, pricing without commitment): (i) The dynamics of prices and
quantities of the durable good are described by the following dynamic system:
(Pt  Wt)  b(1  d)Et (Pt+1  Wt+1) (3.8)
= (Dt   (1  d)Dt 1)
 
u00(Dt; xt) + b(1  d)Et p0(Dt;Wt+1, xt+1)
 
,
u0(Dt; xt) = p(Dt 1;Wt, xt)  b(1  d)Et p(Dt;Wt+1, xt+1). (3.9)
This system simultaneously determines the equilibrium dynamics of Dt and the op-
timal policy function p.
(ii) The policy functions satisfy p0(Dt 1;Wt, xt) < 0 and f 0(Dt 1;Wt, xt) > 0.
Proof: Equations (3.8) and (3.9) follow from (3.6), (3.7), and (3.5). The conditions
p0(Dt 1;Wt, xt) < 0 and f 0(Dt 1;Wt, xt) > 0 are derived in the appendix. ⌅
Condition (3.8), or (3.6), has an intuitive interpretation: it is the firm’s optimality
condition that can be obtained using a perturbation argument. We can rewrite it as
Pt   b(1  d)EtPt+1 + 1d0(Pt;Wt, xt)Xt = Wt   b(1  d)EtWt+1.
The left hand side is the marginal revenue associated with increasing the quantity
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Xt = Dt   (1  d)Dt 1 sold in period t and reducing the quantity Xt+1 sold in the
next period in a way that leaves Dt+1 unchanged. The first two terms represent the
direct gain from markups, which would be present even in competitive markets. The
third term captures the loss in the monopolist’s profit margin due to the negative
movement in price Pt. The right hand side, of course, represents the marginal cost
corresponding to this small change in production.
Lemma 2 fully characterizes the equilibrium dynamics. The equilibrium pric-
ing is suboptimal in the sense that it no longer satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1.
To see this observe the two extra expressions in (3.8) compared to (3.3): Dt 1 and
p0(Dt;Wt+1, xt+1). Both are in general non-zero and they are directly related to the
time inconsistency of the monopolistic pricing. In particular, Dt 1 appears because
the monopolist does not internalize the effect of the pricing policy on demand last
period. The expression p0(Dt;Wt+1, xt+1) represents the fact that the monopolist can
partially affect its future pricing policy through the state variable.
Result 3 In the absence of shocks to cost and demand (Wt = W¯, xt = x¯) the steady state
price is given by
P¯ =
s¯
s¯  dw¯W¯
where s¯ ⌘ s(D¯; x¯), steady state consumption D¯ satisfies u0(D¯) = (1  b(1  d)) P¯, and
w¯ ⌘ 1+ b(1  d)p0(D¯; W¯, x¯)/u00(D¯; x¯). As a corollary, there is marginal cost pricing in the
long run if the good is perfectly durable, i.e., P¯ = W¯ when d = 0.
Proof: This result directly follows from (3.8)-(3.9). ⌅
Note that for d > 0 the value of steady state markup is related to the out-of-
steady-state behavior of prices.
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Solution in the case of quadratic utility
Bond and Samuelson (1984) studied the durable good monopolist problem in the
case of quadratic utility. They demonstrated the following properties of the steady
state: (i) in the case of zero depreciation rate, marginal cost pricing is reached in the
long run; (ii) for a non-zero depreciation rate, price is above marginal cost in the long-
run if the time period has non-zero length; (iii) in the limit of zero length of the time
period, the durable good price is equal to the marginal cost, independently of d, i.e.,
the Coase conjecture holds. In the present work, we additionally study the dynamics
of pricing.
Lemma 4 (Linear pricing under quadratic utility): Let Wt and xt follow AR(1) pro-
cesses with means W¯ and zero, respectively. With quadratic utility, u0(Dt; xt) =
a  bDt + xt, there exists a linear solution to the pricing equations (3.8)-(3.9):
p(Dt 1;Wt, xt) = P¯  a(Dt 1   D¯) + g(Wt   W¯) + lxt, (3.10)
In addition, the dynamics of the state variable is also linear and satisfies
Dt = D¯+ f(Dt 1   D¯)  y(Wt   W¯) + hxt. (3.11)
Here a,g,l, f,y, and h are constants.
Proof: In this case u00(Dt; xt) =  b. Substituting the conjectured linear policy rules
(3.10) and (3.11) into the pricing equations (3.8) and (3.9) and comparing coefficients
of different terms eight conditions for the eight unknown parameters. The solution
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to this system of equations is
a = b(z 1)b(1 d) > 0, f =
z 1
zb(1 d) 2 (0, 1),
g = z1+z 2 (1/2, 1), y = 1 b(1 d)fWb(1+z) > 0,
l = 11+z
1
1 b(1 d)fx > 0, h =
1
(1+z)b > 0,
P¯ = W1 b(1 d)+dz +
a
1 b(1 d)
 b(1 d)+dz
1 b(1 d)+dz , D¯ =
1
b
a (1 b(1 d))W
1 b(1 d)+dz .
where z ⌘  1  b(1  d)2  1/2 > 1, and fW and fx are the persistence parameters
of the process Wt and xt, respectively. It is straightforward to verify that with these
parameters, the dynamic equations are satisfied. ⌅
Note that equations (3.10) and (3.11) imply the following process for prices:
Pt   P¯ = f (Pt 1   P¯) + g(Wt   W¯) + lxt   fb(1  d)gfW(Wt 1   W¯)
  f(1+ lb(1  d)fx)xt 1.
Result 5 In this environment prices adjust slowly over time in response to shocks (even one-
time permanent shocks) and pass-through is incomplete. As the durability of the good declines
(d ! 1), the persistence parameter f approaches zero, i.e., in the nondurable limit there is no
endogenous dynamics.
1. Dt increases over time, while Pt and markup decrease over time.
2. Markup and price increase in response to a positive demand shock (procyclical markup).
3. Markup decreases and price increases in response to a positive cost shock (countercycli-
cal markup).
The fact that markups decrease in response to a positive cost shock has implica-
tions for the literature on incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Most traded goods
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are durable in nature. The fact that pass-through is incomplete in the long-run is fre-
quently attributed to strategic complementarities in pricing that prevents a firm from
raising its price in response to cost shocks as this causes the elasticity of demand it
faces to rise. Adding the assumption of frictions in price adjustment then generates
dynamics in pass-through.
We have seen that in the case of durable goods with discretion in pricing one
obtains pass-through dynamics even in the flexible price case, and incomplete pass-
through even in the case the absence of standard strategic complementarities in pric-
ing. In a sense, in the case under consideration, there are strategic complementarities
over time that arise from the firm competing with itself.
The solution here also contrasts with the marginal cost pricing case of durable
goods. It exhibits smaller price volatility and quantity volatility.
General utility functions
Here we present a compact equation that determines the transition function f in
the absence of demand shocks and cost shocks. Note that for small deviations from
the steady state D¯ the persistence parameter is given by f 0 (D¯).
Lemma 6 (Transition function for general utility): The transition function f , for any
D, satisfies
(1  b (1  d))W   u0 ( f (D))
f (D)  (1  d)D   u
00 ( f (D)) (3.12)
= b (1  d) (1  b (1  d))W   u
0 ( f ( f (D)))
f ( f (D))  (1  d) f (D) f
0 ( f (D)) .
Moreover, with the knowledge of f , the consumer reaction function d may be recov-
121
ered as the solution to
f (d (P)) = d
✓
P  u0 (d (P))
b (1  d)
◆
(3.13)
Proof: Notice that (3.13) is an immediate consequence of the demand equation P 
u0 (d (P)) = b (1  d) p (d (P)). We just need to demonstrate the result (3.12). We start
with (3.6) adapted to the case under consideration, with time indices suppressed:
⇣
d (P)  (1  d) f 1 (d (P))
⌘
+ [(P W)  b(1  d) (p (d (P)) W)] d0(P) = 0.
The demand equation P  b(1  d)p (d (P)) = u0 (d (P)) then implies
d (P)  (1  d) f 1 (d (P)) = ⇥(1  b (1  d))W   u0 (d (P))⇤ d0 (P) .
Applying the inverse function differentiation theorem d 10 (D) = 1/d0
 
d 1 (D)
 
, we
get
d 10 (D) = (
1  b (1  d))W   u0 (D)
D  (1  d) f 1 (D) .
Integrating both sides of this equation gives
d 1 (D)  P¯ =
Z D
D¯
(1  b (1  d))W   u0(D˜)
D˜  (1  d) f 1(D˜) dD˜. (3.14)
This equation must hold for any D. Using this last equation at a different point, and
noting that d 1 (D+) = p (D), we get
p (D)  P¯ =
Z D+
D¯
(1  b (1  d))W   u0(D˜)
D˜  (1  d) f 1(D˜) dD˜. (3.15)
Multiplying (3.15) by  b (1  d) and adding the resulting equation to (3.14) yields
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u0 (D)  (1  b (1  d)) P¯
=
Z D
D¯
(1  b (1  d))W   u0(D˜)
D˜  (1  d) f 1(D˜) dD˜  b (1  d)
Z f (D)
D¯
(1  b (1  d))W   u0(D˜)
D˜  (1  d) f 1(D˜) dD˜.
Here we simplified the left hand using the demand equation d 1 (D)  b (1  d) p (D) =
u0 (D). Differentiation with respect to D (and shifting the time period under consid-
eration) leads to the final result (3.12). ⌅
Numerical solution
We further study the properties of the dynamics of durable good pricing without
commitment in the special case of constant elasticity utility by means of a numeri-
cal solution. The solution to the dynamic system (3.8)–(3.9) does not have a simple
characterization in this case, and we obtain the model’s solution using value function
iteration.
Specifically, we start with a guess for the value function, V(·), and pricing rule,
p(·). Given the pricing rule, we can use demand (3.2) express current period price as
a function of current period stock D:
P = u0(D) + b(1  d)Ep(D),
where we have suppressed demand and cost shocks from notation (including in the
expectation). Substituting this expression into the value function, we can write the
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value of the firm recursively:
V˜(D ) = max
D
n 
u0(D) + b(1  d)Ep(D) W  D  (1  d)D  + bEV(D)o,
(3.16)
where D  is the state variable—the stock of the durable good last period. The argmax
of this problem is the state variable transition function, D = f˜ (D ). From this we can
update the pricing rule according to:
p˜(D ) = u0
 
f˜ (D )
 
+ b(1  d)Ep  f˜ (D ) .
Hence, on each iteration, given the initial guesses V(·) and p(·), we obtain a new
value function V˜(·) and a new pricing rule p˜(·). We repeat this procedure until
convergence. In order to obtain convergence, we apply polynomial smoothing to
V˜(·) and p˜(·) on each iteration.
In this numerical solution, we focus on the case of constant elasticity demand with
s = 2. Larger values of s mute the endogenous dynamics of durable monopolist
prices. We choose the remaining two parameters—the discount rate and depreciation
rate—at b = 0.9 and d = 0.2 respectively. This roughly correspond to a 2.5-year
period. The reason for the choice of such a long time period is technical complications
with numerical convergence for smaller values of d, and future versions of this work
will address this technical issue.
Simulations confirm qualitative approximation results above for price and quan-
tity dynamics. We start by exploring the dynamic path towards the steady state when
both cost and demand shocks are switched off (Wt ⌘ xt ⌘ 1), and the initial stock
of the durable good is zero (D 1 = 0). Figure 3.1 reports the path of prices in the
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium dynamic path of quantities and prices, no shocks
right panel and the path of quantities in the left panel. We contrast the equilibrium
dynamics without commitment with the case of marginal-cost pricing and monopoly-
pricing with commitment. In both of these benchmark cases there is no dynamics in
prices and durable stock jumps instantaneously to its steady state level. The dynam-
ics without commitment is substantially different: prices gradually decline as stock
gradually rises, reaching steady state only after a number of periods. This illustrates
endogenous dynamics in this case and the role of the durable stock as the state vari-
able.
Next, in Figures 3.2–3.3, we consider the response of monopolist price, markup
and durable stock to an unanticipated permanent cost and demand shocks. Con-
firming our theoretical findings, markup is decreasing in response to a cost rise, and
increasing in response to a positive demand shock. This endogenous response of
markup and price dampens the short-run response of quantities to both shocks. As a
result, quantities adjust only gradually to both shocks, which is contrasted with the
immediate adjustment of quantities under both marginal-cost and constant-markup
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Figure 3.2: Response to a one-time cost shock
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Figure 3.3: Response to a one-time demand shock
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(the case of commitment) pricing.
Table 3.1: Equilibrium Dynamics under Cost Shocks
log(·) s (%) r corr(·, logWt)
Wage, Wt 4.9 0.80 1.00
Price, Pt 5.1 0.90 0.88
Markup, Pt/Wt 2.2 0.69  0.19
Durable stock, Dt
— constant markup 15.5 0.79  0.99
— discretion 12.2 0.95  0.75
— ratio (disc/comm) 0.29
Durable purchases, Xt
— constant markup 70.7 -0.08  0.31
— discretion 21.4 0.57  0.91
— ratio (disc/comm) 0.16
Finally, we simulate the partial equilibrium dynamics under stochastic cost and
demand shocks. First, we consider stochastic cost shocks evolving according to a
discretized version of an AR(1) with standard deviation of innovation of 5% and
a persistence of 0.8. Table 3.1 reports the statistical properties prices and quanti-
ties in this dynamic equilibrium. Markup is indeed countercyclical and price ex-
hibits endogenous persistence, in excess of that of the exogenous cost process. Fur-
thermore, durable good purchases are mildly negatively correlated under constant-
markup pricing, while they become strongly positively autocorrelated under solution
without commitment. This is an empirically appealing property of durable pricing
without commitment, which allows to obtain realistic dynamics of durable purchases
even in the absence of adjustment costs. Lastly, endogenous markup variation with-
out commitment substantially reduces the volatility of both durable purchases and
durable stock.
Table 3.2 reports the pass-through coefficients from the regression of prices on
costs, with and without the lagged cost variable. The upper panel runs the pass-
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Table 3.2: Pass-through of Cost Shocks
logWt logWt 1
log Pt 0.91
log Pt 0.65 0.34
D logWt D logWt 1
D log Pt 0.61
D log Pt 0.63 0.15
through regression in levels, while the lower panel produces results in differences.
Pass-through is incomplete (91% in levels and 61% in differences) with over 2/3 of
pass-through happening on impact and the remaining pass-through after one period.
Table 3.3: Equilibrium Dynamics under Demand Shocks
log(·) s (%) r corr(·, log xt)
Demand, xt 4.8 0.77 1.00
Price and markup, Pt/W 1.9 0.79 0.18
Durable stock, Dt
— constant markup 9.7 0.77 1.00
— discretion 7.2 0.94 0.66
— ratio (disc/comm)  0.22
Durable purchases, Xt
— constant markup 36.1  0.03 0.91
— discretion 13.6 0.56 0.55
Finally, we consider the dynamic equilibrium with demand shocks. We assume
that demand shocks follow a discretized AR(1) process also with standard deviation
of innovation of 5% and persistence of 0.8. Table 3.3 reports the statistical properties
of the dynamics of prices and quantities in this stochastic equilibrium. The markup
is procyclical in this case, with a standard deviation of about 2% and persistence
of about 0.8. This again results in positively autocorrelated durable purchases in
contrast with iid durable purchases under marginal-cost or constant-markup pricing.
In addition, both durable purchases and durable stock is less volatile under pricing
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without commitment, as in the case of cost shocks.
3.3.3 Extension: Calvo sticky price setting
Result 7 (Equivalence of Calvo and Flexible Pricing): The solution of a durable-good
monopolist pricing problem under Calvo price stickiness with probability of price
non-adjustment q is identical to the problem of a flexible price durable-good mo-
nopolist under the following substitution of primitives:b ! bC, d ! dC, u ! uC,
where
bC ⌘ b 1 q1 bq ,
dC ⌘ 1  1 bq1 bq(1 d) (1  d),
uC(D) ⌘ 11 bq(1 d)u(D).
(3.17)
Proof: We have seen that with flexible prices the dynamics can be summarized as
V(D ) = max
P
{(P W) (d(P)  (1  d)D ) + bV (d(P))} , (3.18)
which yields policy function p(D ), and where the consumer reaction function d(P)
is implicitly defined by the consumer first order condition
u0 (d(P)) = P  b(1  d)p (d(P)) . (3.19)
To keep notation simple, we suppressed the time indices, replacing (Pt,Dt 1) by
(P,D ) .
Now let us consider the case of Calvo price setting. Denote by 1  q the probability
that the firm is allowed to adjust prices in any definite period. The consumer first
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order condition will become
u0 (d(P)) = P  b(1  d) (qP+ (1  q) p (d(P))) ,
where p is again the firm’s desired price as the function of the state variable. Using
definitions (3.17), this may be rewritten as
u0C (d(P)) = P  bC(1  dC)p (d(P)) . (3.20)
Note that demand as a function of P is the same irrespective of whether the firm
adjusted the price this period: consumers take the current price as given and the
expected price next period (for a given stock of durables) does not depend on whether
the firm adjusted the price in the current period.
The problem of the firm in a period of price adjustment is
V(D ) = max
P
{(P W) (d(P)  (1  d)D ) + b (1  q)V (d(P)) + bqU(P)} ,
where U(P) is the value of the firm if the price is not adjusted; i.e., U(P) is given by
U(P) = (P W)dd(P) + b (1  q)V (d(P)) + bqU(P).
Note that if the firm does not adjust prices, consumers will consume the same amount
as in the previous period. Combining the two expressions, leads to the Bellman
equation
V(D ) = max
P
⇢
(P W)

1  b(1  d)q
1  bq d(P)  (1  d)D 
 
+
b (1  q)
1  bq V (d(p))
 
.
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Recalling the definitions (3.17), we see that problem is equivalent to
V˜(D ) = max
P
 
(P W) (d(P)  (1  dC)D ) + bCV˜ (d(P))
 
, (3.21)
with
V˜(D) ⌘ 1  bq
1  b(1  d)qV(D).
Equations (3.20) and (3.21) are the same as (3.19) and (3.18) with the replacement
b ! bC, d ! dC, u ! uC,V (D) ! V˜ (D) . This implies the equivalence of the
dynamics with flexible prices and with Calvo price setting stated above. ⌅
3.4 Durable good oligopoly
We have analyzed the price dynamics of durable goods in the case of monopoly.
In this section, we will investigate the case of Cournot competition of N symmetric
oligopolistic firms producing a homogenous durable good. The firms are unable to
commit to future production policy. The production decision of each firm is influ-
enced by two different forces: competition with the other firms and inter-temporal
competition with itself, since the future decision makers at the firm do not have the
same objectives. Macroeconomic literature has focused on the first effect, assuming
that for firms production decisions are based on the current competition, see (e.g.,
Barsky, House, and Kimball, 2007). Here we model both forces jointly. As we will
see, both of them push prices closer to marginal cost.
The stock of the durable good is the only state variable. For simplicity, we do not
consider stochastic cost shocks and demand shocks here, although the analysis can
be extended to parallel our discussion of monopoly. In this simpler setting, one can
still analyze the endogenous price dynamics in response to permanent shocks and
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identify the value of the persistence parameter. The following lemma characterizes
the price dynamics in the case under consideration.
Lemma 8 (Durable-good oligopoly equilibrium dynamics): The equilibrium in the durable-
good Cournot oligopoly market with N symmetric firms with constant marginal cost
W is described by the following system:
(Pt  W)  b(Pt+1  W)
✓
1  d
N
+
N   1
N
f 0(Dt)
◆
(3.22)
=  Dt   (1  d)Dt 1
N
 
u00(Dt) + b(1  d)p0(Dt)
 
u0(Dt) = Pt   b(1  d)Pt+1, (3.23)
where
Dt = f (Dt 1) , Pt = p(Dt 1).
Proof: Consumer optimization immediately implies
Pt = u0(Dt) + b(1  d)p(Dt), (3.24)
where p(Dt) describes the dependence of the price of the durable good in the next
period on the stock of the good in the current period. This is the second equation of
the lemma. Denote by x(Dt+1) the equilibrium strategy (i.e., the amount produced)
of every oligopolist a function of the state variable. Suppose that in period t one firm
deviates from its equilibrium strategy x(Dt 1), and produces x˜t instead. In this case
Dt = (1  d)Dt 1 + X˜t + (N   1)x(Dt 1). (3.25)
132
Since the firm is free to choose its optimal level of production, its value satisfies the
Bellman equation
V(Dt 1) = max
X˜t
 
(Pt(x˜t) W) X˜t + bV
 
Dt(X˜t)
  
,
where the dependence of Pt and Dt on X˜t is given by equations (3.24) and (3.25).
Denote by l and µ the Lagrange multipliers on those two equations. The envelope
condition and the first order conditions corresponding to the choice of X˜t, Pt and Dt
may be written as
V 0(Dt 1) =  µ
 
(1  d) + (N   1)x0(Dt 1)
 
,
Pt  W = µ,
bV 0(Dt) + µ =  l
 
u00(Dt) + b(1  d)p0(Dt)
 
,
X˜t = l.
Substituting out the Lagrange multipliers and imposing the equilibrium requirement
X˜t = x(Dt 1) yields
(Pt  W)  b(Pt+1  W)
 
(1  d) + (N   1)x0(Dt)
 
=  x(Dt 1)
 
u00(Dt) + b(1  d)p0(Dt)
 
Just like (3.8), this condition can be justified by a simple perturbation argument (see
the discussion following Lemma 2). The firm sells a little bit more in period t and a
little less in period t+ 1, with this amounts chosen in a way that lead to the original
equilibrium path from period t + 2 onward. In choosing the quantity deviations
for the perturbation argument, one needs to take into account the reaction of the
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competitors to the deviation in period t, reflected by the presence of (N   1)x0(Dt)
on the left hand side.
This condition together the following definition of the function f
Dt = f (Dt 1) = (1  d)Dt 1 + Nx(Dt 1), with f 0(Dt 1) = (1  d) + Nx0(Dt 1).
implies the first equation of the lemma. ⌅
For N = 1, the system of equations in the lemma agrees with the monopoly
results. For N = 1 we observe the following two changes to the system of equations.
First, on the right hand side instead of Xt = Dt   (1  d)Dt 1 we have Xt/N, which
implies that the profit losses of an oligopolist from lower price are shared equally with
the (N   1) competitors. This force is present also in the case of nondurable goods
(d = 1), and it reduces the price charged by the monopolist. Second, in the spirit of
the perturbation argument, if a firm sells one additional unit of the durable good in
period t, and wants to compensate for this in period t + 1 to return to the original
equilibrium path, its sales should not drop by (1   d), but by (1   d)/N plus the
change in sales by its competitors, reflected by x0(Dt)(N   1)/N. Since x0(Dt) < 0,
this is less than (1  d).
Lemma 9 (Oligopoly with quadratic utility): With N symmetric firms, constant
marginal cost W, and quadratic utility u0(Dt) = a  bDt, there exists a ‘linear’ equi-
librium of the form:
Dt = D¯+ f (Dt 1   D¯) (3.26)
Pt = P¯  a(Dt 1   D¯) (3.27)
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which solves the equilibrium system of equations exactly. The positive persis-
tence parameter f satisfies the cubic4 equation
b (N   1) f3 + b (1  d) f2   (N + 1) f+ 1  d = 0. (3.28)
With the knowledge of f, the parameters a, D¯, and P¯ may be recovered as
a = bfg2
D¯ = 1b
⇣
a
g1
 W
⌘
g1+(N 1)g2
g1+(N 1)g2+ dg2
P¯ = ag1   1g1
⇣
a
g1
 W
⌘
g1+(N 1)g2
g1+(N 1)g2+ dg2
where
g1 ⌘ 1  b (1  d) , g2 ⌘ 1  b (1  d) f
Proof: Plugging the assumed form of the solution (3.26) and (3.27) into the dynamic
equations (3.22) and (3.23) and comparing coefficients of different terms leads to the
four conditions
a
f
dD¯
P¯ W = 1  b (1  d) + (N   1) (1  bf)
0 = 1  1 df + N   bf (1  d+ (N   1) f)
u0 (D¯) = (1  b (1  d)) P¯
 u00 (D¯) fa = 1  b (1  d) f
Here we used p0 (Dt 1) =  a , as implied by (3.27). The second condition may be
rewritten as (3.28). The remaining three conditions can be manipulated to give the
explicit expressions for a, D¯, and P¯ in the lemma. It is straightforward to check
that with these values of the parameters, the dynamic equations (3.22) and (3.23) are
4 Of course, any cubic equation can be solved algebraically. For brevity, we will omit the explicit
expressions for the solution here.
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identically satisfied. ⌅
Result 10 Both f and a decrease in N.
Proof: Treat the parameter N in (3.28) as a continuous variable. Implicit function
theorem then implies
  df
dN
=
f  bf3
N + 1  2b (1  d) f  3b (N   1) f2
Since f < 1, the numerator is clearly positive. Algebraic manipulation may be used to
show that the denominator is also positive. This leads to the conclusion that f is a de-
creasing function of N. The explicit expression for a is a = bf/ (1  b (1  d) f) . This
is obviously an increasing function of f, which implies that a decreases in response
to increased N. ⌅
3.5 Durable good monopolistic competition
We now consider the case of monopolistic competition with infinitesimal firms
producing imperfectly substitutable varieties. The firms cannot commit to a path of
future prices. We specialize to the cases where the influence of other firms on the
demand for a particular variety can be summarized by a simple sufficient statistic.
Consider the case of a continuum of varieties of durable goods, distinguished by
index i 2 W ⌘ [0, 1]. The varieties depreciate at the same rate d, and the stock of
variety i evolves according to
Dit = Xit + (1  d)Di,t 1,
where Xit is quantity of variety i sold in t. Denote the price of variety i by Pit. The
136
consumer maximizes
E0
•
Â
t=0
btU
 
Ct, {Dit}i2W
 
subject to
•
Â
t=0
bt
✓
PC,tCt +
Z
i2W
Pit (Dit   (1  d)Di,t 1) di
◆
= NPV0
with Di, 1 and NPV0 given5. The consumer’s first order condition is
dU
 
Ct, {Dit}i2W
 
dDit
= ltPit   b(1  d)Etlt+1Pi,t+1,
where dU
 
Ct, {Dit}i2W
 
/dDit is the functional derivative of U
 
Ct, {Dit}i2W
 
with
respect to Dit, and lt ⌘ U1,t/PCt. Consider the case of quasi-linear utility function
U
 
Ct, {Dit}i2W
 
= Ct + u
 {Dit}i2W . The price of the nondurable good PCt will be
normalized to one, implying lt = 1. The first order condition becomes
du
 {Dit}i2W 
dDit
= Pit   b(1  d)EtPi,t+1.
Let us specialize to cases6 where the influence of competitors on firm i may be sum-
marized by a sufficient statistic Dt ⌘ Y
 {Dit}i2W  in the sense that
du ({Dit}i2W)
dDit = v(Dit;Dt)
.
The demand equation now takes the form
v(Dit;Dt) = Pit   b(1  d)EtPi,t+1.
5 Generalization to consumer’s stochastic endowment is straightforward.
6 These include CES utility functions, as well as quadratic utility functions discussed below.
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Result 11 For a given process Dt, the problem of durable good monopolistic competitor de-
scribed above is equivalent to the problem of a durable good monopolist with stochastic demand
shocks.
For simplicity, let us consider the case without uncertainty: Wt = W. The follow-
ing lemma characterizes the price dynamics.
Lemma 12 (Monopolistic competition, pricing without commitment): The equilibrium
prices and quantities satisfy
(Pit  W)  b(1  d) (Pi,t+1  W) (3.29)
= (Dit   (1  d)Di,t 1)
 
v0(Dit;Dt) + b(1  d)p0(Dit;Dt)
 
,
v(Dt;Dit) = Pit   b(1  d)Pi,t+1 (3.30)
where Dt ⌘ Y
 {Dit}i2W , and the policy function p(Dit;Dt) describes the depen-
dence of Pi,t+1 on Dit and Dt.
Proof: Equation (3.30) has been derived above. Equation (3.29) is an immediate con-
sequence of Lemma 2, with the appropriate renaming of variables. This is because of
the equivalence of the problem of durable good monopolistic competitor and durable
good monopolist facing shifts in demand. ⌅
Consider now the case of quadratic utility. Our goal is to identify the persistence
parameters corresponding to deviations from the steady state. The utility will be
parameterized as
u
 {Dit}i2W  = a Z
i2W
Ditdi  b12
Z
i2W
D2itdi 
b2
2
✓Z
i2W
Ditdi
◆2
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This type of utility function has been used, for example, in Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and
Thisse (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The function v(Dit;Dt) now takes the
form
v(Dit;Dt) = a  b1Dit   b2Dt (3.31)
with
Dt ⌘
Z
i2W
Ditdi
being the average stock of durable goods at time t. The following lemma characterizes
the equilibrium path
Lemma 13 (Monopolistic competition, quadratic utility): The evolution of prices and
quantities is described by
Dit = D¯+ fk(Dt 1   D¯) + fa (Di,t 1   Dt 1) , (3.32)
Pit = P¯  k(Dt 1   D¯)  a(Di,t 1   Dt 1), (3.33)
Dt ⌘
Z
i2W
Ditdi, Pt ⌘
Z
i2W
Pitdi.
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The parameters are given by
fa =
1 
p
1 b(1 d)2
b(1 d) ,
a = b1b(1 d)
✓
1p
1 b(1 d)2   1
◆
,
fk = 1 d
1+ b1+b2b1
p
1 b(1 d)2 ,
k = (1 d)(b1+b2)
1 b(1 d)2+ b1+b2b1
p
1 b(1 d)2 ,
Ds =
a (1 b(1 d))W
db1p
1 b(1 d)2
+b1+b2
,
Ps = 1
1+ b1+b2db1
p
1 b(1 d)2
a
1 b(1 d) +
1
db1
b1+b2
1p
1 b(1 d)2
+1
W.
(3.34)
Proof: With v(Dit;Dt) taking the form (3.31), the dynamic equations (3.29) and (3.30)
become
(Pit  W)  b(1  d) (Pi,t+1  W) = (Dit   (1  d)Di,t 1)
  b1 + b(1  d)p0(Dit;Dt) 
a  b1Dit   b2Dt = Pit   b(1  d)Pi,t+1
Plugging the assumed form of the equilibrium (3.32) and (3.33) into these equations
and comparing coefficients of different terms leads to six conditions:
(1  b (1  d)) P¯ = a  (b1 + b2) D¯
1  b (1  d) fk = (b1 + b2) fkk
1  b (1  d) fa = b1 faa
a
fa
dD¯ = (1  b (1  d)) (P¯ W)
  fkafak
⇣
1  1 dfk
⌘
= 1  b (1  d) fk
 
⇣
1  1 dfa
⌘
= 1  b (1  d) fa
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Note that here we used p0 (Di,t 1;Dt 1) =  a, implied by (3.33). Algebraic manipu-
lations lead the result (3.34). It is straightforward to verify that with these values all
equilibrium conditions are satisfied. ⌅
Result 14 The collective persistence parameter is smaller than the idiosyncratic persistence
parameter: fk < fa.
Proof: The values of these parameters given in Lemma 13 may be rewritten as
fk =
1  d
1+ b1+b2b1
q
1  b (1  d)2
, fa =
1  d
1+
q
1  b (1  d)2
.
Since (b1 + b2) /b1 > 1, the inequality fk < fa immediately follows. ⌅
Result 15 The price Pit of a particular variety of durable goods depends more strongly on the
deviations of the average stock of durables Dt 1 from the steady state value D¯ than on the
deviations of the stock Di,t 1 of this variety from the average Dt 1: k > a.
Proof: Start with the inequality
1
b1
b1+b2
⇣
1  b (1  d)2
⌘
+
q
1  b (1  d)2
>
1
1  b (1  d)2 +
q
1  b (1  d)2
,
which is certainly satisfied due to (b1 + b2) /b1 > 1. Multiplying both sides by
(1  d) b1 and then manipulation each side separately leads to
(1  d) (b1 + b2)
1  b (1  d)2 + b1+b2b1
q
1  b (1  d)2
>
b1
b (1  d)
0@ 1q
1  b (1  d)2
  1
1A ,
which is, due to Lemma 13, equivalent to k > a. ⌅
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3.6 Conclusion
We evaluate price and quantity dynamics in several environments such as
monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. We show that in all these envi-
ronment, in response to cost shocks, markups are countercyclical and therefore pass-
through is incomplete. We contrast these findings with that of nondurable goods
pricing results. We also contrast this to the case of marginal cost pricing of durable
goods which is the typical assumption in the macroeconomic literature.
In this work we have limited our study to the pricing problem of firms and there-
fore the analysis has been partial equilibrium in nature. In future versions we plan to
add general equilibrium elements into the model and study the implications of the
pricing dynamics of durable goods for aggregate macroeconomic variables both in
closed and open economy environments.
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Neglecting changes in general equilibrium effects
Consider the Krugman (1980) model in the case of a completely symmetric circle,
as in Fig. 1.1a. Solving for the equilibrium is simple because the GDP density will be
the same everywhere. Now suppose we would like to know the response to changes
in trade costs. To be concrete, let us split the circle into two semicircular ‘countries’,
and introduce additional ‘iceberg’ type border costs, as in Anderson and vanWincoop
(2003), i.e. as goods cross the border a certain fixed percentage is lost.
The consequences of this change in trade costs are illustrated in Fig. A.1b, which
captures all general equilibrium effects. At no location will the GDP increase when
the border costs are introduced. If we decided to neglect general equilibrium feed-
back, in the sense of neglecting the first term on the right-hand-side of (1.5) or (1.18),
the calculations would be much simpler, and we would get Fig. A.1a. The results are
quite different. In certain regions we would not get even the sign of the overall effect
right.
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Figure A.1: The figure shows the first-order response of GDP to increased border costs. The
spatial configuration is a circle parameterized by q 2 ( p,p], with only the range
[0,p] shown in the figure, which is sufficient due to the left-right symmetry. The
circle is split into two semi-circular countries with the two border points located
at q = ±p/2. Part (a) plots the first-order change in GDP induced by increasing
border costs as calculated ignoring general equilibrium feedback, while part (b)
presents the full general equilibrium result. The parameter values used to generate
the figure are s = 6, r = 0.75, and aR = 5, and the functional form of trade
costs is (1+ 4a2R2 sin2(q/2))r/2. For simple comparison, the y-axes are linearly
transformed.
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A.2 Remarks on methodology: reverse engineering equilibria from comparative
statics
A.2.1 The case of a single endogenous variable
International trade models are fairly complicated. In order to make the general
computational strategy employed in the present work easier to follow, this appendix
illustrates some intuition used extensively in the main text with elementary examples,
not necessarily coming from trade theory. Readers who find the rest of the present
work intuitively clear may prefer to skip this discussion, as it does not contain any
novel economic insights.
Consider an economic model in which the equilibrium value of an endogenous
variable y is given implicitly as a function of an exogenous parameter k by the equa-
tion
f (y, k) = 0.
where the known function f satisfies the requirements of the implicit function theo-
rem. For example, one can think of f (y, k) = 0 as representing the first-order condi-
tion of a maximization problem. Suppose that we know the value y0 corresponding
to k = 0, i.e. f (y0, 0) = 0. Assume also that it is possible to compute all partial
derivatives of f at (y, k) = (y0, 0). It may be that the function f (y, k) is hard to invert
with respect to its first argument. Under such circumstances, we can still recover the
solution to the economic problem y (k) using comparative statics, assuming that y (k)
is an analytic function.
First of all, since the first partial derivatives are known, we can use the approxi-
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mation
y (k) = y0 +
dy
dk
    
k=0
k +O
 
k2
 
,
where the derivative may be computed as
dy
dk
    
k=0
=   f2 (y0, 0)
f1 (y0, 0)
. (A.1)
This is what first-order comparative statics teaches us. But of course, we can go
further. With higher precision,
y (k) = y0 +
dy
dk
    
k=0
k +
1
2
d2y
dk2
    
k=0
k2 +O
 
k3
 
.
The second derivative here can be obtained by the standard formula for second-order
comparative statics,
d2y
dk2
    
k=0
=   f
2
2 f11   2 f1 f2 f12 + f 21 f22
f 31
    
y=y0,k=0
. (A.2)
In principle we can evaluate any derivative dny/dkn, and recover the full solution
to the economic problem as the series
y (k) = y0 + y1k + y2k2 + y3k3 + ...
with
yn ⌘ 1n!
dny
dkn
    
k=0
.
This is of course not as elegant as inverting f (y, k) with respect to its first argument
directly, but it conveys the same information.
Obviously, we need a systematic way to express yn in terms of partial derivatives
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of f . But that is not difficult. Substituting the Taylor expansion of y (k) for y into
f (y, k) = 0, we get
f
 
y0 + y1k + y2k2 + y3k3 + ..., k
 
= 0.
The Taylor series of the left hand side is
•
Â
j=0
•
Â
k=0
f (j,k) (y0, 0)
j!k!
 
•
Â
l=1
ylkl
!j
kk,
where f (j,k) is the jth partial derivative with respect to the first argument of f and the
kth partial derivative with respect to the second argument. The relation must hold
for any k, so for any non-negative integer n, the term proportional to kn must vanish.
For n = 0, this implies f (y0, 0) = 0, which is satisfied by assumption. For n = 1, the
requirement becomes
f1 (y0, 0) y1k + f2 (y0, 0) k = 0,
which is equivalent to the first-order comparative statics (A.1). For n = 2,
f1 (y0, 0) y2k2 +
1
2
f11 (y0, 0) y21k
2 + f12 (y0, 0) y1k2 +
1
2
f22 (y0, 0) k2 = 0,
leading to the second-order comparative statics formula (A.2). The value of y3 can be
obtained by looking at terms proportional to k3, etc.
Of course, in concrete applications of this method, it is very likely that most eco-
nomic intuition is already contained in the first few terms, say y0, y1, and y2. Only
under rare circumstances would one need to compute even higher terms. This makes
the present approach useful at the practical level.
148
A.2.2 The case of two endogenous variables and its generalization
The case of a single endogenous variable was straightforward. Now suppose that
instead, y is a two-dimensional vector, y ⌘
⇣
y(x1), y(x2)
⌘0
, where the labels x1 and x2
can be thought of as two distinct locations in space. Let the equations following from
the model take the implicit form,
f (y, k) = 0,
where f (y, k) is now a two-dimensional vector as well. Assume also that the first
component of this equation can be solved with respect to y(x1) and the second one
with respect to y(x2), i.e. that for some known functions g(x1) and g(x2), the equations
y(x1) = g(x1)
⇣
y(x2), k
⌘
,
y(x2) = g(x2)
⇣
y(x1), k
⌘
are equivalent to f (y, k) = 0. This assumption is made for expositional purposes
only, and can be easily lifted. The task is again the same as in the single endogenous
variable case. We are given the solution to these equations y0 = (y0(x1), y0(x2))
0, corre-
sponding to k = 0, and need to find y for non-zero k, or at least the first-order change
y1 defined by y = y0 + y1k +O
 
k2
 
.
One intuitive way to approach the problem is the following. Denote
v ⌘
0B@ v(x1)
v(x2)
1CA =
0BBBB@
∂g(x1)
∂k
    
y(x2)=y0(x2),k=0
∂g(x2)
∂k
    
y(x1)=y0(x1),k=0
1CCCCA ,
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G ⌘
0B@ G(x1,x1) G(x1,x2)
G(x2,x1) G(x2,x2)
1CA ⌘
0BBBB@
0
∂g(x1)
∂y(x2)
    
y(x2)=y0(x2),k=0
∂g(x2)
∂y(x1)
    
y(x1)=y0(x1),k=0
0
1CCCCA .
If the exogenous parameter changes from 0 to some small value k, it is natural to
make the initial guess that y(x1) changes from y0(x1) to
y0(x1) + v(x1)k,
and similarly y(x2) becomes
y0(x2) + v(x2)k.
But that cannot be the whole story. The fact that y(x2) is now different will influence
y(x1) through the equation y(x1) = g(x1)
⇣
y(x2), k
⌘
, and vice versa. So a better guess for
y(x1) and y(x2) is
y0(x1) + v(x1)k + G(x1,x2)v(x2)k
and
y0(x2) + v(x2)k + G(x2,x1)v(x1)k.
Repeating this logic indefinitely, we would get a candidate expression for y(x1) and
y(x2) in the form of an infinite series. It can be succinctly written as
y = y0 + k
•
Â
n=0
Gnv+O
 
k2
 
. (A.3)
This expression is of course correct, as can be seen by the standard method of com-
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parative statics. Taking exact differentials of the equations of the problem, we obtain
dy(x1) = G(x1,x2)dy(x2) + v(x1)dk,
dy(x2) = G(x2,x1)dy(x1) + v(x2)dk,
and in matrix notation,
(1  G) (y  y0) = vk +O
 
k2
 
,
y = y0 + k (1  G) 1 v+O
 
k2
 
.
This is equivalent to the candidate expression above, thanks to the matrix geometric
series identity (1  G) 1 = Â•n=0 Gn.
We see that to succeed in this kind of task, one must be able to invert the matrix
1  G, or equivalently, to sum an infinite series of powers of G. In the two-variable
case this is not a problem, of course. When the number of variables is large, however,
this becomes a major obstacle.
There is a way to proceed, however. In situations where we can easily diagonalize
G, computing (1  G) 1 is straightforward. Diagonalization of G means that we can
express it as
G = C 1DC,
where C is a known matrix and D is a known diagonal matrix with eigenvalues of G
on its diagonal: D =diag(d1, d 2, ...) . In this case
(1  G) 1 = C 1 (1  D) 1 C, (1  D) 1 = diag
✓
1
1  d1 ,
1
1  d2 , ...
◆
.
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This strategy is extensively used in the main text. The action of the matrix C can
be thought of as a change of basis in the vector space of infinitesimal changes in en-
dogenous variables. In concrete examples it corresponds to either Fourier series ex-
pansion, or to spherical harmonic expansion. In those cases, G,C, and D are infinite-
dimensional. One could also consider the case of discrete Fourier transform where
the matrices would be finite-dimensional, but for brevity that case will be omitted.
A.3 Derivation of equation (1.18)
Start with the GDP equation (1.17) with trade costs characterized by the function
(1  kb (x, x0)) T (x, x0). Using the Taylor expansion y (x) = y0 (x) + ky1 (x) +O
 
k2
 
on the right-hand side of the GDP equation yields
ys (x) = ys0 (x)  k
Z b (x, x0) T (x, x0) y0 (x0)R
T (x00, x0) y1 s0 (x00) dL (x00)
dL
 
x0
 
+k
Z
T
 
x, x0
 
y0
 
x0
  R b (x00, x0) T (x00, x0) y1 s0 (x00) dL (x00)⇣R
T (x00, x0) y1 s0 (x00) dL (x00)
⌘2 dL  x0 
+skys 10 (x) (Gy1) (x) +O
 
k2
 
.
Remembering the expression (1.12) for Gc (x, x0) , this can be written as
ys (x) = ys0 (x)  ksys 10 (x)
Z
b
 
x, x0
 
Gc
 
x, x0
 
y0
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
+ks2ys 10 (x)
Z
Gc
 
x, x0
  ✓Z
b
 
x00, x0
 
Gc
 
x00, x0
 
dL
 
x00
 ◆
y0
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
+sys 10 (x) (Gy1) (x) +O
 
k2
 
.
152
Taylor expanding the left hand side then leads to the final equation,
y1 (x) =  
Z
b
 
x, x0
 
Gc
 
x, x0
 
y0
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
+s
Z
Gc
 
x, x0
  ✓Z
b
 
x00, x0
 
Gc
 
x00, x0
 
dL
 
x00
 ◆
y0
 
x0
 
dL
 
x0
 
+ (Gy1) (x) .
Given the definition (1.19), this is equivalent to (1.18).
A.4 Local-price-index-adjusted GDP
The welfare of individual agents is characterized by the local GDP per capita
adjusted for the local price index, y(P) (x) ⌘ y (x) /P (x), with
P (x) ⌘ s  1
s
✓
1
sF
Z  
1  kb  x0, x   T  x0, x  y1 s  x0  dL  x0 ◆ 11 s .
The first-order Taylor expansion of y(P) (x) is
y(P) (x) = y(P)0 (x) + ky
(P)
0 (x)
y1 (x)
y0 (x)
+
k
s  1y
(P)
0 (x)
N1 (x)
N (x)
+O
 
k2
 
,
where
N˜ (x) ⌘ R (1  kb (x0, x)) T (x0, x) y1 s (x0) dL (x0) ,
N (x) ⌘ R T (x0, x) y1 s0 (x0) dL (x0) ,
N1 (x) ⌘ limk!0 1k N˜(x) N(x)N(x) .
Given the definition y(P)1 (x) ⌘ limk!0
⇣
y(P) (x)  y(P)0 (x)
⌘
/k, this implies
y(P)1 (x)
y(P)0 (x)
=
y1 (x)
y0 (x)
+
1
s  1
N1 (x)
N (x)
,
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y(P)1 (x)
y(P)0 (x)
=
y1 (x)
y0 (x)
 
R
T (x0, x) y s0 (x0) y1 (x0) dL (x0)R
T (x0, x) y1 s0 (x0) dL (x0)
  1
s  1
R
b (x0, x) T (x0, x) y1 s0 (x0) dL (x0)R
T (x0, x) y1 s0 (x0) dL (x0)
.
Using the expression (1.12) for Gc (x0, x), this is
y(P)1 (x)
y(P)0 (x)
=
y1 (x)
y0 (x)
  s
Z
Gc
 
x0, x
  y1 (x0)
y0 (x0)
dL
 
x0
   s
s  1 gˆc (x) ,
or in operator notation
y(P)1
y(P)0
= (1  sGc) y1y0  
s
s  1 gˆc.
The function gˆc is defined in (1.26). If Gc (x0, x) = Gc (x, x0) and b (x0, x) = b (x, x0) ,
then gˆc = g˜c, and we can write
y(P)1
y(P)0
= (1  sGc) y1y0  
s
s  1 g˜c.
A.5 Properties of G⇤2c (q) on the circle for large R
In the present context, the expression (1.12) for Gc becomes
Gc (q) =
1
sLT¯
T (q) , (A.4)
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with the average T (q) defined as T¯ ⌘ L 1 R p p T (q) dL (q) . The function of interest,
G⇤2c (q) , can be rewritten as
G⇤2c (q) ⌘
Z p
 p
Gc
 
q0
 
Gc
 
q   q0  dq0 = 1
(sLT¯)2
T⇤2 (q)
⌘ 1
(sLT¯)2
Z p
 p
T
 
q0
 
T
 
q   q0  dq0.
The transportation costs t˜ (d) are asymptotically power-law, in the sense of satisfying
condition (1.29). This implies that T (q) is asymptotically power-law as well,
a1 sh Tˆ (q)  T (q)  a1 sl Tˆ (q) , (A.5)
with Tˆ (d) = tˆ1 s (d). Since
Z p
 p
Tˆ (q) dq = 2
Z 1
aR
0
dq + 2
Z p
1
aR
(aRq)r(1 s) dq =
2d
2d  1
2
aR
  2p
2d  1
1
(paR)2d
,
a two sided bound on T¯ immediately follows,
a1 sh
2d  1
 
2d
paR
  1
(paR)2d
!
 T¯  a
1 s
l
2d  1
 
2d
paR
  1
(paR)2d
!
. (A.6)
Now that we know roughly the magnitude of T¯, it remains to understand the nature
of T⇤2 (q) . For this purpose, notice that (A.5) implies also
a1 sh
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)  T⇤2 (q)  a1 sl  T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) (A.7)
and
a2 2sh Tˆ
⇤2 (q)  T⇤2 (q)  a2 2sl Tˆ⇤2 (q) . (A.8)
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A.5.1 The peaks of G⇤2c (q)
Equation (A.4) implies
G⇤2c (0) =
1
(sLT¯)2
T⇤2 (0) .
The related function Tˆ2 (q) can be integrated explicitly,
Tˆ⇤2 (0) ⌘
Z p
 p
Tˆ2 (q) dq =
Z 1
aR
0
dq + 2
Z p
1
aR
1
(aRq)4d
dq =
4d
4d  1
2
aR
+
1
1  4d
2p
(paR)4d
.
In the final expression, the first term comes from |q| of order 1/ (aR) . The part of the
integration domain responsible for the second term is characterized by |q| being of
order one. The first term is important for d 2   14 ,•  . The second term dominates if
d 2  0, 14  . Combining these two equalities with (A.8) and (A.6) gives
(2d  1)2 4p
(4d  1) (sL)2
2d
paR   1(paR)4d✓
2d
paR   1(paR)2d
◆2 a2s 2la2s 2h
 G⇤2c (0)  (2d  1)
2 4p
(4d  1) (sL)2
2d
paR   1(paR)4d✓
2d
paR   1(paR)2d
◆2 a2s 2ha2s 2l .
Alternatively, using also (A.4) and (A.5) with q = 0, the same relations imply
2d  1
sL
2d
paR   1(paR)4d
2d
paR   1(paR)2d
Gc (0)
a2s 2l
a2s 2h
 G⇤2c (0)  2d  1sL
2d
paR   1(paR)4d
2d
paR   1(paR)2d
Gc (0)
a2s 2h
a2s 2l
.
Specializing to various ranges for d and remembering that R is large, the last two sets
of inequalities imply (1.33) and (1.34).
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A.5.2 d < 12 , tails of G
⇤2
c (q)
Consider q greater than 2/ (aR) . For simplicity, assume also that it is smaller than
p   1/ (aR) . Then the definition of Tˆ⇤2 (q) gives
Tˆ⇤2 (q) =
1
(aR)4d
Z   1aR
 p
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0 + 1
(aR)2d
Z 1
aR
  1aR
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0
+
1
(aR)4d
Z q  1aR
1
aR
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0 + 1
(aR)2d
Z q+ 1aR
q  1aR
1
|q0|2d dq
0
+
1
(aR)4d
Z p
q+ 1aR
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0.
It is easy to see that since R is large, the second and the fourth term give a contribution
that is negligible relative to the remaining terms.
(aR)4d Tˆ⇤2 (q) ⇡
Z   1aR
 p
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0
+
Z q  1aR
1
aR
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0 +
Z p
q+ 1aR
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0.
Similarly, the remaining integrals will not change much if in their limits 1/ (aR) is
replaced by zero. In that case, the three integrals can be merged into one.
(aR)4d Tˆ⇤2 (q) ⇡
Z p
 p
1
|q0|2d
1
|q   q0|2d dq
0 ⌘ I (q) . (A.9)
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The integral1 I (q) is independent of R. The last relation, together with (A.4), (A.8),
and (A.6), gives
(1  2d)2
(sL)2
p4d I (q)
a2s 2l
a2s 2h
. G⇤2c (q) .
(1  2d)2
(sL)2
p4d I (q)
a2s 2h
a2s 2l
.
This results, in turn, implies the first lines of (1.35) and (1.36).
A.5.3 d > 12 , tails of G
⇤2
c (q)
The definition of
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) is
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) = Z 1aR
  1aR
T
 
q   q0  dq0 + Z p
1
aR
T (q   q0)
|aRq0|2d dq
0 +
Z   1aR
 p
T (q   q0)
|aRq0|2d dq
0.
Assuming for simplicity that T is differentiable (this assumption can be lifted at the
cost of a longer explanation), and integrating by parts, we get
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) = Z 1aR
  1aR
T
 
q   q0  dq0
+
1
2d  1
1
aR
✓
T
✓
q   1
aR
◆
+ T
✓
 q   1
aR
◆◆
  1
(paR)2d
p
2d  1 (T (q   p) + T ( q   p))
  1
2d  1
1
(aR)2d
Z p
1
aR
  q0  1 2d  T0  q   q0 + T0   q   q0   dq0.
Consider q in absolute value much greater than 1/ (aR). In that case, T is slowly
varying. We can neglect the last two terms because they go to zero faster than 1/R.
1 The integral can be expressed using the gamma function G and the incomplete beta function B as
( 1)2d |q|1 2d
⇣
B p
|q| (1  2d, 1  2d)  B  p|q| (1  2d, 1  2d)
⌘
+
⇣
( 1)2d   1
⌘p
p24d dG( 2d)
G( 32 2d)
|q|1 4d .
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In the remaining terms, we can approximate
Z 1
aR
  1aR
T
 
q   q0  dq0 ⇡ 2
aR
T (q) , T
✓
q   1
aR
◆
⇡ T
✓
 q   1
aR
◆
⇡ T (q) ,
leading to the result that
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) ⇡ 2d
2d  1
2
aR
T (q) .
Inequality (A.7) then becomes
a1 sh
2d
2d  1
2
aR
T (q) . T⇤2 (q) . a1 sl
2d
2d  1
2
aR
T (q) .
Using (A.4) and (A.6), the implication for G⇤2c (q) is
1
srL
✓
al
ah
◆s 1
Gc (q) . G⇤2c (q) .
1
srL
✓
ah
al
◆s 1
Gc (q) . (A.10)
This implies the second line of (1.36). Combining this with (A.4), (A.6), and (A.5)
then also gives the second line of (1.35).
A.6 Properties of G⇤2c (q) on the sphere for large R
In analogy to the case of the circle, Gc (q) = T (q) / (sLT¯) , where T (q) averaged
over the sphere is T¯ ⌘ L 1 R pq=0 R 2pj=0 T (q) dL (q, j) . The function G⇤2c (q) is defined as
G⇤2c (q) ⌘
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
Gc
 
q0
 
Gc
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
sin q0dj0dq0.
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Note that the right-hand side is independent of j. It is again simple to find a bound
on T¯. An upper bound comes from (A.5), sin q  q, and explicit integration.
T¯as 1l 
1
2
Z p
0
Tˆ (q) sin qdq  1
2
Z p
0
Tˆ (q) qdq =
1
2
Z 1
aR
0
qdq +
1
2
1
(aR)2d
Z p
1
aR
q1 2ddq.
T¯ 
 
1
4
d
d  1
1
(aR)2
+
1
4
1
1  d
p2
(paR)2d
!
a1 sl .
A lower bound can be obtained by direct analogy, this time using sin q   2/pq, q 2⇥
0, p2
⇤
rather than sin q  q.
T¯as 1h  
1
2
Z p
0
Tˆ (q) sin qdq
  1
p
Z 1
aR
0
qdq +
1
p
1
(aR)2d
Z p
2
1
aR
q1 2ddq + 1
2
1
(aR)2d
Z p
p
2
q 2d sin qdq.
Omitting the last term, which is positive, and evaluating the others yields
T¯as 1h  
1
2p
1
(aR)2
+
1
p
1
(aR)2d
1
2  2d
⇣p
2
⌘2 2d   1
p
1
(aR)2d
1
2  2d
✓
1
aR
◆2 2d
,
T¯  
 
d
d  1
1
2p (aR)2
+
22d 3p
1  d
1
(paR)2d
!
a1 sh .
The reader can certainly derive stricter bounds, but to understand the dependence on
R, these two are sufficient.
 
d
d  1
1
2p (aR)2
+
22d 3p
1  d
1
(paR)2d
!
a1 sh (A.11)
 T¯ 
 
1
4
d
d  1
1
(aR)2
+
1
4
1
1  d
p2
(paR)2d
!
a1 sl . (A.12)
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A.6.1 The peaks of G⇤2c (q)
G⇤2c (0) =
1
(sLT¯)2
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
T2 (q) sin qdjdq =
2p
(sLT¯)2
Z p
0
T2 (q) sin qdq.
The upper bound is
Z p
0
Tˆ2 (q) sin qdq 
Z 1
aR
0
qdq +
1
(aR)4d
Z p
1
aR
q1 4ddq,
Z p
0
Tˆ2 (q) sin qdq  1
2
1
(aR)2
+
1
(aR)4d
1
2  4dp
2 4d   1
(aR)4d
1
2  4d
1
(aR)2 4d
,
Z p
0
Tˆ2 (q) sin qdq  d
2d  1
1
(aR)2
+
p2
2
1
1  2d
1
(paR)4d
.
The lower bound is
Z p
0
Tˆ2 (q) sin qdq   2
p
Z 1
aR
0
qdq +
1
(aR)4d
2
p
Z p
2
1
aR
q1 4ddq,
Z p
0
Tˆ2 (q) sin qdq   1
p
1
(aR)2
+
1
(aR)4d
1
p
1
1  2d
⇣p
2
⌘2 4d   1
(aR)2
1
1  2d
1
p
,
Z p
0
Tˆ2 (q) sin qdq   1
p
2d
2d  1
1
(aR)2
+
24d 2p1 4d
1  2d
1
(aR)4d
.
The bounds combined:
 
1
p
2d
2d  1
1
(aR)2
+
24d 2p1 4d
1  2d
1
(aR)4d
!
a2 2sh

Z p
0
T2 (q) sin qdq 
 
d
2d  1
1
(aR)2
+
p2
2
1
1  2d
1
(paR)4d
!
a2 2sl .
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Combining this with (A.11) gives
2p
(sL)2
1
p
2d
2d 1
1
(aR)2
+ 2
4d 2p1 4d
1 2d
1
(aR)4d✓
1
4
d
d 1
1
(aR)2
+ 14
1
1 d
p2
(paR)2d
◆2 a2s 2la2s 2h
 G⇤2c (0)  2p
(sL)2
d
2d 1
1
(aR)2
+ p
2
2
1
1 2d
1
(paR)4d✓
d
d 1
1
2p(aR)2
+ 2
2d 3p
1 d
1
(paR)2d
◆2 a2s 2ha2s 2l ,
or alternatively, also with (A.5)
2pGc (0)
sL
1
p
2d
2d 1
1
(aR)2
+ 2
4d 2p1 4d
1 2d
1
(aR)4d
1
4
d
d 1
1
(aR)2
+ 14
1
1 d
p2
(paR)2d
a2s 2l
a2s 2h
 G⇤2c (0)  2pGc (0)sL
d
2d 1
1
(aR)2
+ p
2
2
1
1 2d
1
(paR)4d
d
d 1
1
2p(aR)2
+ 2
2d 3p
1 d
1
(paR)2d
a2s 2h
a2s 2l
.
A.6.2 d < 1, tails of G⇤2c (q)
Tˆ2 (q) ⌘
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
Tˆ
 
q0
 
Tˆ
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
sin q0dj0dq0.
This integral contains regions where either q0 or d (q, j, q0, j0) are smaller than 1/ (aR) .
As in the case of the circle with d < 12 , they do not contribute much to the integral
when d (q, j, q0, j0)  1/ (aR) , and in this case can be safely ignored. As a result, we
get the following approximation.
(aR)4d Tˆ2 (q) ⇡
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
1
q02d
1
d2d (q, j, q0, j0)
sin q0dj0dq0 ⌘ I(2) (q) .
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The right-hand side is now independent of R. Together with (A.11) this implies
25p4d 3
(sL)2
(1  d) I(2) (q)
a2s 2l
a2s 2h
 G⇤2c (q)  2
5p4d 3
(sL)2
(1  d) I(2) (q)
a2s 2h
a2s 2l
.
A.6.3 d > 1, tails of G⇤2c (q)
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) ⌘ Z p
0
Z 2p
0
Tˆ
 
q0
 
T
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
sin q0dj0dq0,
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) = Z 1aR
0
Z 2p
0
T
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
sin q0dj0dq0
+
1
(aR)2d
Z p
1
aR
Z 2p
0
1
q02d
T
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
sin q0dj0dq0.
For q   1/ (aR) , T is slowly varying.
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q) ⇡ p
(aR)2
T (q)
+
1
(aR)2d
Z p
1
aR
Z 2p
0
1
q02d
T
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
sin q0dj0dq0.
Using sin q < q and integrating by parts,
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)  p
(aR)2
T (q)
+
1
(aR)2d
1
2  2d
Z 2p
0
h
q02 2dT
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  ip
1
aR
dj0
  1
(aR)2d
1
2  2d
Z p
1
aR
Z 2p
0
q02 2d ∂T (d (q, j, q
0, j0))
∂q0
dj0dq0.
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Since q02 2d is small for q0   1/ (aR) and T varies slowly over the region where q0 is
of order 1/ (aR) , the last term can be neglected.
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)  p
(aR)2
T (q)
+
1
(aR)2d
1
1  dp
3 2dT (p   q)
  1
(aR)2d
1
2  2d
Z 2p
0
1
(aR)1 2d
T
✓
d
✓
q, j,
1
aR
, j0
◆◆
1
aR
dj0.
In the last term, the dependence on j0 is very weak since q0 is set to 1/ (aR) . We can
approximate
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)  p
(aR)2
T (q)
+
1
(aR)2d
1
1  dp
3 2dT (p   q)
  1
(aR)2
1
1  dpT (q) .
Since R is large  
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)  p
(aR)2
d
d  1T (q) .
A lower bound can be obtained analogously using sin q < 2p q.
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)   p
(aR)2
T (q) +
1
(aR)2d
1
2  2d
2
p
Z 2p
0
h
q02 2dT
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  i p2
1
aR
dj0,
 
T ⇤ Tˆ  (q)   ✓p + 2
d  1
◆
1
(aR)2
T (q) .
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Together with (A.11), this leads to
2
sL
(p (d  1) + 2)
pd
Gc (q)
as 1l
as 1h
 G⇤2c (q)  2sLGc (q)
as 1h
as 1l
,
or alternatively, to
8
(sL)2
d  1
d
(p (d  1) + 2)
pd
1
(paR)2d 2
a2s 2l
a2s 2h
 G⇤2c (p)  4p
(sL)2
d  1
d
1
(paR)2d 2
a2s 2h
a2s 2l
.
A.7 Fourier series expansions
A.7.1 Fourier series expansions of country indicator functions
In the case of the indicator function 1CA (q) of the set CA =
  p2 , p2   characterizing
country A, the standard formula for Fourier coefficients (1.38) specializes to
1CA,n =
1
2p
Z p
 p
1CA (q) e
 inqdq = 1
2p
Z p
2
  p2
e inqdq.
Evaluating the integral in various cases,
1CA,n =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2 for n = 0,
0 for n even and nonzero,
( 1) n 12
pn for n odd.
(A.13)
Now consider the indicator function 1CB (q) of country B with CB =
  p, p2   [
(p2 ,p]. Because almost everywhere 1CA (q) + 1CB (q) = 1, it must be that 1CA,0 +
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1CA,0 = 1 and for nonzero n, 1CA,n + 1CA,n = 0. This implies
1CB,n =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2 for n = 0,
0 for n even and nonzero,
( 1) n+12
pn for n odd.
(A.14)
We see that the Fourier series expansions of the country indicator functions are
1CA (q) =
1
2 +
1
p Ân2Z, n odd ( 1)
n 1
2 1
n e
inq ,
1CB (q) =
1
2   1p Ân2Z, n odd ( 1)
n 1
2 1
n e
inq .
(A.15)
For future convenience, multiply the expression for 1CA (q) by e
imq and replace n !
n m to arrive at the following identity
1CA (q) e
imq =
1
2
eimq +
1
p Ân2Z, n m odd
( 1) n m+12 1
n me
inq . (A.16)
A.7.2 Fourier expansion of h˜ (q)
For a symmetric function H (q) on the circle (extended periodically to the real
line), let us evaluate h˜n ⌘
 
H˜1
 
n where H˜ is the integral operator with kernel
rLH˜ (d (q, q0)) b (q, q0). The function b (q, q0) is one whenever q and q0 lie on opposite
sides of the border and zero otherwise. It can be written as b (q, q0) = bAB (q, q0) +
bBA (q, q0) with bAB (q, q0) ⌘ 1CA (q) 1CB (q0) and bBA (q, q0) = 1CB (q) 1CA (q0) . For
ease of notation, define also h˜AB ⌘ H˜AB1 with the kernel of the operator H˜AB be-
ing rLH˜ (d (q, q0)) bAB (q, q0) , and analogously h˜BA ⌘ H˜BA1. These two functions add
up to h˜, so h˜n = h˜AB,n + h˜BA,n.
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First, compute h˜AB,n.
h˜AB (q) = rL1CA (q)
Z p
 p
H
 
q   q0  1CB  q0  dq0.
Fourier expanding the function H (q   q0) ,
h˜AB (q) = rL1CA (q) Â
m2Z
Hmeimq
Z p
 p
e imq01CB
 
q0
 
dq0 = L Â
m2Z
Hm1CB,m1CA (q) e
imq .
Note that because H (q) is symmetric, Hm = H m. Substituting for 1CA (q) eimq from
(A.16) gives
h˜AB (q) = L Â
m2Z
Am1CB,m
 
1
2
eimq +
1
p Ân2Z, n m odd
( 1) n m+12 1
n me
inq
!
.
Exchanging the order of summations,
h˜AB (q) =
1
2
L Â
m2Z
Hm1CB,me
imq
+
1
p
L Â
n2Z
 
Â
m2Z, m n odd
( 1) n m+12 1
n mHm1CB,m
!
einq .
The Fourier series expansion h˜BA (q) follows from the one for h˜AB (q) because these
two functions are related to each other by the shift q ! q + p,
h˜BA (q) =
1
2
L Â
m2Z
( 1)m Hm1CB,meimq
+
1
p
L Â
n2Z
 
Â
m2Z, m n odd
( 1) n m+12 1
n mHm1CB,m
!
einq .
According to (A.14), 1CB,m with even m is nonzero only for m = 0, in which case
167
1CB,0 =
1
2 . This means that after adding the two equations, we obtain
h˜ (q) =
1
2
LH0
+
1
p
L Â
n2Z
 
Â
m2Z, m n odd
( 1) n m+12 + ( 1) n m+12
n m Hm1CB,m
!
einq .
This is the desired Fourier expansion of h˜ (q) . From here we can read off the individ-
ual Fourier coefficients.
h˜n =
8><>:
1
2LH0d0n +
2
p LÂm2Z, m odd
( 1) n m+12
n m Hm1CB,m for n even,
0 for n odd.
Here d0n is the Kronecker delta, equal to one if n = 0 and zero otherwise. Now we
can substitute the explicit expressions (A.14) for 1CB,m and use the relabeling
Â
m2Z, m odd
1
n m
Hm
m
= Â
m2Z, m odd positive
✓
1
n m
Hm
m
  1
n+m
Hm
m
◆
=  2
•
Â
m=0
H2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2
to get the final expression
h˜n =
8><>: 0 for n odd,1
2LH0d0n   4p2 ( 1)
n
2 LÂ•m=0 1(2m+1)2 n2H2m+1 for n even.
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A.7.3 Fourier expansion of g˜c (q)
The discussion above was for an unspecified function H (q) on the circle. Special-
izing to Gc (q) , we get the result
g˜c,n =
8><>: 0 for n odd,1
2s d0n   4p2 ( 1)
n
2 LÂ•m=0 1(2m+1)2 n2Gc,2m+1 for n even.
(A.17)
A.8 Derivation of the expression for Tn on circle
The goal here is to evaluate the Fourier coefficients of
T (q) =
 
1
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 q2
!d
.
The standard formula (1.38) for Fourier coefficients implies
Tn =
1
2p
Z p
 p
e inq 
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 q2
 d dq = 12p
Z p
 p
cos nq 
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 q2
 d dq,
where the second equality follows from the Euler formula eix = cos x + i sin x and
from the fact that T (q) is symmetric while sin nq is antisymmetric. Taking advantage
of the symmetry of the final integrand to adjust the integration range and using the
identity sin2 (q/2) = (1  cos q) /2,
Tn =
1
p
Z p
0
cos nq
(1+ 2a2R2   2a2R2 cos q)d dq.
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Define Z ⌘ 1/p1+ 4a2R2. Then 2a2R2 =  1  Z2  /  2Z2 , and the integral can be
rewritten as
Tn = Zd
1
p
✓
2Z
1+ Z2
◆d Z p
0
cos nq⇣
1  1 Z21+Z2 cos q
⌘d dq.
The (corrected2 version) of second equation in paragraph 9.131 on p. 1008 of Grad-
shteyn and Ryzhik (2007) states that
Pmn (z) =
n (n  1) ... (n m+ 1)
p
Z p
0
cosmj⇣
z pz2   1 cos j
⌘n+1 dj,
where Pmn (z) denotes3 associated Legendre functions of the first kind. Using this
equation with the replacement {m, n, j}! {n, d  1, q} , gives
( 1)n
(1  d)n
Pnd 1 (z) =
1
p
1
zd
Z p
0
cos nq⇣
1 
p
z2 1
z cos q
⌘d dq,
where (1  d)n is the Pochhammer symbol. Replacing also z ! 1+Z
2
2Z and noticing
that this corresponds to
p
z2 1
z ! 1 Z
2
1+Z2 , one gets the identity
( 1)n
(1  d)n
Pnd 1
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
=
1
p
✓
2Z
1+ Z2
◆d Z p
0
cos nq⇣
1  1 Z21+Z2 cos q
⌘d dq.
The integral on the right-hand side has the same form as the one in the expression
for Tn, which leads to the conclusion
Tn =
( 1)n
(1  d)n
ZdPnd 1
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
.
2 The formula in the book contains an additional factor of ( 1)m, which is a typo.
3 The Mathematica notation for this function is LegendreP[n,µ,3,z].
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A.9 Spherical harmonic expansions
A.9.1 Spherical harmonic expansions of country indicator functions
Let us find the spherical harmonic expansion of the indicator function 1CA (q)
of the set CA =
 
(q, j) |q 2   0, p2   , which corresponds to country A. The general
formula for spherical harmonic coefficients (1.51) gives
(1CA)
m
l =
Z p
2
0
Z 2p
0
Ym⇤l (q, j) dj sin qdq.
This vanishes for non-zero m. For m = 0, we can use the expression (1.52) to simplify
the integral to
(1CA)
0
l =
p
p
p
2l + 1
Z p
2
0
Pl (cos q) sin qdq =
p
p
p
2l + 1
Z 1
0
Pl (t) dt.
The last integral can be evaluated explicitly, with the result
(1CA)
0
l =
8>>>><>>>>:
p
p for l = 0,
0 for l even and nonzero,
p
p
p
2l + 1 ( 1)
l 1
2
2l
(l 1)!
l 1
2 !
l+1
2 !
for l odd.
Because up to a set of measure zero 1CA (q, j) + 1CB (q, j) = 1 = 2
p
pY00 (q, j) , the
spherical harmonic coefficients of 1CB with CB =
 
(q, j) |q 2  p2 ,p⇤ follow. (1CB)ml
with non-zero m vanishes, and
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(1CB)
0
l =
8>>>><>>>>:
p
p for l = 0,
0 for l even and nonzero,
p
p
p
2l + 1 ( 1)
 l 1
2
2l
(l 1)!
l 1
2 !
l+1
2 !
for l odd.
(A.18)
A.9.2 Spherical harmonic expansion of Y0l0 (q, j)CB (q, j) and
Y0l0 (q, j)CA (q, j)
To find spherical harmonic coefficients of Y0l0 (q, j) 1CB (q, j) we may again use
(1.51). The coefficients with nonzero m vanish, because Y00 (q, j) 1CB (q, j) is indepen-
dent of j. For the remaining coefficients,
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l = 2p
Z p
0
Y0l0 (q, 0) 1CB (q, 0)Y
0
l (q, 0) sin qdq.
Due to (1.52) this is
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l =
1
2
p
2l0 + 1
p
2l + 1
Z 1
0
Pl0 (t) Pl (t) dt.
It is not hard to evaluate the integral for any given pair l, l0 using the standard defini-
tion of Legendre polynomials. An alternative expression may be obtained as follows.
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l = 2p
•
Â
l00=0
(1CB)
0
l00
Z p
0
Y0l0 (q, 0)Y
0
l00 (q, 0)Y
0
l (q, 0) sin qdq.
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l =
p
2l + 1
p
2l0 + 1p
4p
⇥
•
Â
l00=0
(1CB)
0
l00
p
2l00 + 11
2
Z p
0
Pl0 (cos q) Pl00 (cos q) Pl (cos q) sin qdq.
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⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l =
p
2l + 1
p
2l0 + 1p
4p
•
Â
l00=0
(1CB)
0
l00
p
2l00 + 1
0B@ l0 l00 l
0 0 0
1CA
2
,
where
0B@ l0 l00 l
0 0 0
1CA is the Wigner 3j symbol (closely related to Clebsch–Gordan
coefficients). Substituting the explicit expressions (A.18) for (1CB)
0
l00 leads to
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l =
p
2l + 1
p
2l0 + 1
2
0B@ l0 0 l
0 0 0
1CA
2
+
p
2l + 1
p
2l0 + 1
2
•
Â
l00=1, l00 odd
( 1) l
00 1
2 (2l00 + 1)
2l00
(l00   1)!
l00 1
2 !
l00+1
2 !
0B@ l0 l00 l
0 0 0
1CA
2
.
Because the Wigner 3j symbol vanishes whenever the triangle inequality between l, l0,
and l00 is not satisfied, the infinite sum reduces to a finite one:
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l =
1
2
dll0
+
p
2l + 1
p
2l0 + 1
2
l+l0
Â
l00=|l+l0|, l00 odd
( 1) l
00 1
2 (2l00 + 1)
2l00
(l00   1)!
l00 1
2 !
l00+1
2 !
0B@ l l0 l00
0 0 0
1CA
2
.
Here dll0 is the Kronecker delta, equal to one when l = l0, and zero otherwise. Since
up to a set of measure zero 1CA (q, j) + 1CB (q, j) = 1 = 2
p
pY00 (q, j) , this result also
implies
⇥
Y0l01CA
⇤0
l =
1
2
dll0
+
p
2l + 1
p
2l0 + 1
2
l+l0
Â
l00=|l+l0|, l00 odd
( 1) l
00+1
2 (2l00 + 1)
2l00
(l00   1)!
l00 1
2 !
l00+1
2 !
0B@ l l0 l00
0 0 0
1CA
2
.
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A.9.3 Spherical harmonic expansions used to analyze the impact of border costs
Let us find certain spherical harmonic expansions needed to evaluate the impact
of changes in border costs. The ‘border indicator function’ b (x, x0) ⌘ b (q, j, q0, j0)
may be decomposed into two parts
b (q, j, q0, j0) = bAB (q, j, q0, j0) + bBA (q, j, q0, j0) ,
bAB (q, j, q0, j0) ⌘ 1CA (q, j) 1CB (q0, j0) ,
bBA (q, j, q0, j0) ⌘ 1CB (q, j) 1CA (q0, j0) .
Consider a function A (q, j) ⌘ A (q) on the on the sphere that is independent of
j. Denote the spherical angle (i.e. 1/R times the spherical distance) between points
x ⌘ (q, j) and x0 ⌘ (q0, j0) as d˜ (x, x0) ⌘ d˜ (q, j, q0, j0) . This angle can be computed
with the help of the identity
cos d˜
 
x, x0
 
= sin q sin q0 + cos q cos q0 sin
 
j  j0  .
The function whose spherical harmonic expansion we need to evaluate is a (q, j) ⌘
a (q) defined4 by the equation
a (q) ⌘ 1
L
Z
A
 
d˜
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
b
 
q, j, q0, j0
 
dL
 
q0, j0
 
.
4 Note that the integral on the right-hand side is independent of j due to the rotational symmetry of
each factor inside the integral.
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It will be convenient to introduce also notation for its two parts corresponding to the
decomposition of b in terms of bAB and bBA:
aAB (q) ⌘ 1L
R
A
 
d˜ (q, j, q0, j0)
 
bAB (q, j, q0, j0) dL (q0, j0) ,
aBA (q) ⌘ 1L
R
A
 
d˜ (q, j, q0, j0)
 
bBA (q, j, q0, j0) dL (q0, j0) ..
Because a (q, j) is independent of j, its spherical harmonic coefficients aml with nonzero
m vanish. The definition of may be rewritten as
aAB (q) = rL1CA (q, j)
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
A
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
1CB
 
q0, j0
 
sin q0dj0dq0.
The integral on the right-hand side depends only on q, the dependence on j is trivial.
To find its value, notice that it is equal to the spherical convolution (A ⇤ 1CB) (q, j) .
With the help of the formula (1.53), its spherical harmonic coefficients are simply
(A ⇤ 1CB)0l =
p
4pp
2l + 1
A0l (1CB)
0
l ,
which means that, according to (1.50),
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
A
 
d
 
q, j, q0, j0
  
1CB
 
q0, j0
 
dj0dq0 =
•
Â
l=0
p
4pp
2l + 1
A0l (1CB)
0
l Y
0
l (q, j) .
As a result, the expression for aAB (q) becomes
aAB (q) = rL
•
Â
l=0
p
4pp
2l + 1
A0l (1CB)
0
l Y
0
l (q, j) 1CA (q, j) ,
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or equivalently,
aAB (q) =
Lp
4p
•
Â
l=0
 
•
Â
l0=0
1p
2l0 + 1
A0l0 (1CB)
0
l0
⇥
Y0l01CA
⇤0
l
!
Y0l (q, j) .
Analogously,
aBA (q) =
Lp
4p
•
Â
l=0
 
•
Â
l0=0
1p
2l0 + 1
A0l0 (1CA)
0
l0
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l
!
Y0l (q, j) .
Adding the last two equations and comparing the result to (1.50) yields the following
expression for the spherical harmonic coefficients of a (q, j):
a0l =
Lp
4p
•
Â
l0=0
A0l0p
2l0 + 1
⇣
(1CB)
0
l0
⇥
Y0l01CA
⇤0
l + (1CA)
0
l0
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l
⌘
.
The values of (1CA)
0
l0 , (1CB)
0
l0 ,
⇥
Y0l01CA
⇤0
l , and
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l were computed in earlier parts
of this appendix.
A.9.4 Spherical harmonic expansion of g˜c (x)
This result can be immediately applied (in the case of border costs) to the function
g˜c (x) ⌘
R
G˜c (x, x0) dL (x0) defined in (1.23) as g˜c (x) ⌘
R
G˜c (x, x0) dL (x0) :
g˜c,l ⌘ (g˜c)0l =
1p
4p
•
Â
l0=0
Gc,l0p
2l0 + 1
⇣
(1CB)
0
l0
⇥
Y0l01CA
⇤0
l + (1CA)
0
l0
⇥
Y0l01CB
⇤0
l
⌘
. (A.19)
Of course, due to rotational symmetry, (g˜c)ml = 0 for m 6= 0. Analogously to the
case of the circle, (gˆc)ml = (g˜c)
m
l for any l and m.
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A.10 Derivation of the expression for Tl for the sphere
The spherical harmonic coefficients Tml of
T (q) =
 
1
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 q2
!d
=
✓
1
1+ 2a2R2   2a2R2 cos q
◆d
can be computed using (1.51). For nonzero m Tml vanishes because T (q) is indepen-
dent of j. For zero m, write Tl ⌘ T0l . In this case (1.51) and (1.52) give
Tl =
Z p
0
Z 2p
0
T (q)Y0⇤l (q, j) dj sin qdq =
p
p
p
2l + 1
Z p
0
T (q) Pl (cos q) sin qdq.
Performing the substitution t ⌘ cos q in the integral gives
Tl =
p
p
p
2l + 1
Z p
0
Pl (cos q) sin qdq
(1+ 2a2R2   2a2R2 cos q)d
=
p
p
p
2l + 1
Z 1
 1
Pl (t) dt
(1+ 2a2R2   2a2R2t)d .
As in the case of the circle, define Z ⌘ 1/p1+ 4a2R2, which implies 2a2R2 = 1 Z22Z2 .
Tl =
p
p
p
2l + 1
✓
2Z2
1  Z2
◆d Z 1
 1
Pl (t)⇣
1+Z2
1 Z2   t
⌘d dt.
The value of the integral can be found in Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007), where equa-
tion 7.228 on p. 791 states that
1
2
G (1+ µ)
Z 1
 1
Pl (x) (z  x) µ 1 dx =
 
z2   1   µ2 e ipµQµl (z) .
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With the replacement {µ, z, x}!
n
d  1, 1+Z21 Z2 , t
o
(which also means z2  1! 4Z2
(1 Z2)2 ),
this is
Z 1
 1
Pl (t)⇣
1+Z2
1 Z2   t
⌘d dt = 2G (d)
✓
1  Z2
2Z
◆d 1
e ip(d 1)Qd 1l
✓
1+ Z2
1  Z2
◆
.
An alternative form of the right-hand side may be found using Gradshteyn and
Ryzhik (2007), p. 959, eq. 8.703,
Qµn (z) =
eµpiG (n+ µ+ 1) G
  1
2
 
2n+1G
 
n+ 32
   z2   1  µ2 z n µ 1F✓n+ µ+ 2
2
,
n+ µ+ 1
2
, n+
3
2
;
1
z2
◆
.
Replacing {µ, n, z}!
n
d  1, l, 1+Z21 Z2
o
and noting that G
  1
2
 
=
p
p,
Qd 1l
✓
1+ Z2
1  Z2
◆
=
e(d 1)pi
p
pG (l + d)
2l+1G
 
l + 32
  (2Z)d 1  1  Z2 l+1
(1+ Z2)l+d
⇥F
 
l + d+ 1
2
,
l + d
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z2
1+ Z2
◆2!
.
As a result, the integral can be rewritten as
Z 1
 1
Pl (t) dt⇣
1+Z2
1 Z2   t
⌘d
=
p
pG (l + d)
2lG (d) G
 
l + 32
  ✓1  Z2
1+ Z2
◆l+d
F
 
l + d+ 1
2
,
l + d
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z2
1+ Z2
◆2!
,
and spherical harmonic coefficient Tl becomes
Tl =
p
p
2l + 1G (l + d)
2lG (d) G
 
l + 32
   2Z2 d  1  Z2 l
(1+ Z2)l+d
F
 
l + d+ 1
2
,
l + d
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z2
1+ Z2
◆2!
.
(A.20)
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The Gauss hypergeometric function on the right-hand side may be further ma-
nipulated using several other identities. Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007), p. 1009,
equation 9.134(2), reads
F (2a, 2a+ 1  g,g; z) = (1+ z) 2a F
 
a, a+
1
2
,g;
4z
(1+ z)2
!
.
Replacement {a,g, z} !
n
l+d
2 , l +
3
2 ,
  1 Z
1+Z
 2o (which implies also 1 + z ! 2 1+Z2
(1+Z)2
and 4z
(1+z)2
!
⇣
1 Z2
1+Z2
⌘2
) leads to
F
 
l + d, d  1
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z
1+ Z
◆2!
=
(1+ Z)2l+2d
2l+d (1+ Z2)l+d
(A.21)
⇥F
 
l + d
2
,
l + d+ 1
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z2
1+ Z2
◆2!
.
Equation 9.131(1) on p. 1008 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007) states that
F (a, b,g; z) = (1  z) b F
✓
b,g  a,g; z
z  1
◆
.
Replacing {a, b,g, z}!
n
l + d, d  12 , l + 32 ,
  1 Z
1+Z
 2o (and consequently 1  z! 4Z
(1+Z)2
and zz 1 !   (1 Z)
2
4Z ) gives
F
 
l + d, d  1
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z
1+ Z
◆2!
=
(4Z)
1
2 d
(1+ Z)1 2d
F
 
d  1
2
,
3
2
  d, l + 3
2
;  (1  Z)
2
4Z
!
.
(A.22)
Equation 8.702 on p. 959 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007) reads
Pµn (z) =
1
G (1  µ)
✓
z+ 1
z  1
◆ µ
2
F
✓
 n, n+ 1, 1  µ; 1  z
2
◆
.
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Replacement {µ, n, z} !
n
 l   12 , d  32 , 1+Z
2
2Z
o
(and z+1z 1 !
  1+Z
1 Z
 2, 1 z2 !   (1 Z)24Z )
leads to
P l 
1
2
d  32
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
=
1
G
 
l + 32
  ✓1  Z
1+ Z
◆l+ 12
F
 
3
2
  d, d  1
2
, l +
3
2
;  (1  Z)
2
4Z
!
.
(A.23)
The definition of the Gauss hypergeometric function (e.g. in Section 9.1 of Gradshteyn
and Ryzhik (2007)) implies that the function is invariant under the exchange of its first
two arguments. For this reason, (A.22) and (A.23) give
P l 
1
2
d  32
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
=
(4Z)d 
1
2
G
 
l + 32
  (1  Z)l+ 12
(1+ Z)l+2d 
1
2
F
 
l + d, d  1
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z
1+ Z
◆2!
.
This can be combined with (A.21) to give
P l 
1
2
d  32
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
=
(4Z)d 
1
2
G
 
l + 32
   1  Z2 l+ 12
2l+d (1+ Z2)l+d
F
 
l + d
2
,
l + d+ 1
2
, l +
3
2
;
✓
1  Z2
1+ Z2
◆2!
.
Recalling that F is symmetric in its first two arguments and substituting the last
equation into (A.20) leads to the final result
Tl = 2p
p
2l + 1 (d)l
Z 12 dp
1  Z2 P
 l  12
d  32
✓
1+ Z2
2Z
◆
. (A.24)
Here the Pochhammer symbol (d)l is defined as G (l + d) /G (d) = d (d+ 1) ... (d+ l   1) .
A.11 Relation to fields in anti de Sitter space
The parameter threshold discussed here has a counterpart in physics, namely the
Breitenlohner and Freedman (1982a,b) bound that applies to fields in anti de Sitter
space. The variables of the economic models with asymptotically power-law trade
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costs share one important property with fields in anti de Sitter space, namely the
behavior of their propagators at long distances. The relevant comparison here is
between a ds-dimensional economic model and fields in a (ds + 1)-dimensional anti
de Sitter space, which has a ds-dimensional boundary where exogenous changes can
be introduced.
Scalar fields in (ds + 1)-dimensional anti de Sitter space have propagators that at
large distances d scale like d 2D for a definite parameter D, which depends on their
mass. The minimum mass-squared that the stability of the system allows is given
by the Breitenlohner-Freedman value of  d2s/
 
4R2AdS
 
, where RAdS is the curvature
radius of the anti de Sitter space; see eq. (2.42) of Aharony, Gubser, Maldacena,
Ooguri, and Oz (2000). Due to eq. (3.14) of Aharony, Gubser, Maldacena, Ooguri,
and Oz (2000), this corresponds to D = ds/2.
In the economics situation of Section 1.4, the consumption part of the GDP prop-
agator behaves at long distances like d 2d, which means that d can be thought of as
the economics counterpart of D. Via this identification the physics relation D = ds/2
translates to the economics relation d = ds/2, which is precisely the threshold where
the qualitative behavior of the trade model changes.
Note that the explicit form of the propagator (3.42) of Aharony, Gubser, Malda-
cena, Ooguri, and Oz (2000) is the same as the consumption part (1.12) of the GDP
propagator when the trade costs are t˜ =
⇣
1+ (ad)2
⌘r/2
. The same propagator (3.42)
may be interpreted also from the point of view of the global anti de Sitter space,
instead of the Poincare´ coordinate patch perspective. When translated to the corre-
sponding global anti de Sitter coordinates, the propagator acquires the same func-
tional form as the consumption part (1.12) of the GDP propagator when the trade
costs are t˜ (d) =
 
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 (d/ (2R))
 r/2 .
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A.12 The impact of border costs in the large-space limit on the circle
This appendix derives the limit behavior (1.47) and (1.48) of the impact of border
costs in the case of trade costs given by t˜ (d) =
⇣
1+ 4a2R2 sin2 d2R
⌘ r
2 . The corre-
sponding expression for Gc,n is given in (1.44). Gc,n is independent of the sign of n,
and is a decreasing function of |n| . The quantity Z, used frequently in this appendix,
is defined as Z ⌘ 1/p1+ 4a2R2.
A.12.1 Nonnegativity of ( 1) n2 g˜c,n
Let us show that ( 1) n2 g˜c,n   0. The Fourier coefficients g˜c,n are given by (1.45).
All g˜c,n with odd n vanish. Also, g˜c,0   0 because g˜c (q) is nonnegative for any q. This
means that it is sufficient to show that
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 (A.25)
is nonpositive for even nonzero n. For this purpose, we can use the identity
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 =
1
2n
•
Â
m=0
✓
1
2m+ 1  n  
1
2m+ 1+ n
◆
=
1
2n
n
2 1
Â
m=  n2
1
2m+ 1
= 0
to rewrite the term of interest (A.25) as
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1   LGc,n
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
If 2m + 1 < n, both the numerator and the denominator are negative. If 2m + 1 >
n, they are both positive. This means that all contributions to the infinite sum are
positive. We conclude that ( 1) n2 g˜c,n   0.
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A.12.2 A lower bound on  y(P)1
 
p
2
 
Plugging the expressions (1.41) for y(P)1,n into the general formula for Fourier series
expansion (1.37) gives
 y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
=   1
y(P)0
•
Â
n= •
y(P)1,n e
in p2 =
s
s  1 g˜c,0 +
2s  1
s  1 Ân even nonzero
( 1) n2 g˜c,n
1+ (s  1) LGc,n .
(A.26)
We know from Subsection 1.5.4 that LGc,0 = 1/s and from Subsection A.12.1 that
( 1) n2 g˜c,n   0. Equation (A.26) combined with 0  LGc,n  1/s and ( 1) n2 g˜c,n  
0 implies
 y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
  s
s  1 Ân even
( 1) n2 g˜c,n.
Taking into account the symmetry between the countries, the fact that
R
Gc (q) dL (q)
= LGc,0 = 1/s, and the definition (1.24) of g˜c, we see that
Â
n even
( 1) n2 g˜c,n = 12s . (A.27)
This leads to the following lower bound on  y(P)1
 
p
2
 
:
 y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
  1
2
1
s  1. (A.28)
A.12.3 An upper bound on  y(P)1
 
p
2
 
Equation (A.26) may be used to derive also an upper bound on  y(P)1
 
p
2
 
. Using
LGc,n   0 and ( 1) n2 g˜c,n   0 leads to
 y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
  g˜c,0 + 2s  1s  1 Ân even
( 1) n2 g˜c,n.
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Omitting the first term on the right-hand side and simplifying the second term using
(A.27) gives
 y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
 2s  1
2s
1
s  1. (A.29)
A.12.4 A lower bound on   limR!• y(P)1 (0) for d < 12
This subsection contains the derivation of a lower bound on   limR!• y(P)1 (0) .
To simplify notation, the limit symbol limR!• will be omitted, but its presence is
implicitly understood.
The asymptotic form of Gc,n for d < 12
For arbitrary R, the expression (1.44) for Gc,n is
Gc,n =
1
sL
( 1)n
(1  d)n
Pnd 1
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘
Pd 1
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘ .
In the large R limit the expression simplifies to
Gc,n =
1
sL
(d)n
(1  d)n
. (A.30)
This asymptotic form can be verified using the definition of the Pochhammer symbol
(d)n ⌘
G (d+ n)
G (d)
= ( 1)n G (1  d)
G (1  d  n) ,
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and the equation 8.766(1) on p. 971 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007), which states
that for |z|  1,
Pµn (z) =
(
2nG
 
n+ 12
 
p
pG (n  µ+ 1) z
n +
G
  n  12 
2n+1
p
pG ( n  µ) z
 n 1
)✓
1+O
✓
1
z2
◆◆
.
The Fourier series expansion of y(P)1 (0)
Using the expressions (1.46) for y(P)1,n in the general formula for Fourier series
expansion (1.38) gives
 y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
=
1
2
1
s  1  
4
p2
s
s  1
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2
  4
p2
2s  1
s  1 Ân even nonzero
( 1) n2
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
This relation may be rewritten as
 y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
=  
 
1
2s
  4
p2
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2
LGc,2m+1
!
+
2s  1
s  1
 
1
2s
  4
p2
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2
LGc,2m+1
!
  4
p2
2s  1
s  1 Ân even nonzero
( 1) n2
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2
+
4
p2
2s  1
s  1 Ân even nonzero
( 1) n2 (s  1) LGc,n
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
The first term on the right-hand side is just  g˜c,0 due to (1.45). The terms on the
second and third line add up to 2s 1s 1 g˜ c (0) , as implied by the Fourier series expansion
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formula (1.37) with the Fourier coefficients (1.45):
g˜ c (0) =
1
2s
  4
p2 Ân even
( 1) n2
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 . (A.31)
The Fourier series expansion of y(P)1 (0) can now be written as
 y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
=  g˜c,0 + 2s  1s  1 g˜ c (0) (A.32)
+
4
p2
2s  1
s  1 Ân even
nonzero
( 1) n2 (s  1) LGc,n
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .(A.33)
The rest of this subsection analyzes the properties of the terms on the right-hand side
in the large-space limit. The analysis then leads to an asymptotic lower bound on
 y(P)1 (0) .
Evaluating limR!• g˜ c (0)
The expression (A.31) for g˜ c (0) with the asymptotic form (A.30) of Gc,n is
sg˜ c (0) =
1
2
  4
p2 Ân even
( 1) n2
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2   n2
(d)2m+1
(1  d)2m+1
.
The identity
•
Â
n even
4 ( 1) n2
p2
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2   n2
(d)2m+1
(1  d)2m+1
=
1
2
  2 G (1  d)p
pG
  1
2   d
  F✓1
2
, 1  d; 3
2
; 1
◆
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then leads to the following compact result for g˜ c (0):
sg˜ c (0) = 2
G (1  d)p
pG
  1
2   d
  F✓1
2
, 1  d; 3
2
; 1
◆
. (A.34)
An alternative way of evaluating of limR!• g˜ c (0)
An alternative way of deriving (A.34) is to work directly with the definition (1.24)
of g˜c (q), which implies
g˜c (0) = 2rL
Z p
p
2
Gc (q) dq.
Substituting the expression (1.42) for Gc (q) , we get
g˜c (0) =
1
s
R p
p
2
T (q) dqR p
0 T (q) dq
.
For the functional form (1.43) of T (q) this is
g˜c (0) =
1
s
R p
p
2
 
Z2 cos2 q2 + sin
2 q
2
  d dqR p
0
 
Z2 cos2 q2 + sin
2 q
2
  d dq .
The large-space limit R! • corresponds to Z ! 0+, and in this limit
g˜c (0) =
1
s
R p
p
2
sin 2d q2dqR p
0 sin
 2d q
2dq
=
1
s
R p
p
2
(1  cos q) d dqR p
0 (1  cos q) d dq
.
To find an explicit expression for the integrals, we can use the substitution t ⌘
1+cos q
2 , dq =   12 t 
1
2 (1  t)  12 dt,
g˜c (0) =
1
s
R 1
2
0 (1  t) d 
1
2 t  12 dtR 1
0 (1  t) d 
1
2 t  12 dt
=
1
s
B1
2
  1
2 ,
1
2   d
 
B1
  1
2 ,
1
2   d
  . (A.35)
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The second equality5 here follows from the definition of the incomplete beta func-
tion,6
Bx (p, q) =
Z x
0
tp 1 (1  t)q 1 dt.
This special function should not be confused with the primary impact function (1.19).
The result (A.35) for g˜c (0) matches the expression (A.34) derived by summing up the
infinite series.
Evaluating limR!• g˜c,0
Now let us look at g˜c,0. The expression for g˜c,0 in (1.45) with the asymptotic form
(A.30) of Gc,n becomes
sg˜ c,0 =
1
2
  4
p2
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2
(d)2m+1
(1  d)2m+1
.
The sum can be expressed in terms of the generalized hypergeometric function 5F4,
sg˜ c,0 =
1
2
+
4
p2
d
1  d 5F4
✓
1
2
,
1
2
, 1,
1
2
+
d
2
, 1+
d
2
;
3
2
,
3
2
, 1  d
2
,
3
2
  d
2
; 1
◆
.
Positivity of the last term
Consider now the last term in (A.32):
4
p2
2s  1
s  1 Ân even nonzero
( 1) n2 (s  1) LGc,n
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
5 Note that B1
⇣
1
2 ,
1
2   d
⌘
may be written in terms of the (complete) beta function as B
⇣
1
2 ,
1
2   d
⌘
or
in terms of the gamma function as
p
pG
⇣
1
2   d
⌘
/G (1  d) . B 1
2
⇣
1
2 ,
1
2   d
⌘
can be expressed in terms of
the Gauss hypergeometric function as
p
2F
⇣
1
2 ,
1
2 + d;
3
2 ;
1
2
⌘
or as 2F
⇣
1
2 , 1  d; 32 ; 1
⌘
.
6 See, for example, equation eq. 8.391 on p. 910 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007).
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With Gc,n given by (A.30), the inner sum can be evaluated explicitly. For n even and
nonzero,
•
Â
m=0
1
(2m+ 1)2   n2
(d)2m+1
(1  d)2m+1
=   d
2 (1  d)
1
n (n2   1)✓
(n  1) 4F3
✓
1,
1+ n
2
,
1+ d
2
,
1+ d
2
;
3+ n
2
, 1  d
2
,
3
2
  d
2
; 1
◆
+ (n+ 1) 4F3
✓
1,
1  n
2
,
1+ d
2
,
1+ d
2
;
3  n
2
, 1  d
2
,
3
2
  d
2
; 1
◆◆
.
Let us now restrict attention to |n| even and nonzero. The expression Â•m=0 LGc,2m+1(2m+1)2 n2
is negative, and its absolute value is a decreasing function of |n| . Note also that
(s 1)LGc,n
1+(s 1)LGc,n is a positive decreasing function of |n|. The factor ( 1)
n
2 is just an alter-
nating sign, which is negative for the lowest terms, i.e. for |n| = 2. These facts imply
that the last term in (A.32) is positive. Omitting this term in (A.32) leads to a lower
bound on  y(P)1 (0).
 y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
   g˜c,0 + 2s  1s  1 g˜ c (0) .
Noting that 2s 1s 1   2 and g˜ c (0)   0, this implies the weaker bound
 y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
  2g˜ c (0)  g˜c,0.
189
The resulting lower bound on limR!• y
(P)
1 (0)
Substituting the expressions for g˜c,0 and g˜ c (0) into the last inequality, we get
 sy
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
=
4G (1  d)p
pG
  1
2   d
  F✓1
2
, 1  d; 3
2
; 1
◆
 1
2
  4
p2
d
1  d 5F4
✓
1
2
,
1
2
, 1,
1
2
+
d
2
, 1+
d
2
;
3
2
,
3
2
, 1  d
2
,
3
2
  d
2
; 1
◆
.
The function on the right-hand side is concave, takes value of 12 at d = 0, and vanishes
at d = 12 . It is therefore never smaller than
1
2   d. This leads to the result
 y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
 
1
2   d
s
. (A.36)
A.12.5 An alternative derivation of the bounds (A.28) and (A.29) in the large-space limit
for d > 12
The large space limit of Gc,n for d > 12
Consider again the expression (1.44) for Gc,n :
Gc,n =
1
sL
( 1)n
(1  d)n
Pnd 1
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘
Pd 1
⇣
1+Z2
2Z
⌘ ,
with the goal of understanding the R ! • (i.e. Z ! 0+) limit when d > 12 . The
definition7 of Pµn (z) is
Pµn (z) =
✓
z+ 1
z  1
◆ µ
2
2F˜1
✓
 n, n+ 1; 1  µ; 1  z
2
◆
,
7 See http://functions.wolfram.com/07.09.02.0001.01
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where 2F˜1 is the regularized hypergeometric function. In order to apply this relation
directly to the expression for Gc,n, we need to choose
z =
1+ Z2
2Z
,
1  z
2
=   (1  Z)
2
4Z
,
z+ 1
z  1 =
✓
1+ Z
1  Z
◆2
.
The Fourier coefficients Gc,n become
Gc,n =
1
sL
( 1)n
(1  d)n
✓
1+ Z
1  Z
◆n 2F˜1 ⇣1  d, d; 1  n;  (1 Z)24Z ⌘
2F˜1
⇣
1  d, d; 1;  (1 Z)24Z
⌘ .
Since Gc,n = Gc, n, we know that the expression on the right-hand side does not
depend on the sign of n. It is therefore sufficient to focus on non-positive n. In this
case one can use the ordinary hypergeometric function 2F1 instead of the regularized
one. These functions are related8 by 2F˜1 (a, b, c, x) ⌘ 2F1 (a, b, c, x) /G (c) , where G (x)
is the gamma function.
Gc,n =
1
sL
( 1)n
(1  d)n
✓
1+ Z
1  Z
◆n 1
G (1  n)
2F1
⇣
1  d, d; 1  n;  (1 Z)24Z
⌘
2F1
⇣
1  d, d; 1;  (1 Z)24Z
⌘ .
For convenience, define the rescaled Fourier mode number9 w as
w ⌘  Zn.
8 See http://functions.wolfram.com/07.24.26.0003.01
9 Not to be confused with the notation for different varieties of goods.
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In terms of w, the Fourier coefficients of Gc are
Gc,wZ =
1
sL
✓
1+ Z
1  Z
◆  wZ ⇥ ( 1) wZ
(1  d)  wZ
Zd 1
G
 
1+ wZ
  ⇥ 2F1
⇣
1  d, d; 1+ wZ ;  (1 Z)
2
4Z
⌘
Zd 1 2F1
⇣
1  d, d; 1;  (1 Z)24Z
⌘ .
(A.37)
The right-hand side has been split into three factors. Let us look at the Z ! 0+ limit
(holding w fixed) of each of them separately.
The first factor in (A.37) has a very simple limit. The definition of the exponential
function implies
lim
Z!0
1
sL
✓
1+ Z
1  Z
◆  wZ
=
1
sL
e 2w.
To evaluate the limit of the second factor in (A.37), recall the definition of the
Pochhammer symbol
(1  d)  wZ ⌘
G
 
1  d  wZ
 
G (1  d) .
With the help of the gamma function identity10 G (1  x) G (x) sinpx = p, this is
(1  d)  wZ =
1
G (1  d)
1
G
 
d+ wZ
  p
sinp
 
d+ wZ
  = ( 1)  wZ 1
G (1  d)
1
G
 
d+ wZ
  p
sinpd
,
where the second equality follows from the periodicity properties of the sine function
with wZ 2 Z. The desired limit is
lim
Z!0+
( 1)  wZ
(1  d)  wZ
Zd 1
G
 
1+ wZ
  = G (1  d) sinpd
p
lim
Z!0+
Zd 1G
 
d+ wZ
 
G
 
1+ wZ
  = G (1  d) sinpd
p
wd 1.
The second equality may be verified using Stirling’s formula.
To find the limit of the third factor in (A.37), we need two identities. The first
10 See, for example, equation 8.334(3) on p. 896 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007).
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one11 reads
lim
c!• 2F1
⇣
a, a  b+ 1; c; 1  c
z
⌘
= zaU (a, b, z) .
The correct version of the second one12 is
U (a, 2a, z) =
1p
p
z
1
2 ae
z
2Ka  12
⇣ z
2
⌘
.
The function U is the confluent hypergeometric function of the second kind, and K is
the modified Bessel function of the second kind. Combining the two identities, and
using Kn (x) = K v (x) yields
lim
c!• 2F1
⇣
a, 1  a; c; 1  c
z
⌘
=
1p
p
z
1
2 e
z
2K 1
2 a
⇣ z
2
⌘
.
The choice
a = 1  d, c = 1+ w
Z
, z = 4w
in this formula leads to
lim
Z!0+ 2
F1
 
1  d, d; 1+ w
Z
;  (1  Z)
2
4Z
!
= lim
Z!0+ 2
F1
✓
1  d, d; 1+ w
Z
;
4w  1
4w
  1
4Z
◆
=
2p
p
e2ww
1
2Kd  12 (2w) .
For the denominator of the third factor in (A.37), asymptotic properties of hypergeo-
11 Available at http://functions.wolfram.com/07.33.09.0001.01
12 Available at http://functions.wolfram.com/07.33.03.0007.01
Note that the graphical version of the formula is wrong on the website (as of April 2012), but its
Mathematica version is correct.
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metric functions imply
lim
Z!0+
Zd 1 2F1
 
1  d, d; 1;  (1  Z)
2
4Z
!
= 41 d G (2d  1)
G2 (d)
.
We have
lim
Z!0+
2F1
⇣
1  d, d; 1+ wZ ;  (1 Z)
2
4Z
⌘
Zd 1 2F1
⇣
1  d, d; 1;  (1 Z)24Z
⌘ = 2pp e2ww 12Kd  12 (2w)
41 d G(2d 1)G2(d)
Applying these three results to (A.37) gives
Gc,wZ =
1
sL
22d 1G (d)p
pG (2d  1)G (1  d) G (d)
sinpd
p
wd 
1
2Kd  12 (2w) .
Using the gamma function identities13
G (1  d) G (d) sinpd
p
= 1
and
22d 1G (d)p
pG (2d  1) =
2
G
 
d  12
  ,
the Fourier coefficients simplify to
Gc,wZ =
1
sL
2
G
 
d  12
 wd  12Kd  12 (2w) .
We conclude that for arbitrary w, in the large-space limit the Fourier coefficients
become
Gc,wZ =
1
sL
2
G
 
d  12
  |w|d  12 Kd  12 (2 |w|) . (A.38)
Notice that the properties of the modified Bessel function of the second kind
13 See, for example, equations 8.334(3) and 8.335(1) on p. 896 of Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007).
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imply that the expression on the right-hand side approaches 1/ (sL) when w ! 0, as
expected from the general relation sLGc,0 = 1.
The limit of y(P)
 
p
2
 
for d > 12
The general formula for Fourier series expansion (1.38) together with the expres-
sions (1.46) for y(P)1,n implies
  (s  1) y
(P)
1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
=
1
2
  4
p2
•
Â
m=0
sLGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2
  Â
n even nonzero
2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
4
p2
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
The R! • limit, or equivalently the Z ! 0+ limit, of the first line on the right-hand
side vanishes.14 We have
  (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
=   lim
R!• Ân even nonzero
2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
4
p2
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
In the Z ! 0+ limit the sums can be faithfully approximated by integrals. Symboli-
cally,
•
Â
m=0
f (2m+ 1)! 1
4Z
Z
f
 
w0
 
dw0, for an even function f ,
Â
n even nonzero
! 1
2Z
Z
dw.
14 As Z ! 0+, the coefficients Gc,2m+1 approach 1/ (sL), and the convergence is uniform in the
appropriate sense. Also, Â•m=0 (2m+ 1)
 2 = p2/8.
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More precisely, the integral over w0 should be taken in the sense of the Cauchy prin-
cipal value (denoted p.v.). This gives
  (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
=   1
2p2
lim
R!•
Z 2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,wZ
p.v.
Z LGc,w0Z
w02  w2 dw
0dw.
Using the algebraic relation
1
w02  w2 =  
1
2w
1
w w0  
1
2w
1
w+w0
and the explicit expression (A.38) for Gc,w0Z
, we obtain
  (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
=
1
sL
1
p2G
 
d  12
 
⇥
Z 2s  1
1+ s 1s
2
G(d  12 )
|w|d  12 Kd  12 (2 |w|)
1
w
p.v.
Z |w0|d  12 Kd  12 (2 |w0|)
w w0 dw
0dw.
The integral over w0 can be evaluated explicitly,
p.v.
R 1
w w0 |w0|d 
1
2 Kd  12 (2 |w
0|) dw0
= 14p
w
|w| |w|d 
1
2 G4,24,2
0B@w2
       
1
4 (1  2d) , 14 (3  2d)
1
4 (1  2d) , 14 (1  2d) , 14 (3  2d) ,  14 (1  2d)
1CA
+pw|w|
d  32
2 G
4,2
6,4
0B@w2
       
1
4 (1  2d) , 14 (3  2d) , 12 (1  d) ,  12d
1
4 (1  2d) , 14 (1  2d) , 14 (3  2d) ,  14 (1  2d) , 12 (1  d) ,  12d
1CA ,
where Gm,np,q is the Meijer G-function. The outer integral over w most likely does not
lead to a closed form expression, but it can easily be evaluated numerically.
Since 1wp.v.
R |w0|d  12 Kd  12 (2|w0|)
w w0 dw
0 is positive, and 2
G(d  12 )
|w|d  12 Kd  12 (2 |w|) 2 (0, 1),
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one can immediately write the following bound on y(P)1
 
p
2
 
in the large-space limit.
1
sL
1
p2G
 
d  12
 s Z 1
w
p.v.
Z |w0|d  12 Kd  12 (2 |w0|)
w w0 dw
0dw 
  (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
 1
sL
1
p2G
 
d  12
  (2s  1) Z 1
w
p.v.
Z |w0|d  12 Kd  12 (2 |w0|)
w w0 dw
0dw.
These integrals can be evaluated using the formula,15
Z •
 •
1
w
p.v.
Z •
 •
f (w0)
w w0 dw
0dw = p2 f (0) ,
which leads to
1
2
   (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1
 
p
2
 
y(P)0
 2s  1
2s
.
This is, of course, consistent with the bounds (A.28) and (A.29) derived previously in
a more general context.
A.12.6 Evaluating limR!• y(P) (0) for d > 12
The logic used above to evaluate the large-space limit of y(P)1
 
p
2
 
will be useful
for finding the same limit of y(P)1 (0) . The Fourier series expansion of y
(P)
1 (0) is
  (s  1) y
(P)
1 (0)
y(P)0
=
1
2
  Â
n even
2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
4
p2
•
Â
m=0
( 1) n2 LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
15 See, for example, equation (8.4.15) of Kanwal (1997).
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Again, in the R! • limit, the n = 0 term in the sum cancels against the 1/2.
  (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)0
=   lim
R!• Ân even nonzero
2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
4
p2
•
Â
m=0
( 1) n2 LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
Splitting the sum into positive and negative contributions,
  (s  1) lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)0
= lim
R!• Ân even nonzero
n/2 odd
2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
4
p2
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2
  lim
R!•
•
Â
n even nonzero
n/2 even
2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,n
4
p2
•
Â
m=0
LGc,2m+1
(2m+ 1)2   n2 .
The first sum on the right-hand side becomes
1
2
1
2p2
lim
R!•
Z 2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,wZ
p.v.
Z LGc,w0Z
w02  w2 dw
0dw,
while the second sum is
 1
2
1
2p2
lim
R!•
Z 2s  1
1+ (s  1) LGc,wZ
p.v.
Z LGc,w0Z
w02  w2 dw
0dw.
These two, of course, cancel, leading to the conclusion that
lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)0
= 0. (A.39)
A.12.7 Conclusion
For d < 12 , the inequalities (A.36) and (A.29) together imply
lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)1
 
p
2
    s  12s  1 (1  2d) .
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This is the result presented in (1.47). For d > 12 , (A.39) and (A.28) give
lim
R!•
y(P)1 (0)
y(P)1
 
p
2
  = 0.
This is the result (1.48).
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A.13 Mathematical notation
G (x) Gamma function
B(x, y) ⌘ G(x)G(y)G(x+y) Beta function
Bx (p, q) Incomplete beta function
(a)n ⌘ G (a+ n) /G (a) Pochhammer symbol
pFq
 
a1, ..., ap; b1, ..., bq; x
 
Generalized hypergeometric function
F (a, b;g; x) ⌘ 2F1 (a, b;g; z) Gauss hypergeometric function
2F˜1 (a, b;g; x) ⌘ 2F1(a,b;g;x)G(g) Regularized hypergeometric function
U (a, b, z) Confluent hypergeometric function
of the second kind
Pn (x) Legendre function; Legendre polynomial
Pµn (x) Associated Legendre function of the first kind,
LegendreP[n, µ, 3, x] in Mathematica notation
Yml (q, j) Spherical harmonic function
Kn (x) Modified Bessel function of the second kind
Gm,np,q
0B@x
       
a1, ...ap
b1, ..., bq
1CA Meijer G-function0B@ j1 j2 j3
m1 m2 m3
1CA Wigner 3j-symbol
p.v.
R
Cauchy principal value integral
dnm Kronecker delta; 1 if n = m, 0 otherwise
fn Fourier coefficient of function f (q)
f ml Spherical harmonic coefficient of function f (q, j)
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Our results in Subsection 2.3.2 assume constant returns to scale, but many of
the general intuitions derived there extend to, or are even strengthened with, non-
linear costs. First, consider the relationship between pass-through and quantity pass-
through. Now, analogously to our analysis in that section, equilibrium is given by
l =  
Q0
⇣
P MC
⇣
Q Q˜
n
⌘
  t
⌘
Q  Q˜ .
However, now the impact of an increase in Q˜ directly on the right-hand side is
 
Q0MC0
n
 
Q  Q˜ +Q0 ⇣P MC ⇣Q Q˜n ⌘  t⌘ 
Q  Q˜ 2 =
✓
l   Q
0MC0
n
◆
1
Q0
Q0
Q  Q˜ .
Recall from above that  Q0MC0n = eDeS . So, by the same logic as in the main text,
rq =
✓
l +
eD
eS
◆
r. (B.1)
Thus when there are declining returns to scale, rq > r and when they slope
downward rq < r. Declining returns to scale reduce pass-through and increasing
returns increase it, so we can say that returns to scale have a larger impact on pass-
through than on quantity pass-through, driving a wedge between them even in the
monopoly case of l = 1.
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rq is always below unity if purely demand driven quantity pass-through (that
which would prevail with constant returns), rˆ ⌘ l1 lµ0 is less than 1. To see this note
that
rq   1 =
l + eDeS
1+ eDeS   lµ0
  1 µ l   1+ lµ0 = l   1+ lµ0,
while
rˆ  1 = l   1+ lµ
0
1  lµ0 µ l   1+ lµ
0.
Thus the sign of rq   1 (the strategic effect, substitutes v. complements) is deter-
mined by the demand side formula. Notice that decreasing returns to scale move rq
towards unity (compared to the constant returns case) by increasing both the numer-
ator and denominator while increasing returns have the opposite effect.
Finally, consider the incidence calculations. For these, it is crucial to specify the
costs at which the exogenous units are produced. For this purpose, consider an
alternative experiment. Rather than introducing exogenous competition, imagine the
state mandating that the firms each produce their first
q
n units at marginal cost. Then
equilibrium is again, as in the text given by
l =
Q0
h
P MC
⇣
Q
n
⌘
  t
i
Q  Q˜
and thus dQdq = lr.
Profits are now P(Q)
⇣
Q  q
⌘
  nC
⇣
Q
n
⌘
+ n
R q
n
q=0 MC (q) dq, so the fall in profits
from an increase in q is
P0lr
⇣
Q  q
⌘
+ P (lr  1) MC
✓
Q
n
◆
lr+ MC
✓ q
n
◆
=  M [1+ r (1  l)  a] .
where a ⌘ MC(
Q
n ) MC(
q
n )
M . The argument for calculating deadweight loss incidence
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proceeds exactly as before, so we obtain relative efficiency gains compared to profit
losses of
lr
1+ r(1  l)  a .
These can be converted, just as in the text, to global incidence formulas. Notice
that with decreasing returns, a < 0 and thus deadweight loss is larger relative to
profit than given by the formula in the text; when returns are increasing a > 0 and
thus deadweight loss is larger relative to profits than the formula given in the text
indicates. Intuitively, the divergence is that while in the text changes in cost only
affected profits, here increasing costs also affect the size of the Harberger triangle
directly. Thus increasing cost has a greater impact on the DWLPS ratio than on the
CS
PS
ratio. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
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C. APPENDIX CHAPTER 3
In this appendix, we prove part (ii) of Lemma 2, namely p0 (Dt 1;Wt, xt)  0 and
f 0 (Dt 1;Wt, xt)   0. We first show that the second derivative of the value function
cannot be negative. The firm’s Bellman equation is
V(Dt 1;Wt, xt) = max
Pt
{(Pt  Wt) (d (Pt; xt)  (1  d)Dt 1)
+ bEV(d (Pt; xt) ;Wt+1, xt+1)}.
Denote the value of Pt that the firm actually chooses when the state variable is Dt 1
by P(0)t . Now consider a small change to the initial stock of durables:
V(Dt 1 + #;Wt, xt) = max
Pt
{(Pt  Wt) (d (Pt; xt)  (1  d)Dt 1   (1  d) #)
+bEV(d (Pt; xt) ;Wt+1, xt+1)} .
If the firm selects a wrong price, its value cannot increase:
V(Dt 1 + #;Wt, xt)  
n⇣
P(0)t  Wt
⌘ ⇣
d
⇣
P(0)t ; xt
⌘
  (1  d)Dt 1   (1  d) #
⌘
+bEV(d
⇣
P(0)t ; xt
⌘
;Wt+1, xt+1)
o
,
V(Dt 1 + #;Wt, xt)    
⇣
P(0)t  Wt
⌘
(1  d) #+V(Dt 1;Wt, xt).
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By replacing # !  # we obtain another inequality of this type. Adding the two
inequalities gives
1
2
V(Dt 1 + #;Wt, xt) V(Dt 1;Wt, xt) + 12V(Dt 1   #;Wt, xt)   0.
Taking the limit #! 0 we get V 00(Dt 1;Wt, xt)   0.
The envelope theorem V 0(Dt 1;Wt, xt) =   (1  d) (p (Dt 1;Wt, xt) Wt) implies
V 00(Dt 1;Wt, xt) =   (1  d) p0 (Dt 1;Wt, xt) ,
which means that p0 (Dt 1;Wt, xt)  0. Given this result, and the assumption of con-
cave utility function, (3.7) implies d0 (Pt;Wt, xt)  0. Differentiating the definition of
the function f gives
f 0 (Dt 1;Wt, xt) = d0(p(Dt 1;Wt, xt);Wt, xt)p0(Dt 1;Wt, xt);Wt, xt )˙.
We conclude that f 0 (Dt 1;Wt, xt)   0.
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